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This	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada.	 ﾠ More	 ﾠ specifically,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ examines	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠimpeded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ equitable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠ terms.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ develops	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ applies	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ
centred	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠand	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠher	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“abnormal	 ﾠjustice”.	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠreflections	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccompanying	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ certainty	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ justice’s	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ meaning	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ provide,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ
suggest,	 ﾠ first,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠpervade	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspheres	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠby	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠpasts	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresents,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ outline	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ sensitive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
productive	 ﾠ ways.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ Part	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thesis	 ﾠ introduces	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ elaborates	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
‘diagnostic’	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠtheorising,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠpossessed	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
frequently	 ﾠ obscured	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ ‘normal’)	 ﾠ bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
societies.	 ﾠPart	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘reconstructive’	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ inform	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ progressive	 ﾠ response	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ meeting	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive-ﾭ‐democratic	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
begin	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠThough,	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
hold,	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠremove,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠ
reduce,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠopen	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠ spaces	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ participate	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ equitably	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ naming	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
injustices	 ﾠand	 ﾠauthoring	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠovercoming	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠdismantling	 ﾠobstacles	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
equitable	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ participation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ This,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ contend,	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ
represent	 ﾠan	 ﾠessential	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvincingly	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpast	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ
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1 
Introduction	 ﾠ
1.1	 ﾠBackground	 ﾠand	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ concern	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ era.	 ﾠ Arguably,	 ﾠ nowhere	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ vividly	 ﾠ
apparent	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠliberal-ﾭ‐democratic	 ﾠand	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐termed	 ﾠ‘Settler’	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada.	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ heart	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ wealthy,	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ developed,	 ﾠ
democratically	 ﾠ proud,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ostensibly	 ﾠ justice-ﾭ‐seeking	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ lies	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ “original	 ﾠ sin”	 ﾠ
(Poole	 ﾠ 2000;	 ﾠ Short	 ﾠ 2012;	 ﾠ Smith	 ﾠ 2012):	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ history	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ coercion,	 ﾠ violence,	 ﾠ exclusion,	 ﾠ
exploitation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheft	 ﾠenacted	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠlands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠintegral	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠalso	 ﾠremains	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠand	 ﾠactive	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ sphere.	 ﾠ Today,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ
forcefully	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ enduring	 ﾠ legacies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
colonialism,	 ﾠ state-ﾭ‐building,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ governance,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠenacted	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present.	 ﾠ Conspiring	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ suppress	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ leaving	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠphysical,	 ﾠpsychological,	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
spiritual	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmix	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠand	 ﾠstill-ﾭ‐unfolding	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠraise	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunicate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtake	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠand	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠ–	 ﾠremain	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠand	 ﾠproblematically	 ﾠconstricted	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠarise.	 ﾠConstructed	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
histories,	 ﾠphilosophies,	 ﾠworldviews,	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐understandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠpopulation,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠseem	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠembody	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠhostility	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠmanifests	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ further,	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ developing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthis	 ﾠend,	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
introduce,	 ﾠ develop,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ apply	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠand	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“abnormal	 ﾠjustice”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(2008;	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠin	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpath	 ﾠ
laid	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ reflections	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deeply	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠera	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccompanying	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠassurance	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
justice’s	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ meaning	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ stand	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ gain	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ pervade	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ spheres	 ﾠ shaped	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠpasts	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠposition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ deal	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ sensitive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ manner	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ far-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠ
senses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ deny	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠexposing	 ﾠand	 ﾠnaming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠin	 ﾠauthoring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠand	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠdirected.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheorise	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠdemocratisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠachieved,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠassist	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ progressing	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
colonialism.	 ﾠ
v	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ course	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ thesis	 ﾠ understands	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠto	 ﾠembody	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctly	 ﾠactive	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠ domination.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ requires	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ clarification	 ﾠ since,	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ doubt,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof)	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsocieties,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠ
marks	 ﾠan	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠactively	 ﾠimplicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠresistance.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠview,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠtell	 ﾠus	 ﾠanything	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠsocieties,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpredominantly	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
liberation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠvestiges	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
(British)	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ twentieth	 ﾠ century,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ emergence	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ states,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ witnessed	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ transition	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐coloniality.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlight,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠ
nevertheless	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ seeming,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠoffensive,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠabsurd.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠour	 ﾠperception	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠupon	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be,	 ﾠexactly.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalibrated	 ﾠnot	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ (but	 ﾠ contesting)	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ authority,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ arrive	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
picture.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠangle,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠto	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐coloniality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
experienced	 ﾠby	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshared	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsubjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠthat	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠcharacterised	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠunder	 ﾠassertions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠother)	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccupation,	 ﾠappropriation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
exploitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomelands	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcame	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit,	 ﾠremains	 ﾠfirmly	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠplace	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠby	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples,	 ﾠ although	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ identities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ agents	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
colonialism	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠchanged,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmight	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠaims	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeans,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ remained	 ﾠ constant	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ transition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
sovereign	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
continued	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ suppresses	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠfreedom.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdirection,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠmight	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠdescriptor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ring	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠabsurd	 ﾠtone.	 ﾠ
Undoubtedly,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
sense,	 ﾠremained	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
transition	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ independence,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ precise	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ relation	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
nevertheless	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ fundamentally	 ﾠ different.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ best	 ﾠ captured	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJames	 ﾠTully	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠforms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake.	 ﾠ
Tully	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠand	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠguises,	 ﾠ
generally	 ﾠ involved	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ exertion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ benefit	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexists	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠbase	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrevolved	 ﾠaround	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
‘external’	 ﾠ relation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ no	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠexists	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ states.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠexerting	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthem	 ﾠexist	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠand	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠ
depend	 ﾠupon	 ﾠit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠform	 ﾠand	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐identity.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
give	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarkedly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroot	 ﾠdriving	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ
behind	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcomposed	 ﾠof	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠof	 ﾠexploiting	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠlabour,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠremoving	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterrupting	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
government	 ﾠ (although	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ certainly	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Canada,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevastating	 ﾠeffect).	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠas	 ﾠTully	 ﾠexplains,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessential	 ﾠground	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠhere:	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ appropriation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ land,	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ jurisdiction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsake	 ﾠof	 ﾠresettlement	 ﾠand	 ﾠexploitation	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠ colonialism),	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ territorial	 ﾠ foundation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ
itself.	 ﾠ
(2000,	 ﾠp.39)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ ‘internal’	 ﾠ relationship	 ﾠ revolves	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠto	 ﾠsecure,	 ﾠonce	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠand	 ﾠownership	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterritory,	 ﾠa	 ﾠneed	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠ
countered	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ resistance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ avert	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ
legitimising	 ﾠ moment	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ regain	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ freedom.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ situation	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
complicated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ territory	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ
society	 ﾠcould	 ﾠwithdraw	 ﾠto	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ colonised	 ﾠ people(s)	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ gain	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ ‘simply’	 ﾠ securing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ removal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠis	 ﾠrendered	 ﾠremote,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠeliminated	 ﾠentirely.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ relation	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ pronounced	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ entanglement	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
contradiction	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ heart.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ characterised	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ palpable	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ seemingly	 ﾠ
insurmountable)	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassertions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠlands	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠnot	 ﾠidentical)	 ﾠ
rights	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ resolving	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relation	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ moving	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ final	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ morally	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ legally	 ﾠ
coherent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠlegitimising	 ﾠmoment,	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠis	 ﾠsecured	 ﾠabsolutely.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠresolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠby	 ﾠrecapturing	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
collective	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠlands	 ﾠand	 ﾠwaters,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠunachievable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshadow	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠclaims.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠstand,	 ﾠas	 ﾠTully	 ﾠ(2000,	 ﾠp.40)	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“irresolution”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
situation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠside.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ understand	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠby	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
relationships.	 ﾠ Throughout	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thesis,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ employ	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ phrase	 ﾠ ‘internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ context’	 ﾠ
consistently	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠreference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intention	 ﾠof	 ﾠreinforcing	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprofoundly	 ﾠactive	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠimmanent	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsocieties,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠare	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠat	 ﾠlength	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠchapters.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ apply	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ said,	 ﾠ centred	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠand	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠher	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠ(2008;	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠhas	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠ
observation	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
characterised	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ expect,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠand	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠ
disagreements	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠshape,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠShe	 ﾠ
finds	 ﾠ that,	 ﾠ today,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ engaging	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
sphere	 ﾠ possess	 ﾠ (sometimes	 ﾠ very)	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presuppositions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ “what”	 ﾠ
substance	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
“who”	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠproper	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠissue	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠof	 ﾠproper	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠlie,	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ“how”	 ﾠany	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
disagreement	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠare	 ﾠawash	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠspill	 ﾠover	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
conventional	 ﾠor	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠ‘first-ﾭ‐order’	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘meta-ﾭ‐
order’	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ implicated	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ source	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ injury	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
exclusion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbreakdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠassurance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ think	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ With	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
realisation	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ single	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ capable	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ adequately	 ﾠ
accommodating	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ meanings	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ shapes	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
differently	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠan	 ﾠuncontroversial	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcould	 ﾠserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrepresents,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
defining	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘abnormal	 ﾠ
justice’	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ meaningful	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ guidance	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ overcoming	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem	 ﾠpossess.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptualising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontend,	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠposition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠNot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠclarify,	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdisagreements	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠarise	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠand	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ progressive	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ theory	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
practice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Specifically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠus	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠchapters,	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠrealising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠachievement	 ﾠof,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠdemocratisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠ
terrain	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠby	 ﾠsubjecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠisolated	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterminable	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠproject	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
deal	 ﾠsensitively	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐standard	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠencounter.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmove	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ abnormalities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ arises	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
translate	 ﾠinto	 ﾠimpotence	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm,	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ
world.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠ
responsibilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠresponsiveness	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠpertain	 ﾠequally	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrefuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠequate	 ﾠto	 ﾠregression	 ﾠor	 ﾠstalling	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠpath	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠ begins	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ lay	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ aims,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
‘metadisputes’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunduly	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠdecisively	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
spite	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠ
offers	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠexclusions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠpervade	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ Canada,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ tend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ leave	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ constant	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ injurious	 ﾠ
disadvantage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ Though	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ argue,	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ
assured	 ﾠ resolution	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ discontents	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ injuries	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ felt	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠor	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
vision	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfully	 ﾠ‘just’	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠordering	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
colonialism	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ evaporated	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ cause	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ disputation	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
nevertheless	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠand	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
discursive	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ construction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ understandings	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠvital	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠonce	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠ begun	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ imbalances	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ exclusions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ
constitute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠsocieties,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠon	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠterms	 ﾠin	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
understandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠ
progress	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠhighlighting	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdenied	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsettings,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
finding	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdisparity,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdirected.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ argue	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ theoretical	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠus	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand,	 ﾠparticularly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintense	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
reflexivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterises	 ﾠher	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcan	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
extend	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠresponsiveness	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠarray	 ﾠof	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconspire	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
give	 ﾠit	 ﾠshape	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ(what	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠas)	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠstands	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
experienced	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
aspirations	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ prominence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsummary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠus,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠbegins	 ﾠto	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ it,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ sustained	 ﾠ conversation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbest	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠknowledge)	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠanywhere	 ﾠelse,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠand	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
dispute	 ﾠ centring	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ moreover,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
develop	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠsuccess;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠenables	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠpush	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠherself	 ﾠhas	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ literature	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ areas:	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
disputation	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠassociated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1.2	 ﾠJustification	 ﾠof	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof,	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠof	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠcases	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
vocal	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠraising	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠand	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ realm.	 ﾠ Indeed,	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ whole	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Latin	 ﾠ America	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
understood	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠqualify	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcould,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠAnglophone	 ﾠ
Settler	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠNew	 ﾠZealand	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUSA.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepth	 ﾠof	 ﾠinquiry	 ﾠintended	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠentirety,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunachievable	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠconstraints,	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠ
true	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconceivably	 ﾠany	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
interesting	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠrests	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpragmatic	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
partly	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interesting	 ﾠ blend	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ similarities	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ dissimilarities	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠdisplay.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Firstly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠmake	 ﾠan	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠcouplet	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠboth	 ﾠstand	 ﾠas	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠdeveloped,	 ﾠwealthy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
proudly	 ﾠliberal-ﾭ‐democratic	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(mainly)	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠcolonialism,	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠin	 ﾠearnest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate-ﾭ‐C18th	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly-ﾭ‐
C19th	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠto	 ﾠfree	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠas	 ﾠfully	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠ
nations,	 ﾠ similarly	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ principles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ federalism	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ constitutionalism.	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠimportantly,	 ﾠretained	 ﾠa	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
tradition,	 ﾠ meaning	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ precedents	 ﾠ laid	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠ exert	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other.	 ﾠ Both	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlong	 ﾠand	 ﾠfraught	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠborders,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠgeared	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
resolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘Indigenous	 ﾠproblem’	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠand	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Alongside	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ similarities,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ progressed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ context.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
explored	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠin	 ﾠChapters	 ﾠ3	 ﾠand	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠsuffices	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠostensibly	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ state-ﾭ‐building	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ occurred,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ context,	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ
today,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠdifferent.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
character	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠface	 ﾠin	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠ
disparity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ powers	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ possess	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
discursive	 ﾠ sphere,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ exclusion	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ authorship	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠblend	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠand	 ﾠdissimilarities	 ﾠserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠaptly	 ﾠ
demonstrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
detailed	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠeach	 ﾠhold,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ pervade	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ each.	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcases	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontend,	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠversatility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠand	 ﾠapply,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
capability	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneralisable	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
adapting	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ
honouring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠdemocratising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfield	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ reasons,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ studies	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ
influenced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ reasons	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ pragmatic	 ﾠ nature.	 ﾠ During	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ course	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ conducting	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
research	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠI	 ﾠwas	 ﾠlucky	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠ
study	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠat	 ﾠuniversities	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ–	 ﾠspending	 ﾠfour	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠVictoria,	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠand	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠand	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ University	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Sydney,	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ February	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ May	 ﾠ 2013.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠcame	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠlinks	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmy	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠsupervisor	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠSouthampton,	 ﾠProfessor	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠOwen,	 ﾠand	 ﾠleading	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠresident	 ﾠat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
offer	 ﾠ me	 ﾠ temporary	 ﾠ supervision	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ respectively,	 ﾠ Professor	 ﾠ James	 ﾠ Tully	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Professor	 ﾠ
Duncan	 ﾠIvison.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠspent	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠhelped	 ﾠto	 ﾠprofoundly	 ﾠshape	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconcerned,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequipped	 ﾠ
me	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intricacies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ
colonialism	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ achieved	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ
consultation	 ﾠ with,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ learning	 ﾠ from,	 ﾠ my	 ﾠ supervisors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ location,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
participating	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwider	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠthere	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠdiscussing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠare	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠstudying	 ﾠor	 ﾠteaching	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ university	 ﾠ level,	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ whom	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ working	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ
politically	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠorganisations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠand	 ﾠlived	 ﾠ
experiences.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthese	 ﾠvisits	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhad	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ my	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
decision	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠin	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠcases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠan	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠand	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmake.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1.3	 ﾠTerminological	 ﾠissues	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠsome	 ﾠterminological	 ﾠconventions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠqualified	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠoutset.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠis,	 ﾠundoubtedly,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠ employ	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ consistently	 ﾠ throughout	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ course	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thesis	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ reference	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
individuals,	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand,	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠcultures,	 ﾠ
philosophies,	 ﾠlanguages,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ that	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare,	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
continuing	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠrose	 ﾠto	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprominence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠas	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ similarly	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ domination,	 ﾠ
dispossession,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠcoordinate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ borders	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ level,	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Nations.	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐claimed	 ﾠcollectivising	 ﾠterm	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠ
partly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠaptly	 ﾠcommunicating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠaligning	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠinferring	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠand	 ﾠprior	 ﾠlink	 ﾠto	 ﾠlands	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠinstitutions),	 ﾠand	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠ signalled	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ departure	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nomenclature	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ powers	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠoppressively	 ﾠcollectivise	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ past.	 ﾠ Yet,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ definition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ criteria	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ determine	 ﾠ
assuredly	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠit	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproven	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠand	 ﾠelusive	 ﾠ
thing.	 ﾠUndoubtedly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠextent	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverwhelming	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠas	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠrecognises	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ excess	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 370	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ worldwide	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Indigenous,	 ﾠ living	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ 90	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ (United	 ﾠ Nations	 ﾠ 2009).	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ huge	 ﾠ amount	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ historical,	 ﾠ cultural,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
diversity	 ﾠexists	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠpopulation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ Finding	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ definition	 ﾠ
expansive	 ﾠand	 ﾠadaptable	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠstill	 ﾠcarrying	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠ
substantive	 ﾠ meaning	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ proven	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
counterproductive	 ﾠendeavour.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠreluctance	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ participating	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ working	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ forums	 ﾠ purely	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
technicality.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐identification	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preferred	 ﾠ route	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
cases.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ working	 ﾠ definition	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ beneficial	 ﾠ
accompaniment	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐definition,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutline	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Ecuadorian	 ﾠdiplomat	 ﾠJose	 ﾠMartinez	 ﾠCobo	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
1970s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1980s	 ﾠstill	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠweight.	 ﾠCobo	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠhis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠ
thus:	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠnations	 ﾠare	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠ
continuity	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐invasion	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
territories,	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ distinct	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ sectors	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ
prevailing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠterritories,	 ﾠor	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠform	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐dominant	 ﾠ
sectors	 ﾠof	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreserve,	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠto	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ
generations	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠancestral	 ﾠterritories,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠethnic	 ﾠidentity,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
continued	 ﾠ existence	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ peoples,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ patterns,	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠ
(Quoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠNations	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠp.4)	 ﾠ12	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As	 ﾠ Coates	 ﾠ (2004)	 ﾠ cautions,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ although	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ proven	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ popular	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ useful	 ﾠ
standard,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠcan	 ﾠconvincingly	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmoreover,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
cannot.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠambiguity	 ﾠover	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠidentification	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠscale	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠmirrored	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscale	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠThere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
identity	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠspace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
applicability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠlevel).	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠreflects,	 ﾠit	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystematic	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠColonial	 ﾠand,	 ﾠlater,	 ﾠstate	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠhave	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ‘Indigenous	 ﾠproblem’	 ﾠby	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠexclusions,	 ﾠ
separations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠinhabitants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠNew	 ﾠWorld,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠAmerican)	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
governments.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠ
conviction	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ certainty	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ reference	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ others)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠera.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Arguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ(starkly	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠlevel)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
‘Indigenous’	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmisunderstood	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignify	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠform,	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ situation,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ experience,	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ representing	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
homogeneity	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ identified,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ identifying,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Indigenous.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠincorporating	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnations	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠ identifications,	 ﾠ experiences,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ single	 ﾠ grouping	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
bears	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
come	 ﾠ close	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ comprehensively	 ﾠ capturing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ identities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ claiming	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ (Smith	 ﾠ
2012).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
My	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠunderstanding.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinfer	 ﾠany	 ﾠessential	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
refer	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnor	 ﾠdo	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresume	 ﾠthere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠany	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠuniformity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ ideology,	 ﾠ interests,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
presume	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ captures	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ identifications	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠcontroversy	 ﾠand	 ﾠitself	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠ
problematisation	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ course	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ After	 ﾠ all,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ13	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠemancipatory	 ﾠedge	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠfew	 ﾠ
decades	 ﾠand	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠlexicons	 ﾠof	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ governance,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ firmly	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ obviously	 ﾠ
rooted	 ﾠpredominantly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠand	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolonisers.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠ undoubtedly	 ﾠ signifies	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ diversity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
tradition,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠasked	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
reasons,	 ﾠI	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapitalise	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠa	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
deeply	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠnature	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠliteral	 ﾠconnotations	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐capitalised	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Where	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ depart	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ collectivisation	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ text,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ reflects	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
specificity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ differentiate	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ
arguments	 ﾠor	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠ
(both	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate)	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcategories:	 ﾠInuit,	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠMétis.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠTorres	 ﾠStrait	 ﾠIslander	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
Dudgeon	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠThese	 ﾠterms	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecificity	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetailing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experiential,	 ﾠcultural,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐political	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpertain,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ occasion	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ employ	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ precise	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
discussion.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ noted,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ
collectivising	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ(albeit	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠabstraction)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠcover	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠrelationally,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
limitations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠand,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠ
commonly	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera.	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ use,	 ﾠ variously,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐Indigenous’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘Settler’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ referring	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
populations,	 ﾠ governments,	 ﾠ institutions,	 ﾠ languages,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ philosophies	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivilege	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠits	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ identity	 ﾠ discussed	 ﾠ above,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ problematic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
contested.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠwould	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠ‘invader’	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠapt	 ﾠ
description	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠattained	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
physical	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestruction	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeaceful	 ﾠsettlement.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠacknowledgement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapitalise	 ﾠ‘Settler’	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠform	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠway	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠdisturbing	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠliteral	 ﾠmeaning.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
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should	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
Indigenous/Settler	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfer	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠor	 ﾠstable	 ﾠline	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ fall	 ﾠ neatly	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ my	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠI	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ(rightly)	 ﾠremains	 ﾠitself	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
societies.	 ﾠ
1.4	 ﾠStructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ substance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thesis	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ divided	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ parts,	 ﾠ broadly	 ﾠ mirroring	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ herself	 ﾠ draws	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ “diagnostic”	 ﾠ (chapters	 ﾠ 2-ﾭ‐5)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
“reconstructive”	 ﾠ(chapters	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ7)	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Chapter	 ﾠ2	 ﾠbegins	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠout	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
reflect	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠit	 ﾠcarries.	 ﾠArguing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsketches	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠan	 ﾠethical	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠbalancing	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠ conflicting	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ responsibility	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ namely,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ responsibility	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠ–	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠby	 ﾠStephen	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠ(1991)	 ﾠas	 ﾠmarking	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠand	 ﾠpostmodern	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
situate	 ﾠher	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠthought	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepth	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdisplays.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ conversation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
dispute,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠout	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠit	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠan	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
inquiry	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ second,	 ﾠ addressing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ methodological	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠexplorations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtone.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
former,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthree	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ serve,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ claim,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ imbue	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ sensitivity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
set	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ analytical	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reading	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ
characteristics	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ display.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ employs	 ﾠ five	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
analytical	 ﾠvantage	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ–	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠrecovery,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
operates	 ﾠto	 ﾠcentralise	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠframework	 ﾠintends	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠand	 ﾠusable	 ﾠvehicle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
complexes	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
practice.	 ﾠ15	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Chapters	 ﾠ4	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ employ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ in,	 ﾠ respectively,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠand	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠintermingle	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
first-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠand	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisplay	 ﾠ
characteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘abnormality’	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm.	 ﾠShowing,	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
case,	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ
bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discourse	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ unable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ sufficiently	 ﾠ accommodate,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
aspirations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠactors	 ﾠhold	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmarginalised	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusionary	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ Part	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thesis	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ move	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ picture	 ﾠ drawn	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Part	 ﾠ 1.	 ﾠ Chapter	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ begins	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
reconstructive	 ﾠtask	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
go	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠand	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠattuned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠstern	 ﾠtest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠrecommendations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
causing	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠturn	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠor	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
recommendations	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlight.	 ﾠArguing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠextent	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐reflexivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠin	 ﾠworking	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠdemocratise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ structurally	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ draw	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ theoretical	 ﾠ
implications	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ recommendations	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠits	 ﾠintended	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠconsistently,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠtask	 ﾠa	 ﾠstep	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠby	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠveins	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠDrawing	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconsonances	 ﾠand	 ﾠdissonances	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠand	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
positions,	 ﾠhere	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠshape	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠcan	 ﾠserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠopen	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠactors	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠimportantly,	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠor	 ﾠimpotence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ16	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putting	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠdecisively	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm,	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠI	 ﾠmove	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcan	 ﾠserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeneficially	 ﾠalter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠof	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠprincipally	 ﾠby	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
enabling	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ equitable	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ authorship	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ understandings	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠput	 ﾠforward	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlie	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada,	 ﾠ rather,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ democratise	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠof	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ
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2 
A	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.1	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐political	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdisagree	 ﾠ
markedly	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠembodiment	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ this	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠis	 ﾠset	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
background	 ﾠof	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠshare	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠare	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠraise	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠor	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠgroups),	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠ
locations	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreside	 ﾠover	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate),	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠboundings	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcitizenry	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠstate),	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘conceptual	 ﾠspace’	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠpertain	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠidentities),	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcleavages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠharbour	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠclass,	 ﾠethnicity,	 ﾠor	 ﾠgender)	 ﾠ
(Fraser	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠWhatever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠheld	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon,	 ﾠand	 ﾠusually	 ﾠsilently,	 ﾠby	 ﾠall	 ﾠor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠsees	 ﾠthem	 ﾠexert	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructuring	 ﾠforce	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠStanding	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ pillars	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ certainty	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ anchor	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ field	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ enable	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠon	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠpredictable	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠKnowing	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
arenas	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠheard,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcriteria	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassessed,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠreparations	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive,	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ certainty.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regularity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
stability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠcharacterises	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“normal	 ﾠjustice”.	 ﾠ20	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Though,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠconcedes,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠmight	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
truly	 ﾠcomplete,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdissent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠalways	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent,	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠlong	 ﾠ“as	 ﾠdeviations	 ﾠremain	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠor	 ﾠappear	 ﾠas	 ﾠanomalies,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
accumulate	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestructure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscourse,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic-ﾭ‐sphere	 ﾠconflicts	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠretains	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecognizable,	 ﾠhence	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘normal’,	 ﾠshape”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.394).	 ﾠ
By	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmeasure,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠposits,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠera	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“abnormal	 ﾠjustice”.	 ﾠToday,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ regularly	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disturb	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ underlying	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ
frameworks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠdescribe,	 ﾠassess,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injury	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscontent.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcontained	 ﾠwithin,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ‘normal’	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠerupt	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“metadisputes”	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenged.	 ﾠDisputants	 ﾠinvoke	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
nonstandard	 ﾠviews	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ highlight	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐universal	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ grammar	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ
dominated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠfield	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠharms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdominance.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ
elements	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“freewheeling	 ﾠcharacter”	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
disputes,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠno	 ﾠsooner	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠarisen	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ“become	 ﾠoverlaid	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠmetadisputes	 ﾠover	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
stake”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.395).	 ﾠAbsent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpillars	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstabilise	 ﾠand	 ﾠorientate	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠunder	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthese	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsolid	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
uncontested	 ﾠground	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠalone	 ﾠsatisfy,	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠquite	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠand	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠzeitdiagnose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlies	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate-ﾭ‐1990s	 ﾠ(Lawson	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠ
Owen	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠPrincipally,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠintends	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠus	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠ
picture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠpurview,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠelements	 ﾠas	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠessay	 ﾠ‘Abnormal	 ﾠJustice’	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠand	 ﾠacross	 ﾠother	 ﾠwritings	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠso,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinform	 ﾠand	 ﾠshape	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdeeper,	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurface	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠand	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠus.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠexploration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ	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2.2	 ﾠAn	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠus	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ‘Abnormal	 ﾠJustice’	 ﾠowes	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ world.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
motivated	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠor	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
disagreement,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠimbued	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠpronounced	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠethical	 ﾠduty	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
responsiveness	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠis	 ﾠattuned	 ﾠ
exclusively	 ﾠto	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ hostility	 ﾠ towards,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ disregard	 ﾠ for,	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ 'radical'	 ﾠ
understandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
developed	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠquite	 ﾠsophisticated	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠ
plays	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠconditioning	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠdraws,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠplace	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠform	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
implications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpicture.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprominence	 ﾠand	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠspecificities	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠis	 ﾠevident	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
destabilisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ"Westphalian-ﾭ‐distributivist"	 ﾠframework	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
occupies	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ attentions	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ (Fraser	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ worse,	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ
contends,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠframework	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverwhelmingly	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠstage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐WWII	 ﾠera.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠ
grip	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice\injustice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ normalised	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ settings.	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestphalian-ﾭ‐distributivist	 ﾠparadigm,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconventionally	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
presumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcitizenry	 ﾠof	 ﾠbounded	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcases	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠstates).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbounded	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
possess	 ﾠsole	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠ(usually	 ﾠsovereign)	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreside	 ﾠover	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠachievement	 ﾠof	 ﾠfair	 ﾠallocations	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠdistribution).	 ﾠ
Although	 ﾠdiscourses	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdeviate	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠor	 ﾠgo	 ﾠbeyond,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠ
have,	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠexample	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ discourse	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ emerged	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ middle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ twentieth	 ﾠ
century	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdeviations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtended	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠand	 ﾠpursued	 ﾠon	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtie	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them	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestphalian-ﾭ‐distributivist	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠtenets	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Westphalian-ﾭ‐distributivist	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠheld	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠstable	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠthreatening	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠchallenge,	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
establish	 ﾠa	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠ‘normal’	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
Particularly	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 1970s,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ Westphalian-ﾭ‐distributivist	 ﾠ
paradigm	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠserious	 ﾠquestioning	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisturbance.	 ﾠDue	 ﾠ
largely	 ﾠto	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠglobalising	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠcultural,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠspheres,	 ﾠcoupled	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbreakdown	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolarising	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠCold	 ﾠWar	 ﾠpolitics,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ discontent	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ emerged	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ along	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ others	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ
formerly	 ﾠobscured	 ﾠor	 ﾠsuppressed,	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrendered	 ﾠimmanent	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠconsciousnesses	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠunprecedented,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠunexpected,	 ﾠways.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠunseen,	 ﾠ
unproblematised,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ taken-ﾭ‐for-ﾭ‐granted	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ begun	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ unravel	 ﾠ
somewhat	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpresumptions	 ﾠupon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
normal	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠbased,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠto	 ﾠinscribe	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠand	 ﾠopened	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠscrutiny.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestphalian-ﾭ‐distributivist	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ wholly	 ﾠ random.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ finds	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ tend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
constellate	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthree	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠ“nodes”:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn.	 ﾠ
‘What’	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠspace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠuse	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
theorise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustice(s)	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠif	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠmeasure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠit.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthree	 ﾠrival	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠactive	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠ“species”	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ(2010,	 ﾠp.16).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ familiar	 ﾠ grammar	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ redistribution	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ locates	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ substance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠor	 ﾠclass	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdistributivist	 ﾠconception,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠhugely	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconventionally	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutionalised	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwentieth	 ﾠcentury,	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠrealised	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠapproximated)	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ23	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wealth,	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠdivisible	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocietal	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠare	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
open	 ﾠand	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠits	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠmaldistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ situated	 ﾠ alongside	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distributivist	 ﾠ conception	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ
disputes,	 ﾠare	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠcouched	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecognition.	 ﾠComing	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
prominence	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ flourishing	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ identity-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ difference-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1960s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1970s,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠ(although	 ﾠthis	 ﾠusually	 ﾠremains	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
disputants)	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ implicitly	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ identities,	 ﾠ values,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ cultures	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ unfairly	 ﾠ hindering	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
marginalising	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisrecognition	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠby	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
conceptualised	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarkers	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender,	 ﾠage,	 ﾠethnicity,	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠor	 ﾠanything	 ﾠelse,	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠroot	 ﾠresides	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠoppressive	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠhierarchies	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠ society,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ provoke	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ accompanying	 ﾠ desire	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ transform	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
recognition	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ
Third,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
grammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentation,	 ﾠcentred	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠon	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠ procedure	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠovertly	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
grammar	 ﾠ insomuch	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ pertains	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ criteria	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ belonging	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠ“who	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin,	 ﾠor	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcircle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
distribution	 ﾠand	 ﾠreciprocal	 ﾠrecognition”	 ﾠ(2010,	 ﾠp.17).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregister,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
misrepresentation	 ﾠ occurs	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ “political	 ﾠ boundaries	 ﾠ and/or	 ﾠ decision	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ
wrongly	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠpar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠothers	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠ–	 ﾠincluding,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly,	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠarenas”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠp.18).	 ﾠThough	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠusually	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠentwined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaldistribution	 ﾠand	 ﾠmisrecognition,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠor	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠorder	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠits	 ﾠboundaries	 ﾠare	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpoliced.	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisrepresentation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ instances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ misrecognition	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ maldistribution,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
reducible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ grammars.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
misrepresentation	 ﾠ arises	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ species	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ claimed	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthree	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠa	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfully	 ﾠor	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠcollapsed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠeach	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠisolate	 ﾠa	 ﾠ24	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different	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ substance	 ﾠ connected	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concept	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ
disputes,	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ argues,	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ pertaining	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ views	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘what’	 ﾠ
regularly	 ﾠ butt	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ injustices	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠand	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠare	 ﾠconceptualised	 ﾠon	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠor	 ﾠare	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠ
missed	 ﾠ entirely,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ individuals,	 ﾠ groups,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ whom	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
engaged.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠa	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠnorm	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlack	 ﾠa	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoccurred.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠhere	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠconceptually	 ﾠspeaking,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠand	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠupon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠfunction.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠis	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠless	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ precise	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ
pervades	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
distribution,	 ﾠ recognition,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ say	 ﾠ something	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠreality	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠconfronts	 ﾠus,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
presumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠfully	 ﾠexhaust	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
time	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠother.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠconceivable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthree	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideas	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠvisibly.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠit	 ﾠserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ
conceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠmight	 ﾠemerge,	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsubverted	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispute.	 ﾠ
‘Who’	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ ‘who’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ describe	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
framing	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ On	 ﾠone	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠother	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠgroups)	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠunit.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbounding	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠspace	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded/excluded),	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ perimeters,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠ25	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Previously,	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘who’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ rarely	 ﾠ erupted	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
discourse	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ overwhelming	 ﾠ dominance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Westphalian	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ
increasingly	 ﾠliberal)	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠstage.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠheld	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuitably	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠbounding	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠcoincided	 ﾠ
exactly	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ borders	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ reach	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ modern	 ﾠ territorial	 ﾠ state.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ
“territorializing”	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠrestricting	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠrelevancy	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcitizenry	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeographically	 ﾠ
bounded	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠdrastically	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠ
obligations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ transgressed	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ borders	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ operated	 ﾠ along	 ﾠ altogether	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠpathways	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.400).	 ﾠAssumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsole	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adjudicate	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ territories,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ legitimately	 ﾠ
impose	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠon	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠmembers,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠhabitually	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐inscribed	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠnormal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠare	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠchallenged	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
multiple	 ﾠ directions.	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ identifies	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ forms:	 ﾠ (1)	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
localists	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunalists	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ reject	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ territorial	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ favour	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
subnational	 ﾠunits;	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠregionalists	 ﾠand	 ﾠnationalists	 ﾠwho	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠ
larger	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐universal)	 ﾠunits	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠor	 ﾠIslam;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠglobalists	 ﾠand	 ﾠcosmopolitans	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ“propose	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccord	 ﾠequal	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
beings”	 ﾠand	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠany	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐universal	 ﾠbounding	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.401).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
ways,	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ contests	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ territorial	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ
represents	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ morally	 ﾠ valid	 ﾠ and/or	 ﾠ practically	 ﾠ viable	 ﾠ bounding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ space.	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠabound	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestphalian	 ﾠframe	 ﾠ
can,	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcontexts;	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠWestphalian	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠa	 ﾠpartitioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠspace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠ
leaves	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoppress	 ﾠ
them;	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ building	 ﾠ sufficiently	 ﾠ detailed	 ﾠ understandings	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠadherence	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestphalian	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
holds,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ catastrophic	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ mounting	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ
responses.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
abnormality	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ ‘who’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ formerly	 ﾠ stable	 ﾠ
presumptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Westphalian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ liberal	 ﾠ paradigms	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠmultiplicity	 ﾠof	 ﾠdirections.	 ﾠ	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It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ again	 ﾠ worth	 ﾠ noting,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ that,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
abnormality,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ hegemonic	 ﾠ ‘who’	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ empirically	 ﾠ
contested	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera	 ﾠis	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠconceptually	 ﾠspeaking,	 ﾠless	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ resolute	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ proper	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ prevails.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠdisagree	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdeliberations	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthem),	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠideas	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassessed	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhom),	 ﾠor	 ﾠelse	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠ politically	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ boundaries	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ operate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ causes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
injustices	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠreach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠby	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
addition	 ﾠto	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasure,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
encounter	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠscope	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
‘How’	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ destabilisation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘what’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘who’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ
inevitably	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠover	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠcan	 ﾠor	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaddressed.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠlack	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ pertain	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ distribution,	 ﾠ recognition,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ representation,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
combination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
counts	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠbreakdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠover	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
contests	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequitably	 ﾠaddressed.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠare	 ﾠwe	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠan	 ﾠuncontroversial	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjudicate	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
competing	 ﾠ views?	 ﾠ And	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ devise	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ fair	 ﾠ reparations	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ
disagreements	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersist?	 ﾠLikewise,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠeven	 ﾠorganise	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠexists	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
voices	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠexcluded)	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠwho	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘we’	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ locations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ vital,	 ﾠ
legitimate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunassailable	 ﾠare	 ﾠimpeached	 ﾠas	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠand	 ﾠinadequate	 ﾠby	 ﾠothers?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequitably	 ﾠassessed	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠresolved	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠInevitably,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmultiplicity	 ﾠof	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
‘who’	 ﾠevoke	 ﾠa	 ﾠplethora	 ﾠof	 ﾠvisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
v	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠalready	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠin	 ﾠpainting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
strongly	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠwith	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distinctions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ provides,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture,	 ﾠresonate	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠher	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠera,	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ steady	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ depiction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ kinds	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ expand	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ encompass	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠno	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠor	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠseems	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠstill	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ resolve	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ discontents	 ﾠ experienced,	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ
demonstrate	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠguided	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠ
thinking	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠresolute	 ﾠ
insistence	 ﾠupon	 ﾠreckoning	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠarray	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepercussions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠabnormalisation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠbrings.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠsense	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exclusionary	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠdestabilised,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinjuries	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhitherto	 ﾠobscured	 ﾠby	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠ
articulation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ exchanges.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ expanded	 ﾠ field	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ
signalled	 ﾠby	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠattentions	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
coming	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recognise	 ﾠ unfamiliar	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ harm	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ finding	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ
possibilities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ ordering	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ From	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
direction,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠan	 ﾠemancipatory	 ﾠface	 ﾠand	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠconnotations	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠabnormalising	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
sphere,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ meet	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ side.	 ﾠ For,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠconventions	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠdestabilised,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ certainty	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ responding	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
sharedness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
abnormalising	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ brings	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ threat	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdistanced	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
assessment	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ redress.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ deep	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ
measures	 ﾠand	 ﾠframings	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠproper	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠuncertain.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
clouding	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠactors	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhear	 ﾠand	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠupon	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdecisive	 ﾠassessments	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
conducted,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠworrying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompounded	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabnormalisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ28	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠ“here,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice:	 ﾠamidst	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠ
contestation,	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcorroborating	 ﾠand	 ﾠredressing	 ﾠinjustice”	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.402).	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ deeply	 ﾠ inflects	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
abnormality	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠwork	 ﾠdeserves	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠunderpins	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠus	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhow	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠus	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠin	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠways.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ turning	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ theorising	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ calls	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠis	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠthought	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Western	 ﾠtradition.	 ﾠ
2.3	 ﾠBalancing	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ keen	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ emphasise	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ mismatch	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ deep	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ describes	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ “familiar	 ﾠ theories	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice”	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ
(2008,	 ﾠp.396).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠperspectives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsway	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Western	 ﾠ liberal	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ are,	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ claims,	 ﾠ insufficiently	 ﾠ accommodating	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsubstance,	 ﾠframing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠabsorbed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠbecause,	 ﾠat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbase,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ'normal'	 ﾠ
modes	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠare	 ﾠformulated	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠreal	 ﾠor	 ﾠimagined	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠsome	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠexists	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdisputants.	 ﾠ
Relying	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠunproblematised	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkey	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
proper	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠand	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠtend	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠshield	 ﾠthose	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠview	 ﾠ(holding	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠor	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐evident	 ﾠtruths)	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠelse	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠengaged).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeither	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccommodation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdisputation	 ﾠaround	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfashion.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ
drive	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠconnect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
uncontroversial	 ﾠground:	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠnorm,	 ﾠconvention,	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠor	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠskeleton	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠupon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠ (potentially)	 ﾠ radically	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ space	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ anchored.	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠdisputed	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠineliminable	 ﾠplurality	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
subjective	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ recognised	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ thinking	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaccommodation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgo	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠdown,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
speak.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠsome	 ﾠjuncture,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠdiscreet,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ29	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠought	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠsubstance(s)	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ measure,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ establishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ apparently	 ﾠ impartial	 ﾠ
procedure	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ promising	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ fair	 ﾠ adjudication	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
disputing	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprecise	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠin	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
modes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ theorising	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ doubt	 ﾠ varies	 ﾠ considerably,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ uniting	 ﾠ factor	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠ boundaries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ shielded	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ full	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
discursive	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠon	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutionalise	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠ“fail	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ justice”	 ﾠ
(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.396).	 ﾠA	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠattuned	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
deeper	 ﾠand	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation,	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠtimes.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmy	 ﾠintention	 ﾠyet	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠreal	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠat	 ﾠFraser's	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠ(that	 ﾠtask	 ﾠis	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠPart	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
thesis).	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ now,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ matter	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distinction	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ drawn	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ‘normal’	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuitably	 ﾠ‘abnormal’	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtell	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ theoretical	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ constructing.	 ﾠ For,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠis	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthreatens	 ﾠto	 ﾠunduly	 ﾠ
close	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ possibilities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ hostility	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality),	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠequally	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠunwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠ
to,	 ﾠor	 ﾠunabatedly	 ﾠrevel	 ﾠin,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠproject	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdismantling	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
assurance	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠonly	 ﾠconcern.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠforces	 ﾠdirecting	 ﾠFraser's	 ﾠ
thinking:	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ corresponding	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠheralds;	 ﾠand	 ﾠanother	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
negative	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠimpotence	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
harm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcarries.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠconjunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
air	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ tension	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ operates	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ establish,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ acutely	 ﾠ indicative	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ
theoretical-ﾭ‐philosophical	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ underpins	 ﾠ Fraser's	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ account.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
conflict	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ visible	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ synthesises	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ tensions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ emerged	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠphilosophy,	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠdefences	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcritiques	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodernity.	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠaversion	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtrespasses	 ﾠ
too	 ﾠfar	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠof	 ﾠeither	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcentres	 ﾠitself	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠor	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠ
permanently	 ﾠon	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwider	 ﾠbody	 ﾠ30	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgain	 ﾠa	 ﾠclearer	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠposition	 ﾠby	 ﾠbriefly	 ﾠturning	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠStephen	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠ(1991).	 ﾠ
White	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ encountered	 ﾠ tension	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ modernity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
postmodernity	 ﾠas	 ﾠcorresponding,	 ﾠprincipally,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
"senses	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility"	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠreflection:	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠa	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠa	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠ(1991,	 ﾠp.19).	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠact,	 ﾠis	 ﾠresolutely	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠlife	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ
styles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Western	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ethical	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ connected	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ Deriving	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
encounter	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeveryday	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠof	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠsurvival	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠharm,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
constraints	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ honour	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ values	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ expectations,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ on),	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠ"a	 ﾠmoral-ﾭ‐prudential	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠends	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdefensible	 ﾠmanner"	 ﾠ(White	 ﾠ1991,	 ﾠp.21).	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
strongly	 ﾠ familiar,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ common-ﾭ‐sense	 ﾠ tone	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ responsibility,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
accompanied	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ impulse	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ creation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge:	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
physical	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlend	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
senses	 ﾠof	 ﾠtractability,	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpressures.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
apparent	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠpostmodern	 ﾠstreams	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠforming	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpillar	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
critiques	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthinkers	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠFoucault,	 ﾠDerrida,	 ﾠand	 ﾠLyotard	 ﾠ(amongst	 ﾠothers)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
brought	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠmodernity	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠideologues.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠethical	 ﾠ
inquiry	 ﾠ falls	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ themes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ dominate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ modern	 ﾠ
mindset,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠonto	 ﾠexposing	 ﾠand	 ﾠtracking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ"modern	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
machinery	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthe	 ﾠineradicability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdissonance"	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor,	 ﾠput	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
inevitability	 ﾠof	 ﾠ'otherness'	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠit	 ﾠengages	 ﾠ(White	 ﾠ1991,	 ﾠp.20).	 ﾠTypically	 ﾠ
driven	 ﾠby	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠborne	 ﾠout	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconstellations	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠmeanings	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
identities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠall	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠembroiled	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠperpetual	 ﾠ
constitution,	 ﾠnone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠever	 ﾠanchor	 ﾠit	 ﾠpermanently	 ﾠor	 ﾠabsolutely,	 ﾠproponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠ‘impossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠclosure’	 ﾠaround	 ﾠall	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠidentity.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠderives	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ construct	 ﾠ inevitably	 ﾠ spawns	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ perpetually	 ﾠ under-ﾭ‐definable	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
‘others’	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠin	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠalways	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ construct	 ﾠ itself.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ exposing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ inevitable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ31	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ineradicable	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠis	 ﾠconcealed	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential	 ﾠif	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
violences	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ minimised.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ improperly	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ insufficiently	 ﾠ
acknowledging	 ﾠthis	 ﾠneed,	 ﾠthinkers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostmodern	 ﾠvein	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠorder-ﾭ‐
orientated	 ﾠpreoccupations	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodernity	 ﾠcome	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcost.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit:	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostmodern	 ﾠthinker	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠassert	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠ[the	 ﾠ'modern'	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ act]	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ requires	 ﾠ one,	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ point,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ fix	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ close	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ
parameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore	 ﾠor	 ﾠhomogenize	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
specificity	 ﾠor	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠamong	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠ
(1991,	 ﾠp.21)	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠencourages	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrasting	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
critique,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpossesses,	 ﾠinstead,	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠimpetus.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠurge	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisturb	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠradical	 ﾠterms)	 ﾠto	 ﾠdismantle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
apparent	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐certainties	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ lay	 ﾠ behind	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ preference	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ modernists	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐
coordinating	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠand	 ﾠlanguage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠ
otherness	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexists	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworlds	 ﾠthey	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠor	 ﾠconstruct.	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠas	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠ
puts	 ﾠit:	 ﾠ
Both	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠaffirmation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
language,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠloosen	 ﾠour	 ﾠworld's	 ﾠhold	 ﾠupon	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠconfronting	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠby	 ﾠunrecognized	 ﾠor	 ﾠwilfully	 ﾠ
forgotten	 ﾠfictions.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhold	 ﾠis	 ﾠloosened,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsensitized	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
otherness	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠengendered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstructures.	 ﾠ
(1991,	 ﾠp.27)	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclash	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmodernity	 ﾠand	 ﾠpostmodernity	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠ preoccupations	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ useful,	 ﾠ first,	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
affirms	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠshared	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠsignified	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
tension:	 ﾠmost	 ﾠnotably,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠan	 ﾠethical	 ﾠstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠworld	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcamp	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠstandards,	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠ‘irresponsible’	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
endeavours	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠground.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠreminds	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdisagreements	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠcompletely,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
apparent.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠworld-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtraced	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠneatly	 ﾠonto	 ﾠ32	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the	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠby	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcharacter.	 ﾠ
2.4	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ theorising	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ calling	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ response	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
abnormalising	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmust	 ﾠreckon	 ﾠequally	 ﾠwith	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠside	 ﾠis	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ
defined	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisturb	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ grammars	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ moments	 ﾠ operate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ conceal	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering;	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠside	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
threat	 ﾠof	 ﾠinaction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshadows	 ﾠa	 ﾠbreakdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠstability.	 ﾠ
Clearly,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ close	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ immediately	 ﾠ obvious	 ﾠ parallels	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ
identification	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ functions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ reflection	 ﾠ brought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
White.	 ﾠ Honouring	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormality	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ
commitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠexposing	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisturbing	 ﾠconcealments	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisagreement,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ constant	 ﾠ refusal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ homogenising	 ﾠ presumptions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ precepts	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ restrict	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
space	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ heard	 ﾠ (i.e.	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠ
function).	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time,	 ﾠ honouring	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormality	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠan	 ﾠequally	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
willingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠand	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠconvincing	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠ
(i.e.	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ function).	 ﾠ An	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ theorising	 ﾠ must,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ
attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ carefully	 ﾠ negotiate	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ terrain	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ supported	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tensions	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcern.	 ﾠWere	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠtread	 ﾠthis	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐
between	 ﾠspace	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠmanner,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠunbearable	 ﾠ
hostility	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice,	 ﾠ manifest,	 ﾠ respectively,	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
indefensible	 ﾠ restraint	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reckless	 ﾠ validation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation,	 ﾠ difference,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
uncertainty.	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ occupying	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ space,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ
reconstructive	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠis	 ﾠalready	 ﾠevident	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
diagnostic	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠshe	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdistinguishable	 ﾠqualities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ identified,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
indicated	 ﾠonly	 ﾠless	 ﾠdirectly.	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The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠelement	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠoutlined	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠClosely	 ﾠ
tethered	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ 'abnormalities'	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ haunt	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ era,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexpressly	 ﾠintends	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ manner,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
direction	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconducive	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠand	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠand	 ﾠinsight,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠinform	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodify	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠways.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
urgency	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠupon	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠto	 ﾠ'know'	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
encounter	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠput	 ﾠthat	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐
coordinating	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠaround	 ﾠus.	 ﾠ
Yet,	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠalongside	 ﾠthis	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠelement	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther,	 ﾠlet's	 ﾠ
call	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ'extra-ﾭ‐empirical'	 ﾠelement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠequal	 ﾠimportance.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ provides	 ﾠ goes	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
catalogue	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimbued	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
structural	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠdescription.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠso,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
indicated,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ'internal'	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat,	 ﾠwho,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠ operation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ categories	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ restricted	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
disagreement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠempirically	 ﾠidentifies.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠconceivable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠand	 ﾠframing	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠdisagreements	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠquestions,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠarise	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐accounted	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠalready	 ﾠtheorised	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnodes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccurately	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ yet	 ﾠ unheard	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ under-ﾭ‐acknowledged	 ﾠ conceptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ substance,	 ﾠ framing,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
application	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ parent	 ﾠ categories	 ﾠ what,	 ﾠ who,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ structurally	 ﾠ
hospitable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠinsomuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠrestrictions	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsignify	 ﾠare	 ﾠcontested;	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
coherent	 ﾠway	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠmanner,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠextra-ﾭ‐empirical	 ﾠelement	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnodes	 ﾠwhat,	 ﾠwho,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ 'external'	 ﾠ sense.	 ﾠ For,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ primary	 ﾠ normal/abnormal	 ﾠ distinction	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
Fraser's	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ built,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ signalling	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
agreement	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠor	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠreliant	 ﾠupon	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠconfiguring	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠform	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
era.	 ﾠ That	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ say,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ contained	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ34	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abnormality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconstellate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnodes	 ﾠwhat,	 ﾠwho,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealised.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠparent	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠspecificity.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠremains	 ﾠ
conceivable	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ nodes	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ interpreted	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ
transformed,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ nodes	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ juncture	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
theorised	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ capture,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ descriptive	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠor	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader,	 ﾠextra-ﾭ‐empirical	 ﾠ
qualities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ render	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ structurally	 ﾠ hospitable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠto,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠfamiliarised	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠofferings,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠfunction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ combination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ empirical/action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ extra-ﾭ‐empirical/world-ﾭ‐
disclosing	 ﾠelements	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
offering.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠand	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠsites	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfore	 ﾠand	 ﾠworked	 ﾠ
upon	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠto	 ﾠenable	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand,	 ﾠcrucially,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠalways	 ﾠopen	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠradical	 ﾠsense	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠindeterminable	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent.	 ﾠ
Through	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ account,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ strikes	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ path	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ
erected	 ﾠ divide	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Western	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ projects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
modernity	 ﾠand	 ﾠpostmodernity	 ﾠ(broadly	 ﾠdefined).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠview	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠconstructs	 ﾠis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
sensitive	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaffirmative	 ﾠof,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrasting	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderpin	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ positions,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ asserts	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ absolutely	 ﾠ essential	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ suitably	 ﾠ
critical	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ thinking	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ disputed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠera.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠis,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠ would,	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ account,	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ satisfy	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thoroughly	 ﾠ ‘modern’	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ thoroughly	 ﾠ
‘postmodern’	 ﾠthinker,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠ positions,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ followed	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ absolute	 ﾠ assurance,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
perpetuation	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavoided	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠreduced.	 ﾠTaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠstance	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ productively	 ﾠ harness	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conflict	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ world-ﾭ‐
disclosing	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠuse.	 ﾠ35	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In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠunderline	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠis	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠher	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdiagnosis	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality.	 ﾠShe	 ﾠanticipates	 ﾠtwo.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“renormalization”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠ
(Fraser	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ p.418).	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ concedes	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ understandable)	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacknowledgement	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠcontested,	 ﾠ‘abnormal’	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠ
sphere	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ energies	 ﾠ principally	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ arresting	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠto	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠimpotence	 ﾠis	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
attempt	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠnormal,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
sensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠnotes:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠpremised	 ﾠon	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinterpretations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ'what',	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ'who',	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ'how'	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobalizing	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ
(2008,	 ﾠp.418)	 ﾠ
Better	 ﾠ resourced	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ accommodate	 ﾠ differences	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ understood	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ
akin	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠunder	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠconditions.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
favour	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠstable	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠbuilt	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠ
diagnostic	 ﾠ account,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ seeks	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ privilege	 ﾠ stability	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ certainty	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
opposites.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘new	 ﾠnormal’	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠan	 ﾠimprovement	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ normal,	 ﾠ shies	 ﾠ away	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ extra-ﾭ‐empirical	 ﾠ elements	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ
diagnostic	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ fails	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ satisfactorily	 ﾠ straddle	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tension	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐
coordinating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠ motivations.	 ﾠ Though	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠpronounced	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnew	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
entrenched	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ emerging	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ closed	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ advance	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠan	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠthreat.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐inscribing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠshortcomings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠin	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnuanced	 ﾠor	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠforms.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
reason,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠdiagnosis,	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠunderstood,	 ﾠ
demands)	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponse.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠhas	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠshe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention,	 ﾠ
here,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ strive	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ outcome	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ consistently	 ﾠ unsettles	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distinction	 ﾠ36	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between	 ﾠ normality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ abnormality.	 ﾠ Better	 ﾠ recognising	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ shortcomings	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
accompany	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠ impulses,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠincorporate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠalso	 ﾠactively	 ﾠ
trying	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠdefects.	 ﾠThus;	 ﾠ
Unlike	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ discourse,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ desired	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ sufficient	 ﾠ structuring	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ stage	 ﾠ today’s	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ arguments,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ parties	 ﾠ
confront	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattention	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠon.	 ﾠ
Unlike	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠdiscourse,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhoped-ﾭ‐for	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
problematizing	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠentertain	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ‘how’.	 ﾠ
(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.418:	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠemphasis)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrefuse	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠclosure,	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffecting	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ does,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ treat	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ closures	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
provisional	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ questioning	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ reimagining	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ dispute.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intention	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ limits	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ
institutional,	 ﾠconceptual,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠview,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠinstil	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠembody	 ﾠexclusions	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠconceal	 ﾠor	 ﾠmarginalise	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
grammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠmomentum	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠat	 ﾠonce:	 ﾠ“entertaining	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisadvantaged	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠalso	 ﾠparsing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmetadisagreements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠinterlaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.419).	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintersection	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐
coordinating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠ urges,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ grammar	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ “mobilizes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
corrective	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother”,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠscrambling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ discourse	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ real	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ (Fraser	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ
p.419).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠimbued	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠan	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ‘under-ﾭ‐defined’	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠUnderstanding	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠtheorised	 ﾠby	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnodes	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠrefuses	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ notion	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ uncontroversial	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ final	 ﾠ closure	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ parameters	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠvaluable).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠnew	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠrendering	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmarginalised	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ37	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is	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠopening	 ﾠto	 ﾠerupt	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtreats	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠany	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠuniversality	 ﾠor	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠsettlement	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ recognises	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ vital	 ﾠ
requirement	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prevent	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ ensuing	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ manifesting	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ institutional)	 ﾠ impotence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ instances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injury,	 ﾠ need,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
discontent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠinaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠas	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠto	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
addressing	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠas	 ﾠadherence	 ﾠto	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠobscure	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ
entirely.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠundertone	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
position.	 ﾠFinding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠopening	 ﾠand	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠclosure	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠcommits	 ﾠitself	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠand	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠmediation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
contrasting	 ﾠpositions.	 ﾠ
2.5	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠher	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ attempted	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ demonstrate,	 ﾠ imbued	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ ethical	 ﾠ orientation	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ spheres.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ primary	 ﾠ impulse	 ﾠ behind	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisagreements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠresisting	 ﾠall	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠproclivities	 ﾠto	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐enter	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmindset,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepeat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmistakes,	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘normal’	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
must,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠroute	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠpolitics)	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠequally	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠwith	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
negative	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠabnormalising	 ﾠ–	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ radically	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠ parameters	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ remaining	 ﾠ committed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠkinds.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠendeavours	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyse	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠought,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠevenly	 ﾠguided	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
responsibilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠand	 ﾠworld-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠway	 ﾠcan	 ﾠour	 ﾠresponsiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgenuinely,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsufficiently,	 ﾠ
reflexive.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠchapter,	 ﾠI	 ﾠmove	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ study	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠand	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠmethodological	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconducting	 ﾠ38	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
detailed	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠand	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
abnormality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠ
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3 
Considering	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠ
3.1	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
Why	 ﾠshould	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠus	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts?	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
offer	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute?	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠ
moreover,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwe	 ﾠgo	 ﾠabout	 ﾠactually	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠtone?	 ﾠThis	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠits	 ﾠlead	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsatisfy,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠquestions.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbring	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Canada.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ highlights	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ qualities	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ or,	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
accurately	 ﾠstated,	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠ–	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠ
encourages	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠsensitivities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠinquiry	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ a	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrealising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠis	 ﾠput	 ﾠforward. 
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmethodological	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ40	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
short,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠexplorations	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠframework	 ﾠcomposed	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
five	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ analytical	 ﾠ vantage	 ﾠ points,	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ attending	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠLooking	 ﾠat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠfive	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnamely:	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠ
voice,	 ﾠrecovery,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠenables	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsituate	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠaspirations,	 ﾠ
concerns,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ centre	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ gain	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ
appreciation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complexes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ first-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ concern	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ display.	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠframework	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠvehicle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrealising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘abnormality’	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdisplay.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ begin,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ exploration	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ prior	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
perspective’s	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsuitability	 ﾠand	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ
3.2	 ﾠThree	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠan	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
interesting	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts.	 ﾠA	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠisolating	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ flow	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ mix	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ action-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠ functions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ critique	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠholds.	 ﾠThree	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠresonate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmanner,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ overlap	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
understood	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠlayer	 ﾠof	 ﾠcongeniality	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠTogether,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaligns	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispute.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective’s	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠaversion	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠclosure	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠforegrounding	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠan	 ﾠorganising	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐discursive	 ﾠfield	 ﾠ
rely	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠand	 ﾠstability	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠforces	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ natural	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ inevitable	 ﾠ force,	 ﾠ alerts	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ setting	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ publicly	 ﾠ salient	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ‘normal’	 ﾠ
conceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ introduced	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ evocatively	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠby	 ﾠCatherine	 ﾠMacKinnon	 ﾠ(1989)	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠ41	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠmale	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠsubordination	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocieties.	 ﾠ
There,	 ﾠMacKinnon	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠmale	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠover	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ–	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠA	 ﾠexerts	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠover	 ﾠB,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
subjectivities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ men	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ discreet	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠforces	 ﾠ(Watson	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠMacKinnon,	 ﾠaccordingly,	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ male	 ﾠ dominance	 ﾠ maintains	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ reproduces	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠalso	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ“[p]ower	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview”	 ﾠ(1989,	 ﾠp.121).	 ﾠMore	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠ
Anthony	 ﾠLaden	 ﾠ(2001;	 ﾠ2007;	 ﾠ2012)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠup	 ﾠMacKinnon’s	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠ
power,	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠMichel	 ﾠFoucault’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠpower.	 ﾠLaden’s	 ﾠ
principal	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“reciprocal	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsive”	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
logical	 ﾠ calculation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘correct’	 ﾠ reasons	 ﾠ drawn	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐political	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ(2012,	 ﾠp.12).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠpower	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Laden	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠits	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠsculpting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘good	 ﾠreasons’	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠhe	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit:	 ﾠ
Constructive	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ works	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ shaping	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ landscape	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠas	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠor	 ﾠnormal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus,	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠand	 ﾠargument	 ﾠare	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠconfused	 ﾠor	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠpleading	 ﾠor	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ‘silly’.	 ﾠ
(2012,	 ﾠp.124)	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ represents	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ mechanism	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
contingent	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠreason	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠtraction	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠfield	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpower	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
held	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠsymmetrically	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠand	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ determination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ identities,	 ﾠ norms,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ meanings	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
prevail	 ﾠacross	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠassociation.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdistributed	 ﾠasymmetrically,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠless	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠexert	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
identity,	 ﾠnorm,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife. 
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠits	 ﾠinsistence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠirreducibly	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ parameters	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ distributions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ a	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matter	 ﾠof	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠconcern.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurface	 ﾠand	 ﾠcentralising	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠfar	 ﾠless	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠpower	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreceptive	 ﾠplatform	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠlisten	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠin	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguages	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ concepts	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ dominate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ field.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠbegs	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠasymmetries	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
partially	 ﾠor	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠconceal	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
sphere,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpower	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcursory	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠresonance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcount.	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠworked	 ﾠto	 ﾠunveil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐universal	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
conventions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ show	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ value-ﾭ‐systems,	 ﾠ languages,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ philosophical	 ﾠ
histories	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
traditional	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠare	 ﾠroutinely	 ﾠmarginalised	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
exchanges	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Alfred	 ﾠ 2005;	 ﾠ 2009a;	 ﾠ Hart	 ﾠ 2010;	 ﾠ Little	 ﾠ Bear	 ﾠ 2000;	 ﾠ Smith	 ﾠ 2012;	 ﾠ Tully	 ﾠ
1995;	 ﾠTurner	 ﾠ2006;	 ﾠYoungblood	 ﾠHenderson	 ﾠ2000).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdriving	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠcomprehensible,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠrendering	 ﾠits	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
plausible	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠ
offers	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ orientation	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐suited	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ explicating	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠand	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠattunement	 ﾠto	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
holds	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfixity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcritical-ﾭ‐analytical	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ attend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ instances	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ asymmetries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ experienced	 ﾠ simultaneously	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ multiple	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
overlapping	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠhovering	 ﾠover	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relationships	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination-ﾭ‐subordination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠcentralised	 ﾠ
(or	 ﾠvocalised)	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠview	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠattune	 ﾠitself	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠalongside.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠopens	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠvein	 ﾠof	 ﾠinquiry	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
geared	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacknowledgement	 ﾠof	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ‘group-ﾭ‐specific’	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpublicised	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes.	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In	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ respect,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ gives	 ﾠ cause	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ think	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
aspirations	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠas	 ﾠTaiaiake	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠJeff	 ﾠCorntassel	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommonality	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“struggle	 ﾠto	 ﾠsurvive	 ﾠas	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠunique	 ﾠheritages,	 ﾠattachments	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhomelands,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠshare,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ(necessarily)	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠinnate	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠor	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠp.597).	 ﾠOr,	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ direction,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Elizabeth	 ﾠ Povinelli	 ﾠ puts	 ﾠ it,	 ﾠ “the	 ﾠ category	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
indigeneity	 ﾠcame	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠ
residing	 ﾠin	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate…and	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠemergent	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ[and	 ﾠtransnational]	 ﾠsubjects”	 ﾠ(2002,	 ﾠp.49).	 ﾠOne	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠfully	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠeither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠto	 ﾠgarner	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthem	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
‘Indigeneity’	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠmarker	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomogenous	 ﾠgrouping,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disparate	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ united	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ similarity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcircumstance.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠ
(as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠsimilarities)	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceivable,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠsome	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠwield	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomparably	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠpower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠother	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠare	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠasymmetry.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠ
gives	 ﾠscope	 ﾠand	 ﾠcause	 ﾠto	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpossibility.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠ
mean	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ completely	 ﾠ abandon	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ generalised	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠpathway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠblindly	 ﾠreplicating	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠasymmetries	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
instead	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ projects).	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ infers	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ conduct	 ﾠ generalised	 ﾠ
discussions	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠof,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
respect,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthey	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
vibrant	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠfield	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdisparities	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpower	 ﾠare	 ﾠ(potentially)	 ﾠ
multifarious	 ﾠand	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠin	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠsame	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠalso	 ﾠencourages	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠasymmetries	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠpower	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠalong	 ﾠother	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠor	 ﾠcircumstance.	 ﾠParticularly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
gives	 ﾠcause	 ﾠto	 ﾠattend	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠexperiencing	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠor	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠother	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdistanced	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ equitably	 ﾠ determining	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ dominate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
normal	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠResponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ44	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠwomen,	 ﾠsexual	 ﾠminorities,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
disabilities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon	 ﾠ–	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠinequitable	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠuncover	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmissed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠunfamiliar	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠRevealed	 ﾠare	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ violence,	 ﾠ marginalisation,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ discrimination	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
sometimes	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠand	 ﾠprejudices	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
rarely	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ reducible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ repercussions	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ today,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ indeed	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ profound	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠdecolonising	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
finding	 ﾠcause	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurface	 ﾠmultiple,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠoverlapping,	 ﾠinequities	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpower	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠpossess,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠguided	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐situated	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠa	 ﾠricher	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠ
involved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠsimultaneous	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠequal	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ driven	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ render	 ﾠ visible	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ constitutive	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠare	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠunsettled	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠmust	 ﾠexist	 ﾠ
entirely	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminds	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠthat	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ possession	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ wholly	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
comprehensive	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠupon	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontesting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
hegemonic	 ﾠ normal.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ accepting	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
normality	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠis	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠalways	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe)	 ﾠchallenged	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
subtle	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ oblique	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ struggle	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ within,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ against,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
bounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublicise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjuries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
leaving	 ﾠspace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactors	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠfully	 ﾠdetach	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ–	 ﾠphysically,	 ﾠpolitically,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
cognitively	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext(s)	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhope	 ﾠor	 ﾠact	 ﾠto	 ﾠunsettle,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠis	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠreal-ﾭ‐world	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠany	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐
order	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠpartially)	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠhorizon	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
meaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠconfronts.	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠone	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠiterates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ
raising	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠare	 ﾠnever	 ﾠimmune	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠ45	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processes,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contests	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠlives	 ﾠare	 ﾠalready,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠ
affected	 ﾠin	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmyriad	 ﾠconversations,	 ﾠconfrontations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠalterations	 ﾠto	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠordering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐
order	 ﾠ contests	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ understandings	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ society.	 ﾠ Rules	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ enforced	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ circumstances	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ change	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthreats	 ﾠwill	 ﾠperiodically	 ﾠmaterialise	 ﾠand	 ﾠfade	 ﾠaway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
hold	 ﾠserious	 ﾠrepercussions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠday-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisputants,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠof	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠany	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠarenas.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
expected,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcrucial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠunavoidable	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠdisputants.	 ﾠ
Acknowledging	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfact	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
experiencing	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠacute	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
entrenched	 ﾠ patterns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ marginalisation,	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ race-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠ
discrimination,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ denials	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ rights.	 ﾠ Achieving	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ overcoming	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠ expressions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ necessitated	 ﾠ acting	 ﾠ
unambiguously	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ideational	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠand	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtools	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠ faced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ daily	 ﾠ life.	 ﾠ Notably,	 ﾠ too,	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
valuable	 ﾠadvancements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠaided	 ﾠby	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠ‘within’	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠ
normal	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠas	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdiscourses	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ come	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ play	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ influential	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ liberal	 ﾠ societies.	 ﾠ Although	 ﾠ
emerging	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmovements,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠalterations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ
conception	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasure)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠ employed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ though	 ﾠ certainly	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
uncontentious	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠCoulthard	 ﾠ2007;	 ﾠ2014)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠin	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles.	 ﾠ Understanding	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ moments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ engagement	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
compliance	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ automatically	 ﾠ denote	 ﾠ endorsement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ norms,	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
absence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcontestation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
strategies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisadvantaged	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠis	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠvital.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ consequence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠentanglement	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠencourages	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	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consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfew,	 ﾠif	 ﾠany,	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠperspectives	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠfully	 ﾠdetached,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfully	 ﾠdistinguished,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠ
standard.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsituatedness	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠactors	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠarticulations	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠshare	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
points	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ convergence	 ﾠ with,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ grammars	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ challenge.	 ﾠ Familiar	 ﾠ concepts	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
redeployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠinnovative	 ﾠor	 ﾠunusual	 ﾠways,	 ﾠothers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpreserved	 ﾠor	 ﾠemphasised,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
others	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠand	 ﾠrejected.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
senses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice\injustice	 ﾠ held,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ significant.	 ﾠ What	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ more,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠ relative	 ﾠ externality	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ exist	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ achieved	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐public’	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠJames	 ﾠScott	 ﾠ(1990)	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“hidden	 ﾠtranscripts”	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠactors	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠthose	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ wider	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ necessitates	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ transposition,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
degree,	 ﾠinto	 ﾠlanguages	 ﾠand	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠreference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠintelligibility	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
clear	 ﾠrole	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠarticulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
carries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠwill	 ﾠever	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠdisconnected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
bounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalready	 ﾠprevail.	 ﾠ
Acknowledging	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ points	 ﾠ matters	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ settings	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ helps	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ resist	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ misconception	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
expressions,	 ﾠarguments,	 ﾠor	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠin	 ﾠconformance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠ conception	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ operation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ devoid	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ
contestation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinability	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠradically	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ escape	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠand	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠ
bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ hegemonic	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ (at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ bringing	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
attention)	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunfamiliar	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfused	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠway.	 ﾠConfronting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
guard	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplacency	 ﾠcreeping	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlistening	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠ
Disputes	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ approached	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ resist	 ﾠ allowing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ familiar	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ eclipse	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
unfamiliar	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠvice	 ﾠversa. 
The	 ﾠthird	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠnote	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective’s	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
appreciate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠstabilising	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestabilising	 ﾠforces	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
disputes,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ particularly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ circumstances	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ create	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
vulnerable	 ﾠor	 ﾠsubordinate	 ﾠpositions.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠI	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠhere	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
episodes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘norm-ﾭ‐conformance’	 ﾠ (i.e.	 ﾠ first-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute)	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contributing	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ossification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠ(hence	 ﾠstabilisation),	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠepisodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘norm-ﾭ‐challenging’	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ47	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features	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute)	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠand	 ﾠweakening	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠ(hence	 ﾠdestabilisation).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠarea	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠturns	 ﾠattentions	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠrealities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccompany	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ maintain	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ metadispute	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ situated	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ actual	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
domination,	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ acts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ carry	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
profoundly	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠat	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠlegitimisation	 ﾠ(stabilisation)	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠis	 ﾠhere	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ challenges	 ﾠ raised	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠhope	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠindefinitely	 ﾠdelay)	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlegitimisation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis,	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠdestabilising	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ created	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ unjust	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ partially	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
wholly	 ﾠescaped.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprolonged	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
rule	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproduced,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠhardship	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ engagement	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ mechanisms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ absolutely	 ﾠ vital.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadvancements	 ﾠ
gained	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfailures	 ﾠfelt)	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠchannels	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consequence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ seeming	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ affirm	 ﾠ something	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ legitimacy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠsociety’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ stable	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ ordering	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ lives.	 ﾠ Where	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
successful,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠengagements	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠchains	 ﾠof	 ﾠdependency	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreserving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrespects)	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogresses	 ﾠgained	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠand	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠput	 ﾠinto	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
stabilising	 ﾠ momentum	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ comes	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ engagement	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ conflict	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
destabilising	 ﾠ intentions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ contestation,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reality	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠare	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠconfront	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegotiate	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠprominence. 
The	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠlies	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠ
effective	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠdouble-ﾭ‐bind	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeground	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconflictual	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠstabilisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestabilisation	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠobservance	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠpotentialities	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
structural	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaligns	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsense)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ encountered	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts.	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methodological	 ﾠ terms,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ responsiveness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deep	 ﾠ tensions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
stability/instability	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ engaged	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdiscreet	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠexerted	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠentrenched	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠdomination,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠcentralise	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠalso	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠdiscussions.	 ﾠ
v	 ﾠ
Together,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthree	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠstand	 ﾠas	 ﾠgood	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ theoretical	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ displays	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ genuine	 ﾠ
responsiveness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ engages,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
attuned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐
ordered	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ face.	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ profundity	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
complexities	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ next	 ﾠ section	 ﾠ moves	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconducted.	 ﾠI	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
analytical	 ﾠframework,	 ﾠunderpinned	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠand	 ﾠqualities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ above,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ according	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ scenes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggle	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ provides	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
efficacious	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ developing	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ detailed	 ﾠ explorations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice\injustice	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ
3.3	 ﾠA	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠframework:	 ﾠfive	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠ
Internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ deep	 ﾠ
entanglement	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderpins	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠyet	 ﾠso	 ﾠoften	 ﾠalso	 ﾠapart)	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠstruggle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanifests	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠlegal,	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠplanes.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanage	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠtype	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠso	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective’s	 ﾠ
explicit	 ﾠattentiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ
character	 ﾠyet	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠremains	 ﾠclear	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccessible,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠsome	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠorganisation.	 ﾠ49	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One	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ align	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ
encountered	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠschema	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠ
‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘how’.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠstrategy.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐advised	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcounts.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠsound	 ﾠorienting	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠ directions	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contingency	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ established	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenged	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠ
somewhat	 ﾠblunter	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠat	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠascertain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ
absence)	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠderive	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprecise	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
arises,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ engage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ responsive	 ﾠ manner	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ
histories,	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperspectives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresonate	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
metadisputes	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐discursive	 ﾠfield.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠ
‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠstand	 ﾠas	 ﾠindispensable	 ﾠreferents	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠmight	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠholding	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠas	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠattention	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
context-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠorganisation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ schema	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘what’,	 ﾠ ‘who’,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘how’,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ employs	 ﾠ it,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ principally	 ﾠ
intended	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ insight	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ challenges	 ﾠ arise	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ extremely	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ dimension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ perspective,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ that,	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ brought	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ
conversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocalised	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠpushing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠfar	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠ
whilst	 ﾠ de-ﾭ‐emphasising	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ interwoven	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ first-ﾭ‐
order	 ﾠarticulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠHolding	 ﾠonto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfraught	 ﾠinterplay	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
perspective,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ trespassing	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ direction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ
inadvertently	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ carry	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ connotations.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ producing	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠcontext-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠdiscussions,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠadvantageous)	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschema	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠalone.	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkey	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthey	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisplay.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠfive	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠthemes	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ50	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presence,	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠrecovery,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontend,	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠ complementary	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ five	 ﾠ themes	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ intended	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ distinct	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
isolated	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠconceptually	 ﾠor	 ﾠpractically.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠintended	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠshifting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
issues,	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcentralised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠdeveloped.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠno	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ analytical	 ﾠ device:	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ separations	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ imply	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ stable	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ dependable	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠof	 ﾠreality.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠclear	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintroductions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠexploration	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthemes	 ﾠin	 ﾠisolation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠcounterparts.	 ﾠA	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
recovery	 ﾠis,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠalways	 ﾠalso	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsecuring	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠand	 ﾠregaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
control,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalways	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdegree,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
equality	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ denied.	 ﾠ Thus,	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ themes	 ﾠ marks	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ altered	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠand	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontest.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠsection	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintelligibly,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠ valuably,	 ﾠ read	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ heading	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ another.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ represents	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
ambiguity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠselected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffirms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfluidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ actual	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ understand	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strength	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ analytical	 ﾠ
applicability,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠhindrance	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠunison,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfive	 ﾠthemes	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠ
detailed	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠaround	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcontest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠand	 ﾠperpetuating	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjuries	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ
3.3.a	 ﾠStruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinitive	 ﾠthemes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevalence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforces	 ﾠacting	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisplace	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
identities	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlandscape.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠroot	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠforces	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlain	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ needs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ consolidate	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ
presences	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠenvironments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalready	 ﾠoccupied	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossessed	 ﾠby	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
prior	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ arrival,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ racist	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ innate	 ﾠ
inferiority	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐European	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠsocieties,	 ﾠcultures,	 ﾠand	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmanifestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠforces	 ﾠhas	 ﾠvaried	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
different)	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠrelationships,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠhas	 ﾠremained	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠevident	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Settler	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠhave	 ﾠresponded	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠ‘problem’	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresences.	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Settler	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠfor	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontain,	 ﾠweaken,	 ﾠor	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
redefine	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠoften	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother)	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠossify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state’s	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ interests;	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ too,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ
reasons,	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ motion	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ undermining	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ security	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
cultures,	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ life,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ identities	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ landscape.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ overriding	 ﾠ
imperative,	 ﾠas	 ﾠTaiaiake	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠsees	 ﾠit,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠ“disconnection	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠland,	 ﾠculture,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunity”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠcease	 ﾠto	 ﾠpose	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠserious	 ﾠmoral,	 ﾠlegal,	 ﾠor	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ(2009b,	 ﾠp.52).	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠfacets	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoffensive	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠevident	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠaltering	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠby	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
complex	 ﾠ mix	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ (legislative,	 ﾠ legal)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ informal	 ﾠ (social,	 ﾠ economic)	 ﾠ forces.	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ
times,	 ﾠopen	 ﾠor	 ﾠthinly	 ﾠveiled	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisplace	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
assimilate	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlifestyles	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
proliferated.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ employed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard,	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ destructive	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠneed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwitness	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠresonance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
residential	 ﾠschool	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ(Castellano	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠFlisfeder	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠRegan	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠ
Stanton	 ﾠ 2011)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘Stolen	 ﾠ Generations’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ (Barta	 ﾠ 2008;	 ﾠ HREOC	 ﾠ 1997;	 ﾠ
Irabinna-ﾭ‐Rigney	 ﾠ 1998)	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ indication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this.	 ﾠ Even	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ objectives	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ full-ﾭ‐scale	 ﾠ
assimilation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ dispossession	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ displacement	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ prominent	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ
clearly	 ﾠ articulated)	 ﾠ goals,	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ authorities	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ commonly	 ﾠ sought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ formally	 ﾠ
‘domesticate’	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠby	 ﾠlegislating	 ﾠaway	 ﾠor	 ﾠeroding	 ﾠany	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠforms	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠor	 ﾠrights	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Against	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ backdrop	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ attacks	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ physical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ politico-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠ presences,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisplacing	 ﾠforces	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
indirect	 ﾠform,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠhad	 ﾠquite	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
collective	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland,	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
changing	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠ(Coates	 ﾠ1999;	 ﾠWeinstein	 ﾠ
2007).	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠunder	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinterwoven	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠforces	 ﾠpulling	 ﾠon	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
place	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ commonly	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ cultures,	 ﾠ worldviews,	 ﾠ languages,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ life	 ﾠ
undervalued,	 ﾠmarginalised,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcommodified	 ﾠin	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠpervasive	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠracial	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠdiscrimination	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence.	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Though	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ representing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ diverse	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ experiences,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
examples	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ involve	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ acting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ threaten,	 ﾠ displace,	 ﾠ undermine,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
redefine	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitico-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠpresences.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠeffected	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠor	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠ
impacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠforces,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠall	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterference	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ presences,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠfreely	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpresence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠresisting	 ﾠthese	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠand	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisplacement,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠ
today	 ﾠ commonly	 ﾠ pitch	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ multiple	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ levels.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
seeking	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recapture	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ lands	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ territories,	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ suppressions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ traditional	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ life,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ secure	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠdenigrating	 ﾠforces,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠalso	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
problematise	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continual	 ﾠ displacement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ worldviews,	 ﾠ spiritual	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
philosophical	 ﾠhistories,	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠlandscape.	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠand	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠpush	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
international)	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ domain,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ dramatically	 ﾠ exceeds	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ planes.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ involve	 ﾠ dimensions	 ﾠ whereby	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
social-ﾭ‐theoretical	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ embedded	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠare	 ﾠheard.	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠproblematise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠ relationships	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ judged,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ expose	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
cultural	 ﾠ specificity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ notions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘property’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘ownership’	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Nadasdy	 ﾠ
2002;	 ﾠTully	 ﾠ1994);	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠprimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠorder	 ﾠand	 ﾠseek	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ gain	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ equivalent	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ systems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ (Borrows	 ﾠ
1996;	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠLangton	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2004;	 ﾠWebber	 ﾠ2009);	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
relationships	 ﾠ embedded	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ argue	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ
pressures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ authenticity	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ unjustly	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
subordination	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ(Barcham	 ﾠ2000;	 ﾠCoulthard	 ﾠ
2007;	 ﾠ 2014).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ cases,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ struggle	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ secure	 ﾠ physical,	 ﾠ cultural,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
presences	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠthreats	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrectify	 ﾠpast	 ﾠepisodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠthem	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforces	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠ
3.3.b	 ﾠStruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
pitched	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisplacing	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism,	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ53	 ﾠ
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instead	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠdisempowering	 ﾠmoments.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdirection,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsecuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠ
cultures,	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠ(although	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠremains	 ﾠcritical),	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
problematising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironments	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠ
economic,	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠare	 ﾠformed	 ﾠand	 ﾠconducted.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠmost	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpressly	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠCiting	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠstatuses	 ﾠas	 ﾠfree	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐determining	 ﾠpeoples,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhighlighting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠor	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠeroded	 ﾠor	 ﾠdenied	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠsubject.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠseek	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rearrangement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠorder	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(re)capture	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
collective	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠunjustly	 ﾠhindered.	 ﾠ
Beyond	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ demand	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐empowerment,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ assume	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ variety	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ different,	 ﾠ sometimes	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ
conflicting,	 ﾠforms.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠperhaps,	 ﾠbest	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠby	 ﾠclarifying	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ connection)	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠsynonymous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
40	 ﾠyears	 ﾠor	 ﾠso:	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ usage,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concept	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ powers	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
jurisdictional	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠover	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠday-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠ
functioning,	 ﾠintegrity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthings	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠcare,	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠlands	 ﾠand	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠpolicing,	 ﾠtaxation,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠwelfare,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠ
range	 ﾠof	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠworkings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠBecause,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠsense	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
agents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠconcept,	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
tacitly	 ﾠinfers	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠrelationality	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
measure	 ﾠof	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
group	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘external’	 ﾠgovernmental	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠforce,	 ﾠconsent,	 ﾠor	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsame	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
group.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠunderstanding,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠright)	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠother	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ
(or	 ﾠrights).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠinfers	 ﾠa	 ﾠsharing	 ﾠof	 ﾠjurisdictions	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthey	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠon	 ﾠcriteria	 ﾠof	 ﾠ54	 ﾠ
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geography,	 ﾠpopulation,	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠor	 ﾠany	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠ
groups.	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠso	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠclear	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠresides	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
content	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠjurisdictions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠ
groups.	 ﾠ Of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ equality	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ reliably	 ﾠ
assumed,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠjurisdictions	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ equitable	 ﾠ negotiation	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ parties	 ﾠ (and,	 ﾠ perhaps,	 ﾠ conflict	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreached).	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠobservably	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠ possess	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ others,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠover	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠjurisdictional	 ﾠdetermination.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠclear	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠand	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠvast	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠpotential,	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrossly	 ﾠ
unequal	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠjurisdictional	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠjurisdiction	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
possess,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ approve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ dominate	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
jurisdictions,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ unilaterally	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ circumstances	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin,	 ﾠsuspend,	 ﾠor	 ﾠpermanently	 ﾠoverride	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠ
Self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ context,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠas	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ(Irlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
concrete	 ﾠ link	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠbody.	 ﾠA	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐governing	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ enable	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ determine	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ success	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ
jurisdictions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ enjoys;	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐governing	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ equally,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
jurisdictions	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠdictated	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠgroup,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthem	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠalteration. 
This	 ﾠ marks	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concepts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
determination	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠplay	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ former,	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ understood	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ refer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
(claimed)	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ destiny	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ (Anaya	 ﾠ 2004).	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
underline,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
typically	 ﾠ employed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ marks	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ notable	 ﾠ departure	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproliferated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscourses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
term’s	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwentieth	 ﾠcentury.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠits	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠguise	 ﾠ55	 ﾠ
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and	 ﾠusage,	 ﾠas	 ﾠIris	 ﾠMarion	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠobserves,	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcentred	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠa	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐intervention:	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ model,	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠon	 ﾠinside	 ﾠits	 ﾠjurisdiction,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠagent	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠupon	 ﾠor	 ﾠinterfere	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determining	 ﾠagent	 ﾠdoes.	 ﾠReciprocally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determining	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠothers	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠissues	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠjurisdictions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
interfere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠof	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ
(2004,	 ﾠp.181)	 ﾠ
Intimately	 ﾠ tied,	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ philosophically,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Westphalian-ﾭ‐derived	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠnation-ﾭ‐states,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠdeployed	 ﾠ
here	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ necessitate	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ full	 ﾠ independence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ autonomy	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
similarly	 ﾠfree	 ﾠagents.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠpresupposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determining	 ﾠagents	 ﾠ“have	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
domain	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠwith	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ others”,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ideal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ consists	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ agents	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ left	 ﾠ alone	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
conduct	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfit	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ“base	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependence”	 ﾠ(Young	 ﾠ2004,	 ﾠ
p.182).	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠif	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠseek	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠrights)	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠfull	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠand	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠdirected.	 ﾠ
Despite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpervasiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠpraxis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconception	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseems	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐suited	 ﾠto	 ﾠmost	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
uses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ term.	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ sure,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ predominantly	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐interference	 ﾠ conception	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
determination	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠinvoked	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsupporters,	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠvision	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠ
(see,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠMansell	 ﾠ2003;	 ﾠalso	 ﾠLevy	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfrequently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠis	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠdrives	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐interference	 ﾠconception's	 ﾠ
key	 ﾠassumptions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
No	 ﾠ doubt,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ contributing	 ﾠ reasons	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ rejection	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
‘standard’	 ﾠsecessionist	 ﾠagenda.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠtension	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
historically	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ culturally	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ ordering	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
wrapped	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠand	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠ
histories,	 ﾠ worldviews,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ systems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ ordering	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ (e.g.	 ﾠ Alfred	 ﾠ 2005;	 ﾠ 2009a;	 ﾠ Blackburn	 ﾠ 2009;	 ﾠ Turner	 ﾠ 2006).	 ﾠ Another	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ
factor	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ56	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠidentities,	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠattachments,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐
economic	 ﾠlives	 ﾠ–	 ﾠboth	 ﾠas	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ–	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbound	 ﾠup	 ﾠinextricably	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwider	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠBlackburn	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠBorrows	 ﾠ
2010).	 ﾠ Simply	 ﾠ presupposing	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ calls	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠmust	 ﾠequate	 ﾠto	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠ
risks	 ﾠreinforcing	 ﾠan	 ﾠahistorical	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠstory	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠanother	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠalways	 ﾠdo	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠ
calls	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ autonomy	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ lands	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ resources,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ usually	 ﾠ
include	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠother)	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠeffective.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠnotes;	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠbe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determining	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠflourish,	 ﾠindigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
insist	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstates	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination…ought	 ﾠto	 ﾠenable	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ realization	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ partly	 ﾠ funding	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ services,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ bureaucratic	 ﾠ staff,	 ﾠ
equipment,	 ﾠschools,	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ
(2005,	 ﾠp.143)	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseizure	 ﾠand	 ﾠexploitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
lands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠstates	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠacquired,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠcharity	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
guilt	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
Whatever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ statehood,	 ﾠ (strong)	 ﾠ separation,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ complete	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐
interference	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠconfigure	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ picture	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ concept	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ needed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ relates	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ unfreedom	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
freedom.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠYoung,	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠmatch	 ﾠis	 ﾠfound	 ﾠby	 ﾠshifting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ
away	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐interference,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠcentring	 ﾠit	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐domination. 
On	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception,	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠdisconnected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠborders	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐interference	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠinstead,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelational	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrender	 ﾠthem	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠby	 ﾠanother	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠDomination,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠ
occurs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠwill	 ﾠof	 ﾠanother	 ﾠagent.	 ﾠOr,	 ﾠas	 ﾠDuncan	 ﾠ
Ivison	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit:	 ﾠ57	 ﾠ
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Relations	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠexist	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠor	 ﾠstable	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠor	 ﾠindirectly,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ–	 ﾠarbitrarily,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
relative	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠreciprocation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ
(2002,	 ﾠp.169)	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠwill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
obvious	 ﾠdetriment	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠand	 ﾠindicative	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
domination.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPhillip	 ﾠPetit’s	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠ“is	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠis	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠto	 ﾠeffect”	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠp.93).	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠ
“an	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterference	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgood	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvictim,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
achieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgood,	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbe	 ﾠarbitrary”	 ﾠ(Petit	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠp.93).	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ arguing	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘well-ﾭ‐intentioned’	 ﾠ interferences	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠas	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠor	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘ill-ﾭ‐intentioned’	 ﾠones.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
apparently	 ﾠgood	 ﾠintentions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest	 ﾠto	 ﾠbestow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘gift	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivilisation’	 ﾠupon	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Western	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠstarkly	 ﾠtestifies	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgood	 ﾠintentions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterference	 ﾠis	 ﾠinconsequential	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠarbitrariness.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
group	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomination,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠin	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ vulnerable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ arbitrary	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ agents,	 ﾠ
irrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrelation.	 ﾠ
Though	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ prima	 ﾠ facie	 ﾠ “presumption	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐interference”	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ
decisions,	 ﾠset	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon	 ﾠunencumbered	 ﾠby	 ﾠany	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ–	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠ
agents	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ legitimately	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ intervention	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ actions	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠor	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠ(whether	 ﾠinside	 ﾠor	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup)	 ﾠin	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠ (Young	 ﾠ 2005,	 ﾠ p.146:	 ﾠ original	 ﾠ emphasis).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ norm	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐
interference	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlegitimately	 ﾠsuspended	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ engaged	 ﾠ groups,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prevent	 ﾠ instances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ occurring	 ﾠ
internally	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠintervention,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠmust	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐domination:	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠwill	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
powerful	 ﾠ groups.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ intervention	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ equitable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
multidirectional	 ﾠin	 ﾠform,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠor	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠless	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠas	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
realising	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠas	 ﾠbigger	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠones.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠdetaches	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixation	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
territorial	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠand	 ﾠreconstitutes	 ﾠit	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠlens	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelational	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠ(Young	 ﾠ58	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2004).	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠwill	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠor	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
interrelational	 ﾠties	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠdepiction	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠis	 ﾠput	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants,	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠshe	 ﾠregards	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠparadigmatic	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ stage,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ conception	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ
indirectly	 ﾠ arisen	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ critique,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ though	 ﾠ drawing	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
moral	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ challenges	 ﾠ raised	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtexts	 ﾠand	 ﾠtraditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ theory.	 ﾠ Notwithstanding	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ limitation,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ reasonable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
assume	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ disempowerment	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ couched	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ language	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ core	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
aspiration	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠby	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠYoung’s	 ﾠconception	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ confidence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ thinking	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisempowerment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠit	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠ–	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐domination	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ future-ﾭ‐orientated	 ﾠ aspect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ group’s	 ﾠ needs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control,	 ﾠ
(re)focuses	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ background	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
expressions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ that,	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ things,	 ﾠ operate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ define	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠit	 ﾠleans	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexpansive	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
open-ﾭ‐ended	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
government	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ stands	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ component	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ
meaningful	 ﾠconception	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determining	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠso	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠover	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠterms	 ﾠare	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠequal.	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐government,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠ acts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reinforce)	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domination,	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ inherently	 ﾠ antithetical	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination. 
It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ negotiating	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ differing	 ﾠ senses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ attentions.	 ﾠ
Opportunities	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recapture	 ﾠ powers	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ dictated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠand	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠcommunity)	 ﾠoften	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ impossible	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reject,	 ﾠ regardless	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
achievement	 ﾠsymbolises	 ﾠand	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuance	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
domination.	 ﾠCompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠabsence,	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠoften	 ﾠstill	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠto	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠ59	 ﾠ
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and,	 ﾠcrucially,	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠimpediment	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
modification	 ﾠis,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠyet	 ﾠunanswered,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠby	 ﾠmany	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠ
today.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠtension	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠimperatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplore.	 ﾠ
3.3.c	 ﾠStruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Alongside	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠforces	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisplacement	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠimpediments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
collective	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control,	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠfind	 ﾠnew	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠvoice.	 ﾠThroughout	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ channels	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard	 ﾠ prohibitively	 ﾠ restrictive	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
desperately	 ﾠ ineffective,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ closed	 ﾠ almost	 ﾠ entirely.	 ﾠ Sometimes	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
facilitated	 ﾠby	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠexclusions	 ﾠand	 ﾠdenials	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠrights	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠother	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfacilitated	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinadvertent	 ﾠor	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠ
means.	 ﾠHowsoever	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoccurred,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconstantly	 ﾠfought	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠand	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuppress	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠvoices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ interests,	 ﾠ
experiences,	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ
simultaneously:	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ bound	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ directly,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ wider	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘domestic’	 ﾠsphere,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠ
maintaining	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠin	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠand	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠ
barriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfull	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠformal	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠfull	 ﾠcitizenship	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠenfranchisement	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠto	 ﾠremove	 ﾠdeleterious	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠattached	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
extension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ enfranchisement	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals);	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ obtaining	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ representative	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ legislative	 ﾠ bodies;	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ
establishing	 ﾠIndigenous-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠformal	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegislative	 ﾠand	 ﾠ60	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
executive	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠiterated	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠand	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ great	 ﾠ tension	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ambivalence	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ(Maddison	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠMurphy	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠas	 ﾠMichael	 ﾠMurphy	 ﾠ
notes,	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠ“self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠis	 ﾠusually	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ gaining	 ﾠ distance	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ protection	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ inclusion	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ institutions”	 ﾠ
(2008,	 ﾠ p.186).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ motivation	 ﾠ behind	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ rarely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ achieving	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ unproblematised	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
inclusion	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠmachinery	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠusually	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtackling	 ﾠ
persistent	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstrict	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpaternalistic	 ﾠtendencies	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠignorance	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ needs.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ marking	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ
affirmation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
progresses	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠstate	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠ addressing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ hardships	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ disadvantages	 ﾠ experienced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠare	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠin	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠ strategies	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ fiercely	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ
congruity	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ hopes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘decolonisation’,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ feature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠstruggles.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ realising	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘domestic’	 ﾠ voice,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ devoted	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstage.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
large,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠout	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠsympathies	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠprotections	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠarena	 ﾠ–	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠenforcement	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠworldwide	 ﾠ(Anaya	 ﾠand	 ﾠWilliams	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠCorntassel	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠPitty	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Smith	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠWilliams	 ﾠ1990).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠhas	 ﾠseen	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠaided	 ﾠby)	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠunification	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ resistance	 ﾠ movements	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ borders.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
UN,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPermanent	 ﾠForum	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠIssues	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠWork	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvocacy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ61	 ﾠ
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causes	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ influential	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐governmental	 ﾠ organisations.	 ﾠ
Progresses	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ establishing	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ standards	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠpertaining	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠhelped	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠ
power)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠof	 ﾠmost	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐date	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
advancement	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ introduction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Conventions	 ﾠ No.107	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ subsequently,	 ﾠ
No.169	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠLabour	 ﾠOrganization	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAnaya	 ﾠ2004,	 ﾠesp.	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ2),	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRights	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠPeoples	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUN	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠAssembly	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2007.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠsuccesses	 ﾠof)	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠhave	 ﾠproven	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠnot	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠdependable	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠuncontentious)	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogressing	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠareas	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠlevels,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠplacing	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠstate	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠand	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠ
arenas,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠframe	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
historically	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠframe	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠharness	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠin	 ﾠtackling	 ﾠits	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠframework	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠare	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ arenas	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠ‘domestic’	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠspheres	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
further,	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdevelopments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein	 ﾠare	 ﾠput	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠin	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠunsettle	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠand	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwider	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠworld).	 ﾠ
3.3.d	 ﾠStruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisplacement	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
improve	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ arenas,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ engaged	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ contend	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
entrenched	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsuffering.	 ﾠProlonged	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ dispossession,	 ﾠ displacement,	 ﾠ disempowerment,	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ disruption,	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ
destruction,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ marginalisation	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ compounded	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ systemic	 ﾠ
patterns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ discrimination	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ (more	 ﾠ recently)	 ﾠ rapidly	 ﾠ changing	 ﾠ population	 ﾠ
demographics.	 ﾠ All	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ contributed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ production	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ maladies	 ﾠ
affecting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠlives	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠAcross	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠevery	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ62	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠregister	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
worst	 ﾠoff	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠsociety. 
The	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
matter	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ urgency	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ near-ﾭ‐constant	 ﾠ feature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ agendas	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ
societies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠover	 ﾠ50	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠcountless	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠ implemented	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ banner	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ tackling	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ
inequalities	 ﾠof	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠopportunity.	 ﾠDespite	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠattention,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpersisted.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠguided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
being,	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ professed	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ causes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
suffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠprogresses	 ﾠcould	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade.	 ﾠOften	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdistinctly	 ﾠindividualistic	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠand	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠ
biomedical	 ﾠindications	 ﾠof	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdid	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠ
cultural,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspiritual	 ﾠtraumas	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠ(Adelson	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠ2009a).	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
shift	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ employ	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ needs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
individuals,	 ﾠfamilies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ(Anderson	 ﾠ2004;	 ﾠAdelson	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠKirmayer	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
2003).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠnotable	 ﾠadvancements	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠin	 ﾠkey	 ﾠareas	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠapproaches;	 ﾠin	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact,	 ﾠ
and,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠeven	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠin	 ﾠworsening	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ disadvantage	 ﾠ (see,	 ﾠ e.g.,	 ﾠ Sutton	 ﾠ 2009).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ practically	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠmore	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠdebate.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠassumptive	 ﾠframework	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠovertly)	 ﾠshapes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ understood	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ represented	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ level.	 ﾠ
Stephanie	 ﾠ Irlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠ (2009)	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ “dysfunction	 ﾠ
theodicy”.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠits	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠscholarly	 ﾠusage,	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheodicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheological	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonotheistic	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠpain,	 ﾠor	 ﾠtorment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐powerful,	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐knowing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
all-ﾭ‐loving	 ﾠGod.	 ﾠIts	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠrationalise	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ–	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠobservers	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsufferers	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ–	 ﾠby	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠimperfections	 ﾠor	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ
juncture	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpathway	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfallibility	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ63	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
fallacy)	 ﾠof	 ﾠGod	 ﾠas	 ﾠprotector	 ﾠand	 ﾠsaviour.	 ﾠIrlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox’s	 ﾠcontention	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠstate	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠinterrelated	 ﾠassumptions. 
The	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ temporal	 ﾠ distance	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ enactment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠgovernance.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ brought	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ harms	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ lives	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ certainly	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ
acknowledged	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ widely	 ﾠ condemned,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ injuries	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ rhetorically	 ﾠ positioned	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
corresponding	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ moments,	 ﾠ temporally	 ﾠ removed	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ agency	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
culpability	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ injustices,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ events	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ visited	 ﾠ unto	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ill-ﾭ‐intentioned	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ill-ﾭ‐informed	 ﾠ actions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
society,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠspawned	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠlegacies	 ﾠof	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpathologies	 ﾠtoday,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠare	 ﾠconfined	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ history	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ regrettable	 ﾠ mistakes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ past,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ dimension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠrelations.	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠgap	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ ‘Indigeneity’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘modernity’.	 ﾠ Irlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠ notes	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ authorities	 ﾠ
consistently	 ﾠplace	 ﾠan	 ﾠonus	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠvalue-ﾭ‐
systems,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
align	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ pressures	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ realities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘modern’	 ﾠ world.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ adapting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
pressures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ modernity,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ logic	 ﾠ goes,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ
overcome	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠills	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠbefall	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠills	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠ acutely	 ﾠ felt	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ adapted	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ pressures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ modernity	 ﾠ (i.e.	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIrlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠemphasising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ enough	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ done	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ acknowledge	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
exclusionary	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ oppressive	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ society.	 ﾠ More	 ﾠ specifically,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
‘modernity’	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠ
character,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠidentifiable	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
aggressive	 ﾠ projection	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ (largely	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐Indigenous)	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ interests.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ
‘modern’	 ﾠis	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfaceless	 ﾠand	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠfact	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠare	 ﾠdistinguishable	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnaturalised	 ﾠimage	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodernity,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠ logically	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ situated	 ﾠ outside	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ ‘pre-ﾭ‐modern’	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐modern’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
meaningful	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠto	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠmimic	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠlifestyles	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠ fitting	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ modernity.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ failure	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ skills	 ﾠ needed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠand	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠ
effective	 ﾠ strategies	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ modern	 ﾠ world.	 ﾠ On	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ counts,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠchange	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
resemble	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐adapted,	 ﾠ‘non-ﾭ‐suffering’	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ insight,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ believe,	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ assumptive	 ﾠ background	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ recovery	 ﾠ confront	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ today.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ commonly	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ implicate	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠenactment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdisturb	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠnaturalness	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠneutrality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
modern	 ﾠworld	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠit	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠonto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
communities.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠno	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠor	 ﾠstable	 ﾠview	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
disputants	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠadvantageous	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
nor,	 ﾠincidentally,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠany	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠor	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠ–	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
‘naming’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ disadvantage	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ virtually	 ﾠ all,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
challenges	 ﾠ brought	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presumptions	 ﾠ underpinning	 ﾠ response	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
programmes.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ theme	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ recovery	 ﾠ seeks	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ streams	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ
consideration	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
contain	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresists	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠfamiliarly	 ﾠ‘political’	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispossession,	 ﾠdisplacement,	 ﾠdisempowerment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
representation.	 ﾠ
3.3.e	 ﾠStruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠequality	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ four	 ﾠ faces	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ struggle,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ deeply	 ﾠ interconnected	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
actual	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠeach	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcerns,	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfocus.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠof	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
entangled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠentrenched	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠnormality.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
respect,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdifferent.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
shifting	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠonto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtrajectory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠof	 ﾠequality	 ﾠpertains	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcut	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠfour	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠto	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠ‘internally’	 ﾠcontested.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠspace	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispossession,	 ﾠdisplacement,	 ﾠdisempowerment,	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdenials	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ captured	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘normal’	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ65	 ﾠ
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disputes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠunpack	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠhold	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
considerations	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts. 
Arguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠtimes,	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠcentres	 ﾠon	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender	 ﾠand,	 ﾠparticularly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
claimed	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ collusions	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ patriarchy	 ﾠ
(Huhndorf	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Suzack	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠ to	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisadvantage,	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠgender	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsimultaneously,	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontainment	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠoften	 ﾠalso	 ﾠracist)	 ﾠoppression,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠpositioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠkinds.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠ
structural	 ﾠ vulnerability	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ensues	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ double-ﾭ‐bind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ gendered	 ﾠ
oppression	 ﾠrenders	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠto	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠ highlighted	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠ feminists	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ women’s	 ﾠ
movements,	 ﾠand	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠracial	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠmade	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
accounts	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintersection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠstill	 ﾠis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsum	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠparts.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠrendered	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmainstream	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecolonising	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠsocieties.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ emancipatory	 ﾠ projects	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ arisen	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
consistently	 ﾠneglects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
women.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
status	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠentangled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ sense.	 ﾠ One	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ
themes	 ﾠto	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠblend	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ European/Settler	 ﾠ patriarchal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ has,	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ course	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠera,	 ﾠeffected	 ﾠa	 ﾠcatastrophic	 ﾠdisruption	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintricate	 ﾠ‘balance’	 ﾠof	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠgender	 ﾠrelations.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠhas	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcomplemented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreservation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmale	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠof	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ(A.	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠalso	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠdivisions	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠ
overall	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠdisplacement,	 ﾠdisempowerment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠassimilation	 ﾠ66	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projects	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠ(Simpson	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠ
experienced	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
increasingly	 ﾠ perceived	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ group,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ integrity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠin	 ﾠgender	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwell	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocieties,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠare	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠperpetuated	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ reflect	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ vividly	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ history	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
intervention.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠstands	 ﾠas	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ hope	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ realising	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ return	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ Kim	 ﾠ
Anderson	 ﾠwrites:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠabout	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government,	 ﾠsovereignty,	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhealing	 ﾠ
path,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnever	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthings	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
disrespect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlives	 ﾠof	 ﾠso	 ﾠmany	 ﾠNative	 ﾠwomen.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
vision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠbetter,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠour	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
(2000,	 ﾠp.14)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfact	 ﾠis,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠa	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠcontentious	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle.	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠconfusion	 ﾠand	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠhas	 ﾠarisen	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠauthenticity	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender	 ﾠinequalities	 ﾠ and	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
fact,	 ﾠmale	 ﾠprivilege	 ﾠin	 ﾠkey	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠlife	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reflect	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocieties.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠseen	 ﾠsome	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ male	 ﾠ dominance	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ come	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ fire	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ furthering	 ﾠ
threats	 ﾠof	 ﾠassimilation	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdiminishing	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠJoyce	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ‘feminist’	 ﾠactivists	 ﾠand	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
embracing	 ﾠ‘White’	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠthey	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠweaken	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
attacking	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠintegrity	 ﾠand	 ﾠimpeding	 ﾠunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠvoice.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐
based	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠand	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠis	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠacknowledged	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠto	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠovercoming	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠonly	 ﾠonce	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠregained	 ﾠand	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrejuvenated	 ﾠ
unencumbered	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ control.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ note	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠ forwarded	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ men,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ deployed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagendas	 ﾠof	 ﾠmainstream	 ﾠfeminist	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠoften	 ﾠseem	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
odds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealities	 ﾠof	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠto.	 ﾠBonita	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Lawrence,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ oppression	 ﾠ requires,	 ﾠ principally,	 ﾠ addressing	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ imbalances	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠmen	 ﾠand	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠprioritise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen:	 ﾠ
Because	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠare	 ﾠNative	 ﾠmen	 ﾠreally	 ﾠin?	 ﾠSome	 ﾠNative	 ﾠmen	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmen.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Native	 ﾠmen	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcut	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠstructure.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgender	 ﾠinequalities,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
disproportionate	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ white	 ﾠ men	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ fuels	 ﾠ feminism,	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ doesn’t	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠin	 ﾠNative	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ
(Quoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠAnderson	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠp.276)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠ“feminist	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠoften	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
irrelevant	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
implicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠpractices”	 ﾠ(Huhndorf	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSuzack	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠp.2).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeither	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠ
gendered	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠperipheralisation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
typically	 ﾠincorporated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
disturb	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmomentum	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbuilt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ added	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ light	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ challenging	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐oppressive	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘traditional’	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ
relations.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠEmma	 ﾠLaRocque	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘balance’	 ﾠaround	 ﾠgender	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠoften	 ﾠheralded	 ﾠof	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠand	 ﾠheld	 ﾠup	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠorienting	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠ struggles,	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ automatically	 ﾠ equate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ equality	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsexes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcan	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠbe	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaintenance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
oppressive	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠmark	 ﾠdeliverance	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠLaRocque,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐
acknowledged	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠtackling	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠinjustice:	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠ intending	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ affirm	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ cultures…many	 ﾠ writers	 ﾠ readily	 ﾠ
criticize	 ﾠ…	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠforces	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠthing	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
gloss	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ practices	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ discriminate(d)	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ women,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
generalize	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ romanticize	 ﾠ traditions.	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ over-ﾭ‐riding	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Aboriginal	 ﾠ traditions	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ universally	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐sexist	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
universally	 ﾠliberating	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠ
(2007,	 ﾠp.65) 
For	 ﾠ LaRocque,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ confronting	 ﾠ “imperial,	 ﾠ systemic,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ personal	 ﾠ
dominations”	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ directed,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ “no	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ68	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
persons…should	 ﾠever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtolerated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠname	 ﾠof	 ﾠadvancing	 ﾠany	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠor	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
interests,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ idealized	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ decolonizing	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ process”	 ﾠ
(2007,	 ﾠ p.68).	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ depictions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women’s	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ subordination	 ﾠ fail	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
sufficiently	 ﾠ illuminate	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interrogate	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ multidimensional	 ﾠ character,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
(potentially)	 ﾠoppressive	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultures	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠa	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
hand,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdo	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠseriously.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠmay	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
little	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriation	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubordination	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠmale-ﾭ‐dominated	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasise,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠproffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠLaRocque	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠitself	 ﾠin	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠideals	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecolonisation.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provoke	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ spirit	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ confidence	 ﾠ needed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recognise	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contend	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ reduced	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
colonialism	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ decolonisation.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
oppression	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠacted	 ﾠto	 ﾠstifle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘internal’	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ struggle,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ overcoming	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ
violences	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠmust	 ﾠentail	 ﾠnurturing	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevival	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuppressed	 ﾠethic	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
criticism.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ contests	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ signify	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ dimension	 ﾠ along	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
certainty	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠscope,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠis	 ﾠdisturbed.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠforget,	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠgroups)	 ﾠarticulate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠoppression,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠacross	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠrevealed.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠevident	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ uniform	 ﾠ fashion	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ groups.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ great	 ﾠ diversity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
difficulties	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjuries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmelds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmany	 ﾠother	 ﾠcultural,	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
wide	 ﾠarray	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐standard	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠand	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠof	 ﾠequality	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠrender	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠyet	 ﾠinterrelated	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccessible	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠconnect	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
planes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠabnormalities	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapparent.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ(potentially)	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐dimensional	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠof	 ﾠequality	 ﾠis	 ﾠvital	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ accurate	 ﾠ depiction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ occurring	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ69	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.4	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfive	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠrecovery,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠa	 ﾠlayered	 ﾠlens	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠenables	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠcentred	 ﾠand	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠway,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
see	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠ–	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠchallenged	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠdiscreet	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
subtle	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠovertly	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠways.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
appreciation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ
pervade	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠyet	 ﾠmore	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbubbling	 ﾠsomewhere	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurface.	 ﾠ
Alongside	 ﾠthis	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ provides	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ gaining	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ practical	 ﾠ
difficulties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactors	 ﾠface	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
interwoven	 ﾠwith	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠaction	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhorizon	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccord	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
accurate	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠexplorations	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠ
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v	 ﾠ
Introduction	 ﾠto	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠ
Across	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠchapters,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠframework	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ3	 ﾠis	 ﾠapplied,	 ﾠ
respectively,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠ
examinations	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
range	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠare	 ﾠreplete	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠand	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠ
challenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsocieties.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ why	 ﾠ theses	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ deserve	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ understood	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
‘abnormal’	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠdescribes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
pursuing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ insights	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
perspective.	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠcommencing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠexplorations,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbriefly	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠa	 ﾠcouple	 ﾠof	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ short,	 ﾠ chapter	 ﾠ length	 ﾠ explorations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
highly	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠsocietal	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
chapters	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ comprehensive	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ
Rather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠvividly	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠstreams	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠEstablishing	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠmould,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠonto	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmost	 ﾠconvincing	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠthat	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠvalid	 ﾠdescriptor	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
exhaust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexact	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcopies	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ
Contemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠ72	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
cultural	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠuniform	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsimilarities.	 ﾠ
Different	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscourses,	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠand	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
centre	 ﾠ stage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ each,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ accurately	 ﾠ reflecting	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
important.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠa	 ﾠclose	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠeach,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠbest	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠby	 ﾠflexing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠappear	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠreplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
examples	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthem	 ﾠboth.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifferences,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
diverse	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthemes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠrecovery,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
equality	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠObtaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ
hegemonic	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthemes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠthat	 ﾠarise,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠour	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠbecome)	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ 
The	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠare	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort	 ﾠconclusion,	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠthem	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
offering	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠ‘diagnostic’,	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis. 
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4 
The	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠ
4.1	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
Internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠremain	 ﾠprofoundly	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠcolonists	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate-ﾭ‐eighteenth	 ﾠcentury.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠnote	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠregard	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠlandscape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
terra	 ﾠnullius	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ translates	 ﾠ literally	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ “land	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ one”	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ “vacant	 ﾠ land”	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
underpinned	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontinent	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
entirety.	 ﾠDespite	 ﾠthis	 ﾠliteral	 ﾠtranslation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘vacancy’	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠby	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius	 ﾠ
never	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠignorance	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠalready	 ﾠoccupying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lands	 ﾠand	 ﾠwaters	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠit	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠrights	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠRooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠLockean	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
property,	 ﾠ recognisable	 ﾠ ownership	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ emanate	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ mixing	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠlabour	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘state	 ﾠof	 ﾠnature’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
intimately	 ﾠ connected	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ agriculture	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ infrastructure.	 ﾠ Since	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠdiffered	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
normal	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠdismissed	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠwasteful,	 ﾠtrivial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
primitive	 ﾠ(Behrendt	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeyes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolonisers,	 ﾠ
attained	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccrue	 ﾠany	 ﾠrights	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠland.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius	 ﾠthus	 ﾠenabled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠnarrative	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcolonisation	 ﾠby	 ﾠsettlement	 ﾠof	 ﾠunclaimed	 ﾠlands	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcolonisation	 ﾠby	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠ
(through	 ﾠtreaty)	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠconquest	 ﾠ(through	 ﾠwar),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnewcomers	 ﾠto	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠprotocols	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
systems	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠliving	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthem.	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These	 ﾠ incipient	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ (i)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ prior	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
assertion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ British	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ (ii)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ innate	 ﾠ inferiority	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ people,	 ﾠ
cultures,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ fundamentally	 ﾠ shaped	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Euro-ﾭ‐Australian	 ﾠ
colonialism	 ﾠ ever	 ﾠ since,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ senses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ fuel	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠVirtually	 ﾠall	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthough	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
reducible	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠare	 ﾠtied	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
intimate	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ claimed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals,	 ﾠ groups,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠin	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
myriad	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ cultural,	 ﾠ geographical,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ factors.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ continually	 ﾠ reflected	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ precise	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ discontent	 ﾠ expressed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpossess.	 ﾠ
Comprehensively	 ﾠcharting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠintricacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
chapter,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠtones	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠresonance,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
normal	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠchallenged	 ﾠand	 ﾠunsettled.	 ﾠ
Before	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠon	 ﾠterminology.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ line	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thesis,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ prefer	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ describing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintroductory	 ﾠchapter,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠterm	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠUndoubtedly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠterm	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
function	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstill	 ﾠdominates	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠmany	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠtoday,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ‘Aboriginal’.	 ﾠUntil	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠa	 ﾠblanket	 ﾠterm	 ﾠcovering,	 ﾠby	 ﾠimplication,	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeople(s)	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontinent.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠDudgeon	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠ
note,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠcomprising,	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdiversities,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠhistorico-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠgroups:	 ﾠ
Aboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠTorres	 ﾠStrait	 ﾠIslander.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdisadvantageous	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
suppose	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ essential	 ﾠ divide	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcultural,	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderpin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfact	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
firmly	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmost	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠmanner.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ75	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discreet	 ﾠslippage	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠin	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ‘Aboriginal’	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠreference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠTorres	 ﾠStrait	 ﾠIslander	 ﾠpeoples.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠis	 ﾠpitched	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠTorres	 ﾠStrait	 ﾠIslander	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠregard	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ circumstances,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ try	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
misunderstanding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠI	 ﾠstick	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠreference,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠ‘Aboriginal’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘Torres	 ﾠStrait	 ﾠIslander’	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠcases	 ﾠas	 ﾠnecessary.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘correct’	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠsources	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconvention	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ(I	 ﾠthink)	 ﾠmatched.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ambiguity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ ‘Aboriginal’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ read	 ﾠ
generality	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠspecificity	 ﾠis	 ﾠintended.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠI	 ﾠraise	 ﾠand	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠ
upon	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠupon	 ﾠresolving	 ﾠthis	 ﾠuncertainty,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
ask	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreader	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠ
4.2	 ﾠPresence	 ﾠ
Over	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfew	 ﾠdecades,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ emerged	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principal	 ﾠreference	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdebates	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ geographical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ landscape	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Australia.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ came	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
favour	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐1980s	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠretreat	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
pursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘unfinished	 ﾠbusiness’	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠforcefully	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s,	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠovercoming	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
rejuvenate	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ cultures,	 ﾠ languages,	 ﾠ identities,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ fundamentally	 ﾠ
depended	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ achieving	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
status(es)	 ﾠ(see,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠGilbert	 ﾠ1987).	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLabor	 ﾠ
Party	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ early	 ﾠ 1980s,	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ treaty	 ﾠ never	 ﾠ materialised.	 ﾠ
Instead,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ establishment	 ﾠ shifted	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ placed	 ﾠ societal	 ﾠ
attitudes	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠadvocated	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrand	 ﾠproject	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
education,	 ﾠ communication,	 ﾠ relationship	 ﾠ building,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ attitudinal	 ﾠ change	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
Australians	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠ alike	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ come	 ﾠ together	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
collectively	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlingering	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠ(Behrendt	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠ
Short	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ initiative	 ﾠ became	 ﾠ formally	 ﾠ instituted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 1991	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ
Reconciliation	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ established	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ body	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ76	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Reconciliation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠguide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠnine	 ﾠyear	 ﾠlong	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfronting,	 ﾠ
coming	 ﾠto	 ﾠterms	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegacies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation’s	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠ
foundations	 ﾠ(Behrendt	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠMuldoon	 ﾠand	 ﾠSchaap	 ﾠ2012;	 ﾠShort	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠtelling	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠ discourse,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ which	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
endured	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠits	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠinstitutionalisation,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠan	 ﾠever-ﾭ‐present	 ﾠovertone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
‘uniting	 ﾠ Australia’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ tackle	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ discontent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ suffering.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠmost	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtutelage	 ﾠof	 ﾠPrime	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠHoward	 ﾠ
(1996-ﾭ‐2007)	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consistent	 ﾠ emphasis	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ his	 ﾠ Liberal-ﾭ‐National	 ﾠ coalition	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ gave	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ‘practical’	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ ‘symbolic’	 ﾠ reconciliatory	 ﾠ strategies,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
outspoken	 ﾠ resistance	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ response	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ ideal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
‘Australian	 ﾠunity’	 ﾠinto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ(Robbins	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsentiment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠoften	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsubtly)	 ﾠaccompanied	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠ
discourse	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠis	 ﾠpunctuated	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ rhetoric	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ overcoming	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ misrecognitions	 ﾠ behind	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ violences,	 ﾠ pressing	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠa	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠcentred	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠprosperity	 ﾠand	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠ Australians,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ building	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ respectful,	 ﾠ unified,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ inclusive	 ﾠ
society.	 ﾠ These,	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ doubt,	 ﾠ worthy	 ﾠ sentiments	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ gained	 ﾠ broad	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
demonstrated	 ﾠ aptly	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ mass	 ﾠ mobilisations	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ took	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
commonwealth	 ﾠ capital	 ﾠ cities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 2000,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ cumulatively	 ﾠ saw	 ﾠ almost	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ million	 ﾠ
Australians	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠbackgrounds	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstreets	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarch	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠ
(see	 ﾠEllis,	 ﾠPratt	 ﾠ&	 ﾠElder	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
drawn	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
tacit	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcarry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Central	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠare	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠupon,	 ﾠand	 ﾠacting	 ﾠto	 ﾠreinforce,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠsubversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
sovereignty.	 ﾠKevin	 ﾠGilbert,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠsummarises	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠasks:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠare	 ﾠwe	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconcile	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠto?	 ﾠTo	 ﾠa	 ﾠholocaust,	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmassacre,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠus	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠour	 ﾠland,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠland?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
achieve	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ...	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠa	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠreparation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠaway	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠlives,	 ﾠour	 ﾠlands	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠbase.	 ﾠUnless	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠthose	 ﾠvery	 ﾠvital	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ...	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠhave	 ﾠwe?	 ﾠA	 ﾠhandshake?	 ﾠA	 ﾠSymbolic	 ﾠdance?	 ﾠAn	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠand	 ﾠfeathers	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthat?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Quoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠMuldoon	 ﾠand	 ﾠSchaap	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠp.536)	 ﾠ77	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplaint,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠpremise	 ﾠitself	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
re-ﾭ‐inscription	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠpresumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
progressing	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠteleology	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠReconciliation	 ﾠought,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
normal	 ﾠview,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠrealising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
intended	 ﾠor	 ﾠdestined	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
misguided	 ﾠor	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐intentioned	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠhave	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbecoming.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠGilbert,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
gloss	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘fully	 ﾠlegitimate’	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
elimination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ
enactment.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠquietly	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠcrucially,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠseems	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarginalise	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠothers	 ﾠsharing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconcerns),	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
bracketing	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠis	 ﾠstarkly	 ﾠfamiliar.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
land	 ﾠrights.	 ﾠArguably	 ﾠnowhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlandmark	 ﾠ
legal	 ﾠcase	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠby	 ﾠEddie	 ﾠMabo	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠMurray	 ﾠIslanders	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Queensland	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1992.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMabo	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpopularly	 ﾠtermed)	 ﾠlies	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
step	 ﾠof	 ﾠoverturning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhad	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthen	 ﾠprevailed	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠundented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠnational	 ﾠstory	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠfound	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠ contrary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ jurisprudence,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ systems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠcolonisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrights	 ﾠheld	 ﾠin	 ﾠlieu	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠ
could,	 ﾠpotentially,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠsurvived	 ﾠassertions	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠsovereignty.	 ﾠ
Most	 ﾠimportantly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠlaw:	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠright	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠderive	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcustomary	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠunder,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠby,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠ(Brock	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠWebber	 ﾠ2000).	 ﾠ
Yet,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt’s	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ(in)validity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
legitimacy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ founded	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ drawn	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ
consideration.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠto	 ﾠhear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠwas	 ﾠclarified	 ﾠby	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠBrennan,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcontended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠentertaining	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠstate)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ“fracture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠskeleton	 ﾠof	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ78	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
law	 ﾠits	 ﾠshape	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠconsistency”	 ﾠ(quoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠReynolds	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠp.14).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
keeping	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ13	 ﾠyears	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠin	 ﾠCoe	 ﾠv.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠ
(1979).	 ﾠThere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠwas	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
court,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ summarily	 ﾠ rejected	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ ‘justiciable’	 ﾠ
(McGlade	 ﾠ 2004;	 ﾠ Reynolds	 ﾠ 1996).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ cases,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ stated	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ
sovereignty	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘act	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate’	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmunicipal	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ(Schaap	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
unable	 ﾠto	 ﾠhear	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠillegitimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠviolate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠdepends:	 ﾠtheoretically,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠhear	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠuphold	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinvalidate	 ﾠits	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠFinding	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠillegitimacy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
decision	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠparadox	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠvery	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠpractically	 ﾠunintelligible	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state)	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ logically	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠset	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontinual	 ﾠsubversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠadvancement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ finding	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ signalled	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ performative	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐inscription	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state’s	 ﾠ overriding	 ﾠ
sovereign	 ﾠclaims.	 ﾠWhatever	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrights	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ anchored	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ unshaken	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state’s	 ﾠ legitimate	 ﾠ
underlying	 ﾠradical	 ﾠtitle	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontinent	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠentirety.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
assumed	 ﾠprior	 ﾠand	 ﾠinalienable	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠlands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠcould	 ﾠfind	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples,	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠ legitimately	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ uphold	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ competing	 ﾠ claims.	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠMabo	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsignalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscarding	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ
fiction	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠupheld	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
sovereignty	 ﾠ (Reynolds	 ﾠ 1996).	 ﾠ Insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
systems	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠis	 ﾠacknowledged	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmechanism,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠare	 ﾠthey	 ﾠheld	 ﾠas	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠ
subordinate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
appropriated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Importantly,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ structural	 ﾠ constraint	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠholds	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
relevance	 ﾠto	 ﾠmost	 ﾠday-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠexperiences;	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmanifests	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠvery	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ79	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors.	 ﾠ Elizabeth	 ﾠ Povinelli	 ﾠ (2002)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
observed	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
scrutiny	 ﾠof,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠcultural,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠpresences.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
success	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Native	 ﾠ Title	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ hinges,	 ﾠ first,	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ establishing	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
previously	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠextinguished	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠlegislation,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
proving	 ﾠan	 ﾠunbroken	 ﾠchain	 ﾠof	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘traditional’	 ﾠusage	 ﾠand	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠland	 ﾠ(where	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠand	 ﾠusage	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
principles	 ﾠalready	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠlaw)	 ﾠ(Brock	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠPovinelli	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠNot	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠto	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠrights	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠupon	 ﾠcriteria	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Native	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠclaimants	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“pass	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeye	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠneedle”,	 ﾠas	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠPaul	 ﾠFinn	 ﾠ
(2012,	 ﾠp.6)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠput	 ﾠit,	 ﾠin	 ﾠproving	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠeligibility;	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurview	 ﾠof	 ﾠNative	 ﾠ
Title	 ﾠexcludes	 ﾠany	 ﾠlands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠirrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2),	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠrights	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠ subordinate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ property	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ highlights	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state’s	 ﾠ
assumed	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthenticity	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroup’s	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
land,	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
court	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠdisplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠ
continuity	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐contact	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠday.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmoderate	 ﾠ
leeway	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠadapting	 ﾠto	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
deemed	 ﾠpermissible,	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠclaimants	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠPovinelli	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠ“embody	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘tradition’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘locality’”	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐
cultural	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠ(2002,	 ﾠp.164).	 ﾠSignificant	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ‘traditional’	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeterioration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠnegates	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠ applicability.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ Povinelli,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ establishes	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ moment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ wherein	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ alterity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ rendered	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ examination	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
asymmetrically	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ conceptually	 ﾠ impossible	 ﾠ image	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ authenticity.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
consequence	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ socio-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠ presences	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ approved	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ rejected	 ﾠ
according	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠin	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠresisted	 ﾠexternally,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinternally,	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonset	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠabstract)	 ﾠ
component	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpresence.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
translate	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ pressure	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ constraint.	 ﾠ Hopes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ gaining	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠformal	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdisplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘modern’	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ80	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ pressure	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ endorses	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ authentically	 ﾠ
Indigenous,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠembody	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠauthenticity	 ﾠis	 ﾠrestricted.	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlong	 ﾠstruggled	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠTaylor	 ﾠ2003;	 ﾠalso	 ﾠPovinelli	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ serve	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ perpetuate	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ kinds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ forces,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
moments	 ﾠof	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecognising	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠworking	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
overcome	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ importantly	 ﾠ violent	 ﾠ component.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ Michael	 ﾠ
Dodson	 ﾠ(1994)	 ﾠsees	 ﾠit,	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐definition.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠDodson,	 ﾠall	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
freely	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐definition,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ inherit	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ identity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ one’s	 ﾠ people,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
transform	 ﾠthat	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠcreatively	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐defined	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠand	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠgeneration.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmust	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cage	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠpeoples’	 ﾠimages	 ﾠand	 ﾠprojections.	 ﾠ
(1994,	 ﾠp.5)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠimpediments	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐definition	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(but	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠonly	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof)	 ﾠNative	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠmark	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠan	 ﾠisolated	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
violation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠgaze	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ‘continuity	 ﾠof	 ﾠtradition’	 ﾠ
offers	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ extinguishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ event	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
say,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠseemingly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠdisconnect	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠ
(Brock	 ﾠ 2001).	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ engage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠredefinition	 ﾠis	 ﾠimpeded	 ﾠindefinitely	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠjuncture,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘un-ﾭ‐Indigenous’	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠrights	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠon,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠ–	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
history	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠnarrative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsettler	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠpersistently	 ﾠ
limited	 ﾠconcessions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgrievance”	 ﾠ(Rowse	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠp.81)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ struggled	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ assert	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ presences	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ constraining	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠdescribed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠthis	 ﾠframework	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠoppositional	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ poignant	 ﾠ examples	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ lies	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘Aboriginal	 ﾠ Tent	 ﾠ Embassy’,	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ summer	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 1972.	 ﾠ Following	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ renewed	 ﾠ governmental	 ﾠ rejection	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ81	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ (this	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐Mabo	 ﾠ era),	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ activists	 ﾠ
assembled	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeach	 ﾠumbrella	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlawns	 ﾠof	 ﾠOld	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Canberra	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ sign	 ﾠ saying	 ﾠ “Aboriginal	 ﾠ Embassy”,	 ﾠ declaring	 ﾠ that,	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
government’s	 ﾠstance	 ﾠon	 ﾠland	 ﾠrights	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠrendered	 ﾠthem	 ﾠaliens	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠland,	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠother	 ﾠaliens	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠan	 ﾠembassy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠ(Schaap	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠA	 ﾠfortunate	 ﾠquirk	 ﾠof	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ police	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ legally	 ﾠ unable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ remove	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ protesters	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ site,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Embassy	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠin	 ﾠsize	 ﾠand	 ﾠreputation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠbeach	 ﾠumbrella	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠtents,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠflag	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhoisted	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠa	 ﾠletterbox	 ﾠinstalled,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
embassy	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠdignitaries	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ came	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ discuss	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ sympathise	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ cause	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ
(Muldoon	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSchaap	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ Tent	 ﾠ Embassy	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ episode	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ marked	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ vivid	 ﾠ
rejection	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ constraining	 ﾠ relational	 ﾠ dynamic	 ﾠ inherent	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state-ﾭ‐centred	 ﾠ
recognition	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠMuldoon	 ﾠand	 ﾠSchaap	 ﾠput	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmbassy	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠplea	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠsovereignty,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠperformative	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty”	 ﾠ(2013,	 ﾠp.196:	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠ
emphasis).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠitself	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumptive	 ﾠframework	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
instead	 ﾠpositioned	 ﾠitself	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsymbol	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠand	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlegitimately	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ gesture	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ externality	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ rendered	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ poignant	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
occupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(effectively)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠspace	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠstate	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Embassy	 ﾠ standing	 ﾠ almost	 ﾠ literally	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ shadows	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ old	 ﾠ parliament	 ﾠ
building	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsymbolising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
geographically	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠentangled.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtransient	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmbassy	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠSchaap	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠresembled	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠfringe	 ﾠdweller	 ﾠcamps	 ﾠof	 ﾠrural	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠtowns”	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠ doing,	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ “visible	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dispossession	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ indigenous	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ [and]	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
[effective]	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ lands”	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ (2009,	 ﾠ p.219).	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ profound	 ﾠ
symbolic	 ﾠ resonance	 ﾠ imbued	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Tent	 ﾠ Embassy	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ
transpired,	 ﾠlasting	 ﾠappeal.	 ﾠNot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmbassy	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanberra	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐established	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
numerous	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠsince,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠothers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrecurrently	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠcities	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠrhetoric	 ﾠattached	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdisplays	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠunceded	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠpreferably	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠtreaty.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠwould	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠview	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠdiscourses	 ﾠof	 ﾠreconciliation	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ‘oppositional’	 ﾠperformances	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTent	 ﾠEmbassy	 ﾠas	 ﾠunavoidably	 ﾠ82	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
relating	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ independence,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ driving	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
secession	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
voices	 ﾠwould	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠ–	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠessential	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ option	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ freely	 ﾠ choose	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠMichael	 ﾠMansell	 ﾠ(2004),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
argues	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ full	 ﾠ independence	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ real	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ
fundamentally	 ﾠalter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠover	 ﾠland	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ jurisdiction,	 ﾠ greatly	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bargaining	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples.	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ observably	 ﾠ true	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ great	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ desire	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ separation.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ assert	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠstatuses,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠresist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠ hypothetically,	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ relinquish	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ membership	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠ state,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ identities	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ simultaneously	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
complementarily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠidentities.	 ﾠAgreeing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstraining	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠbefall	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdisagreeing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ(or,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠcan)	 ﾠbe	 ﾠextricated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠunsettle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconventions	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠand	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdomain.	 ﾠ
Whilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠLarissa	 ﾠBehrendt	 ﾠobserves,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ‘sovereignty’	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠtones	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠmisleading,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠobservers;	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ catchword,	 ﾠ expression	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ phrase	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
English	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcould	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccurately	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
community.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsemantic	 ﾠconfusion	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoverty	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
language,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuniqueness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠthat	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠforge	 ﾠwith	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ
(2003,	 ﾠp.103)	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ an	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpresences.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtrack,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐centred	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠseems	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ constrain	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ presences	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ premising	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ inclusion	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠan	 ﾠunproblematised	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoppositional	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ(taken	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ ‘oppositional’)	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ comparable	 ﾠ constraint	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ receiving	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ progressing	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ exclusion	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ similarly	 ﾠ
unproblematised	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpetus	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠover	 ﾠ83	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠ according	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ norms,	 ﾠ concepts,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ grammars	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ gained	 ﾠ
prevalence	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseem	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐suited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
them.	 ﾠ Relatively	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ paid	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ exploring	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
moments	 ﾠ embedded	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ horizons	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ underpin	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ
grammars	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevalence	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠinclusion/exclusion	 ﾠ
logic	 ﾠproblematically	 ﾠconstricts	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠwidely,	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
consistently,	 ﾠappreciated.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠ
purchase	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠimpetus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ
inclusion/exclusion	 ﾠdichotomy	 ﾠsees	 ﾠit	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠregain	 ﾠsupremacy	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrare	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐conforming	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠdo	 ﾠtake	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠas	 ﾠAustralians	 ﾠ
continue	 ﾠto	 ﾠponder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaltered	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsymbolic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠhold	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinent	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠDavis	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
diversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscourses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
area	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠcouched	 ﾠor	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠon	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
‘simple’	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ inclusion/exclusion,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ perspectives	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
easily	 ﾠconform	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmisheard	 ﾠor	 ﾠmarginalised	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠact,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠexpressly	 ﾠseek,	 ﾠto	 ﾠunsettle	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ
Although	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ undoubtedly	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ diversity	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconfigure	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
ongoing	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠunity	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdominating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠare	 ﾠdramatically	 ﾠill	 ﾠ
suited	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adequately	 ﾠ satisfy	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ struggles.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ways,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
disputants	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ standards	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ conventions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ legitimacy	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠinto	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠdisturbing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠideational,	 ﾠlinguistic,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsalience.	 ﾠ
4.3	 ﾠControl	 ﾠ
Contestation	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
only,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presence,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ equally)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ locations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ presences.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ bringing	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ challenges	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠattention	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠalso	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠto	 ﾠunjustly	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠ84	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisempowerment,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
argued,	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ exacerbated	 ﾠ by)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forced	 ﾠ displacement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ lands	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ coercive	 ﾠ separation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ kinship	 ﾠ
networks,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ appropriation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ (including	 ﾠ slave)	 ﾠ labour,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
advancement	 ﾠof	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠof	 ﾠassimilation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentities.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
acknowledged	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ possess	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
ostensibly	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
eras	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuro-ﾭ‐Australian	 ﾠgovernance.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlate-ﾭ‐1960s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ when,	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ pressure	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ changing	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ home	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
internationally,	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ began	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ retreat	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ approaches	 ﾠ
centred	 ﾠon	 ﾠpaternalistic	 ﾠpresumptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠovertly)	 ﾠassimilationist	 ﾠideals.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
so-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ ‘protection	 ﾠ era’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ preceded	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ shift	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
characterised	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠoverarching	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcommands	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠresources	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinadequate	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠserve	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbest	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ(Behrendt	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠTatz	 ﾠ1999).	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠinto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
affairs	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ comprehensive	 ﾠ fashion.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ govern,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ
virtually	 ﾠevery	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠlife	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinvested	 ﾠin	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
institutions.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠBehrendt	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠnote,	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠbreadth	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠafforded	 ﾠsuperintendents	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠprotectors	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠrestrain	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower”	 ﾠ
(2009,	 ﾠp.25),	 ﾠand	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠdistanced	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deeply	 ﾠ paternalistic	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ protectionist	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ideals	 ﾠ became	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
unpalatable	 ﾠon	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintrusive	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠit	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠ
became	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠas	 ﾠunjustly	 ﾠstifling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples,	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠcounterbalance.	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠinterference	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠinto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠlife	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrolled	 ﾠback,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠwere	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
(re)gain	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ affairs.	 ﾠ
Importantly,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠguided	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠarose	 ﾠin	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceived	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠ
protectionist	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠ
arguably	 ﾠless	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠrealisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ85	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
re-ﾭ‐empowerment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrather	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwith	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdisempowering	 ﾠ
aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ protectionist	 ﾠ policies.	 ﾠ Effectively,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ meant	 ﾠ transferring	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠor	 ﾠno	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠareas	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacute	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠcome	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠday-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ move	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ consequences:	 ﾠ first,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ rapidly	 ﾠ removed	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ long	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
organised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠreplacement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
process;	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠand	 ﾠirrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdubious	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠactually	 ﾠconducted,	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠshift	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisturb	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠand	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ rendered	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ
intervention)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠgave	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠ place.	 ﾠ Self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ emerged	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ effectively	 ﾠ
consisted	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ community	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐management	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ space	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
ultimately	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ(Howard-ﾭ‐Wagner	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠlimitation	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠhas	 ﾠendured	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠ decades,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ today.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ inherent	 ﾠ
precariousness	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ arrangement	 ﾠ represents,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
‘self-ﾭ‐determining’	 ﾠ communities,	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ nowhere	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ illustrated	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
controversial	 ﾠ Northern	 ﾠ Territory	 ﾠ National	 ﾠ Emergency	 ﾠ Response	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ commonly	 ﾠ
referred	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNorthern	 ﾠTerritory	 ﾠIntervention	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2007.	 ﾠ
Following	 ﾠreports	 ﾠof	 ﾠepidemical	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠand	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Territory,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Howard-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠ Liberal-ﾭ‐National	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠemergency	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstigated	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ federal	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ intervention	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ affected	 ﾠ communities.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ passed	 ﾠ legislation	 ﾠ
enabling	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠseize	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠin	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠof	 ﾠsixty	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNorthern	 ﾠTerritory,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
step	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuspension	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ(Altman	 ﾠ2007;	 ﾠWatson	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠ
gave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠleases	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠlands	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠsubsequently,	 ﾠto	 ﾠunilaterally	 ﾠextend	 ﾠthose	 ﾠleases);	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ organisational	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ delivery	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplacing	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠin	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠauthority);	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠa	 ﾠregime	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠincome	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠwelfare;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠplace	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠbans	 ﾠon	 ﾠalcohol	 ﾠand	 ﾠpornography	 ﾠ(Anaya	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ86	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
devised	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ implemented	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ consultation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠ(Anaya	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠHoward-ﾭ‐Wagner	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠWatson	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠwriting,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIntervention	 ﾠis	 ﾠongoing,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpreserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ ways,	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ subsequent	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ federal	 ﾠ
government.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNorthern	 ﾠTerritory	 ﾠ
Intervention	 ﾠ symbolises	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distance	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ exists	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
control	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
arbitrary	 ﾠwill	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler-ﾭ‐dominated	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠto	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠunderline	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfew	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠadvantageous)	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseverity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠat	 ﾠhand	 ﾠin	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinaction	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
ever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠon	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠrespecting	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠrights	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠone	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠpurchase,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠone	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠ
put	 ﾠforward	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Rather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpertinent	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunilateral	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ suspension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ occurred.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
equitable	 ﾠ consultation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institutions,	 ﾠ leaders,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ membership	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
affected	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠstages	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIntervention	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠ
expression	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠretain	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠand	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠor	 ﾠremove	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
expectations	 ﾠof	 ﾠgood	 ﾠgovernance.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
sufficiently	 ﾠmet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapabilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠand	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
legitimacy	 ﾠ needed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ (again)	 ﾠ assume	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ distinctly	 ﾠ paternalistic	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠby	 ﾠunilaterally	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠmeans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Realising	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ background	 ﾠ imbalance	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
dynamics	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia.	 ﾠ
Certainly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ years	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ advancements	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
removing	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ acute	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ paternalism	 ﾠ enacted	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠand	 ﾠofficials,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ lives	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ affairs	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ day-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠ basis.	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ fulfil	 ﾠ
roles	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠprominence	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠnational	 ﾠpolitics)	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠtime	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠera	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ(Behrendt	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠ
Sutton	 ﾠ 2009),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indigenous-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠ organisations	 ﾠ87	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠdelivery	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠresources	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
Hunt	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠadvancements	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠmodification,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
is,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ “governance	 ﾠ environment”	 ﾠ (Smith	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Hunt	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ p.3)	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
historically	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disempowerment.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ fact,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
returns	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠremain	 ﾠunambiguously	 ﾠsecured	 ﾠagainst,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
inherently	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠto,	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
control	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠrealised	 ﾠand	 ﾠpracticed	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠor	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠ
remaining	 ﾠ incredibly	 ﾠ important,	 ﾠ nevertheless	 ﾠ fall	 ﾠ desperately	 ﾠ short	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
collective	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠessential	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice.	 ﾠ Insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ dependent	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ times	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ goodwill	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ
governments,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐governing	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ vulnerable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
unilaterally	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠsuspensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Conceiving	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐empowerment	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supremacy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ
problematically	 ﾠ limits	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ extent	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ discontents	 ﾠ
surrounding	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠare	 ﾠentertained.	 ﾠSeriously	 ﾠoverlooking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ arising	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ relation	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ subjection	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ
arbitrary	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠa	 ﾠdenial	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptive	 ﾠframework	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdominates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐inscribe	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ aspect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ dispute,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ instils	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ
precariousness	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ advancements	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ realising	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
practicing	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠevidently,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.4	 ﾠVoice	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ progressing	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ control,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ struggle	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ attain	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
voice	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘domestic’	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠactually	 ﾠtranspired	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ40	 ﾠyears	 ﾠor	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠat	 ﾠnational	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ closely	 ﾠ entwined.	 ﾠ Indeed,	 ﾠ arguably	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ emergence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ Australians	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ scene	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ realised	 ﾠ primarily	 ﾠ88	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ initially	 ﾠ intended	 ﾠ (on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
representative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠnational	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠConference	 ﾠ
(NAC)	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1976.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠNAC,	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠpredecessor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠ
Aboriginal	 ﾠConsultative	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠ(NACC)	 ﾠ(1973-ﾭ‐76),	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ dedicated	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ arenas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ politics.	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠadvisory	 ﾠbody	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠaffairs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠheld	 ﾠno	 ﾠreal	 ﾠdiscernible	 ﾠpower.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠlimitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ NAC	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ regarded	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ
officials	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠforum	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠopinion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ held	 ﾠ accountable	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ provoked	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Conference’s	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcentrate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠon	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternationalisation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcause	 ﾠ(Beresford	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠThey	 ﾠsought	 ﾠand	 ﾠgained	 ﾠattendance	 ﾠat	 ﾠUN	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ
conferences,	 ﾠ offering	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ platform	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ publicise	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠlife	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠto	 ﾠUN	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠfront	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠthus	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠand	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠ
aspirations.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠrealising	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
expanded	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ subsequent	 ﾠ years.	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ despite	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
embarrassment	 ﾠ caused	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ heightened	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ scrutiny	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ conduct,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠyield	 ﾠto	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
advancements	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠ
ineffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠNAC	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠminimally	 ﾠincorporated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠdisenchantment	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠit	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠsides.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ NAC’s	 ﾠ abolition	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ1985,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ
began	 ﾠon	 ﾠdevising	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠand	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠbody	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠAustralians.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ convergence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ representational	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠwitnessed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNAC	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfore	 ﾠa	 ﾠtension	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠ
body	 ﾠ to-ﾭ‐date,	 ﾠ NAC’s	 ﾠ eventual	 ﾠ replacement,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Torres	 ﾠ Strait	 ﾠ Islander	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠ(ATSIC)	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1989.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠATSIC	 ﾠlies,	 ﾠpartly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
sheer	 ﾠscale	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠconsisted	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiodically	 ﾠelected	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠcouncils	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠelected	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠboard	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommissioner	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpreceded	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfollowed)	 ﾠit,	 ﾠATSIC	 ﾠ
possessed	 ﾠquite	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠa	 ﾠsizeable	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠfor	 ﾠuse	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ development	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ throughout	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commonwealth	 ﾠ (at	 ﾠ89	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ATSIC’s	 ﾠheight,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion	 ﾠof	 ﾠAUS$	 ﾠ1	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ(Pratt	 ﾠ&	 ﾠBennett	 ﾠ
2004;	 ﾠRobbins	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ATSIC’s	 ﾠ organisational	 ﾠ objectives	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ enhance	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ life	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social,	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠat	 ﾠlocal,	 ﾠnational,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ(Pratt	 ﾠ&	 ﾠBennett	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠATSIC’s	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
gave	 ﾠscope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠworking	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠin	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠraise	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠ
and,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠto	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠinform	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
brought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠUN	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠforums	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
working	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Rights	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠPeoples	 ﾠ(UNDRIP).	 ﾠOver	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠlifespan,	 ﾠ
ATSIC	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrepresentation,	 ﾠenabling,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid,	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ interests,	 ﾠ needs,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ flow	 ﾠ together	 ﾠ throughout	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
multi-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠand	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Ultimately,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠATSIC’s	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠrole	 ﾠ proved	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ factor	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ demise	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ representative	 ﾠ functions.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ celebrated	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ clout	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ATSIC	 ﾠ
rendered	 ﾠit	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠextraordinarily	 ﾠintense	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠscrutiny.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠmisconception	 ﾠ(one	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠdid	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorrect)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠATSIC	 ﾠwas	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ programmes	 ﾠ (Pratt	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Bennett	 ﾠ 2004).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ
reality,	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠ85%	 ﾠof	 ﾠATSIC's	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ“quarantined”	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠon	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐designated	 ﾠprogrammes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠATSIC	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠnever	 ﾠexceeded	 ﾠ
50%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannual	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ(Pratt	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Bennett	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠits	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
situations	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwas	 ﾠheavily	 ﾠconstrained.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠATSIC	 ﾠbore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
brunt	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ dismay	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continued	 ﾠ failure	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ improve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHoward	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
‘practical	 ﾠ reconciliation’,	 ﾠ ATSIC	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ disbanded	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 2005	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ
failings	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ programmes	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ subsumed	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ
mainstream	 ﾠ healthcare,	 ﾠ education,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ policies.	 ﾠ That	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ simultaneously	 ﾠ
resulted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ removal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ source	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠin	 ﾠregional,	 ﾠnational,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ state,	 ﾠ negated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ formation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ National	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ (NIC)	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ90	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
appointed	 ﾠ body	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “distinguished	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ people”	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ advice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠissues	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠ(Robbins	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvoid	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ created	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ lost	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ few.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ
particularly	 ﾠ acutely	 ﾠ felt	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ level,	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ gap	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ funding	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠat	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠforums	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠATSIC’s	 ﾠabolition	 ﾠ
(Aboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠTorres	 ﾠStrait	 ﾠIslander	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpoignant	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠNAC	 ﾠand	 ﾠATSIC	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
insight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠone	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstruggled	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠin	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠand	 ﾠservice	 ﾠprovision,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠat	 ﾠtimes,	 ﾠ
evidently	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠin	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠand	 ﾠgradually	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
voice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ politics.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ representative	 ﾠ channels	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ also,	 ﾠ importantly,	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠ invaluable	 ﾠ platforms	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ voice	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffectively,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ movement)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ clarification	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ modification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ laws	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ contributed	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ transformation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠ‘normal’	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ in	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠproven	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurthering	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠat	 ﾠhome.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠachievements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐date,	 ﾠ
remained	 ﾠ stunted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ insistence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ held	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
‘aspirational	 ﾠstandards’	 ﾠfor	 ﾠUN	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfully	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠJoffe	 ﾠ
2013),	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠin	 ﾠenabling	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ pressure	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bear	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ states.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ
recently	 ﾠevident,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠRapporteur	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Rights	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠPeoples,	 ﾠJames	 ﾠAnaya,	 ﾠto	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠreport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠ
Rights	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠhighlighted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantages	 ﾠfaced,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtook	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNorthern	 ﾠTerritory	 ﾠIntervention	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAnaya	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠattention,	 ﾠbacked	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
conventions	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠattuned	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠprove	 ﾠ
absolutely	 ﾠvital.	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠremains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠto	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠand	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠadvancements	 ﾠhave	 ﾠremained	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠwithin,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠ
on,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ state-ﾭ‐centric	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ renders	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ inherently	 ﾠ vulnerable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ arbitrary	 ﾠ91	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
removal.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ positioned	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ determine	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
organisational	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠchannels,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ transform,	 ﾠ replace,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ remove	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ deemed	 ﾠ
appropriate.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
typically	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinefficiency	 ﾠin	 ﾠservice	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠor	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
policy,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ consequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠat	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Perhaps	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ greatest	 ﾠ irony	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ area	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
undoubtedly	 ﾠalready	 ﾠseen	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
gaining	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠ
state,	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠ–	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ(Aboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠTorres	 ﾠStrait	 ﾠIslander	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠ
2008).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠdestabilisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠpresumption	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘peoples’	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠNations	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠequate	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcitizenry	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠresources	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠNAC	 ﾠand	 ﾠATSIC	 ﾠhave	 ﾠprovided.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ success	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ challenging	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ legitimate	 ﾠ participation	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠreplicated	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Australia.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠnow	 ﾠpopularly	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
dedicated	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
moreover,	 ﾠbasically	 ﾠessential,	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠconcession	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠways	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠliberate	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠdependency	 ﾠon,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
constant	 ﾠvulnerability	 ﾠto,	 ﾠstate	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠNational	 ﾠCongress	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia’s	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠPeoples	 ﾠ(NCAFP),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrealising	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
independence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ autonomy	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ governments,	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
problematically	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠstate	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠkey	 ﾠ
revenue	 ﾠ streams	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Anthony	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ channels	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
undoubtedly	 ﾠ offered	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ comparison	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ situations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠin	 ﾠnational	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠinsufficiency	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠ
satisfying	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee.	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠ conform	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ places	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ legitimate	 ﾠ shaper	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
facilitator	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠin	 ﾠnational	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
initial	 ﾠsense	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcontinuously	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthese	 ﾠchannels	 ﾠmark	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany,	 ﾠ92	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠunacceptable)	 ﾠsuppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkey	 ﾠrespects,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
remaining	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠvehicle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Contemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠchallenges.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpushing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠformal	 ﾠand	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
episodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠoccur.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠevident	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactors	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠ times,	 ﾠ employed	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ restrictive	 ﾠ bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ representative	 ﾠ channels	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠexert	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠbring	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠestablishment.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠhave	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
far	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠa	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠsecure	 ﾠand	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠprevalence	 ﾠof	 ﾠkey	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠcontested,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
unlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsatisfied	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠby	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠ
4.5	 ﾠRecovery	 ﾠ
Contemporary	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠsecure	 ﾠand	 ﾠaffirm	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresences,	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecapture	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
collective	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠin	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠ occur	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ backdrops	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ widespread	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ disadvantage	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia.	 ﾠ Patterns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ poverty,	 ﾠ violence,	 ﾠ abuse,	 ﾠ alcohol	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
substance	 ﾠ dependency,	 ﾠ poor	 ﾠ health,	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ education	 ﾠ opportunities,	 ﾠ unemployment,	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠdependency,	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠincarceration,	 ﾠsuicide	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpremature	 ﾠ
death	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ desperately	 ﾠ familiar	 ﾠ realities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Australia.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ scenes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disadvantage	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
suffering	 ﾠare	 ﾠby	 ﾠno	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠway	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠby	 ﾠall,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠabundance	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠacross	 ﾠall	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠall	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsettings,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠall	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠregister	 ﾠas	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠworse	 ﾠoff	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠAustralians.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgap	 ﾠin	 ﾠlife	 ﾠexpectancy	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠAustralians,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠnarrowing	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ
few	 ﾠdecades,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠsees	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠdie	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ10	 ﾠyears	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
chronic	 ﾠdiseases	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠmortality	 ﾠ
gap	 ﾠ (AIHW	 ﾠ 2011;	 ﾠ Phillips	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2014).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ infant	 ﾠ mortality	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠ(Phillips	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014),	 ﾠand	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠof	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠ(AIHW	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠAlcoholism	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ substance	 ﾠ misuse	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ widely,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ acutely,	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ majority	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ93	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠas	 ﾠare	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
violence,	 ﾠincarceration,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠ(Paradies	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠinequalities	 ﾠis	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠaround	 ﾠan	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“normalisation”	 ﾠ(Sullivan	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
this,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠimperative	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠindications	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠinto	 ﾠalignment	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“close	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgap”	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠsuccinctly	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠHolland	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsentiment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecurrent	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠsince	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1971	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
comparisons	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐Indigenous’	 ﾠ populations	 ﾠ started	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
drawn	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystematic	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠ(Altman	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Yet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠsway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormalisation	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠholds	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
revival.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsalience	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠand	 ﾠrights	 ﾠdiscourses	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠ
contributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfacilitating	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunity-ﾭ‐run	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠ
programmes,	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠcooperatives	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
disadvantage	 ﾠ(Kowal	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠThough	 ﾠfinancially	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠgovernments,	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠ organisations	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ charged	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ delivering	 ﾠ essential	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ according	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
culturally	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ locally	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ methods,	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ remote	 ﾠ regions.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
emphasis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
devising	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠtailored	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfaced.	 ﾠOver	 ﾠthe	 ﾠensuing	 ﾠdecades,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠ
seemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠworsen	 ﾠconsiderably.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1990s,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠremote	 ﾠrural	 ﾠareas,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠspiralling	 ﾠ
downwards.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐existing	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠwere	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠby	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
destructive	 ﾠ patterns	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ widespread	 ﾠ alcohol	 ﾠ abuse	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ suicide	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ
previously	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠunknown	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdeteriorating	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠ fuelled	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘failure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
arguments	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠonce	 ﾠagain	 ﾠassume	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinterventionist	 ﾠrole	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠovert	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
prominence	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHoward	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠ‘practical	 ﾠreconciliation’	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistaste	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ‘symbolic’	 ﾠreparations,	 ﾠits	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠto	 ﾠdismantle	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠstructures,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ beginning	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Northern	 ﾠ Territory	 ﾠ Intervention.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ
sentiment	 ﾠunderpins	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠthought	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
suffering,	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ return	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ favouring	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ normalisation	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠsupport. 94	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Peter	 ﾠSutton	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠview	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠput	 ﾠforward	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ argument	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deteriorating	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ witnessed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠworst-ﾭ‐affected	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠleast	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
heavy	 ﾠpaternalistic	 ﾠand	 ﾠassimilationist	 ﾠhand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsufficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
narrative	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ suffering.	 ﾠ Instead,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Sutton,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ previously	 ﾠ heralded	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ culture	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ autonomy	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ examined	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
creating	 ﾠand	 ﾠperpetuating	 ﾠsuffering.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠasks	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠcycles	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehaviour,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠfurther,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ local	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ established	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ banner	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
determination	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ unsuitable	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ behaviours	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠspiralling	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠSutton,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperpetuation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cultural	 ﾠ traditions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ ill-ﾭ‐suited	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ
circumstances	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ fuels	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ patterns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ addiction	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ dependency,	 ﾠ abuse,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ poor	 ﾠ
health	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠafflicting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠis	 ﾠparamount,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠrefuses	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠparalysed	 ﾠby	 ﾠsentimentality	 ﾠor	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfringing	 ﾠon	 ﾠideals	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠprotection. 
There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ interesting	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ overlap	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Sutton’s	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
presented	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ prominent	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ divisive)	 ﾠ figures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera,	 ﾠNoel	 ﾠPearson.	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠechoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠarose	 ﾠand	 ﾠaptly	 ﾠserved	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
hunter-ﾭ‐gatherer	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorm	 ﾠare	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠdramatically	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐suited	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠdistorted	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
grip	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpathological	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnow	 ﾠprevails.	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘tradition’	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnow	 ﾠserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperpetuation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠabuse,	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠneglect	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountering	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rapid	 ﾠdeterioration	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠstate	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
ended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠera.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcause	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson’s	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠ–	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠcontainment	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠ“irrational”	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbased	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ“passive	 ﾠwelfare”	 ﾠ(2000,	 ﾠp.141)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government,	 ﾠ his	 ﾠ assertions	 ﾠ regarding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ95	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ownership	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
circumstances	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠand	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpathological	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgained	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcommentators	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormalisation	 ﾠbracket.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ emphasis	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ implicitly	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ conveyed	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠmust	 ﾠseek	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ in	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
overcome	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ disadvantage	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ stands	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ controversial	 ﾠ
aspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecovery.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠas	 ﾠPatrick	 ﾠSullivan	 ﾠnotes:	 ﾠ
Normalisation	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠif	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠof	 ﾠliving	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠnorm.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reflect	 ﾠ socially,	 ﾠ culturally,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ individually	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ idealised	 ﾠ
profile	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremote	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠbureaucratic	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmaking.	 ﾠ
(2011,	 ﾠp.3)	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠis	 ﾠattached	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoerced	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
forced	 ﾠ change,	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ relationship	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ becomes	 ﾠ intensely	 ﾠ dubious	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ normative	 ﾠ
sense,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ undoubtedly	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ profound	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠingrained	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐fit	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘modern’	 ﾠworld	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdominated	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠ–	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpoignantly	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
forced	 ﾠchild	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠthat	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠpursued	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ
until	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 1970s	 ﾠ (HREOC	 ﾠ 1997)	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ inadequacy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ emphasis	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ realising	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠ‘within’	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠis	 ﾠobvious.	 ﾠObserving,	 ﾠas	 ﾠSutton	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠless	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpast	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠnow	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmost	 ﾠacutely	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠis	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠ
important.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠ serve	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ deploy	 ﾠ worryingly	 ﾠ familiar	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
externally	 ﾠ demanded	 ﾠ change	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ communities.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
growing	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ(Indigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠalike)	 ﾠnow	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
causes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
reduced	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠin	 ﾠhugely	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ beyond)	 ﾠ today.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ course	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ invoke	 ﾠ updated	 ﾠ96	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
versions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠideas	 ﾠand	 ﾠsentiments,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠin	 ﾠguises	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpalatable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠsensibilities,	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
contributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew,	 ﾠor	 ﾠexacerbating	 ﾠexisting,	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering.	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ profound	 ﾠ difficulty	 ﾠ involved	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ tackling	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
disadvantage	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠNeither	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠisolation	 ﾠand	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
strong	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠpaternalism	 ﾠand	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠrecovery,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠoften	 ﾠremain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠturning	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscussion.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠneglect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubtleties	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠthat	 ﾠarises	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠcounterbalance	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠNotwithstanding	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolarisation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠare	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠmisses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinescapable	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠreal	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠcultural,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠmaladies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠbefall	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidely,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgenuinely,	 ﾠshared	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
overwhelming	 ﾠmajority.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
realised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards,	 ﾠremain	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠ
contested	 ﾠand	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissues	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ addressed.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ strategies	 ﾠ pursued	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ counteract	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐inscribe	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ displacement,	 ﾠ assimilation,	 ﾠ
disempowerment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdenials	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠfeed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠlonger-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠ
cycles	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠescape	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.6	 ﾠEquality	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ struggle	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ complicated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
exclusionary	 ﾠterms	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠoccurred.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠveins	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
struggle	 ﾠis	 ﾠpermeated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠand	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ unjustly	 ﾠ marginalised,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ
advancements	 ﾠon	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠand	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠissues	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠachieved.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
claimed	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ men	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠ (albeit	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
somewhat	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ manners	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ somewhat	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ degrees)	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ
dominated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
place	 ﾠand,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpoorly	 ﾠattuned	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠworst	 ﾠhave	 ﾠacted	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠ
Marcia	 ﾠ Langton	 ﾠ (2008)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ recently	 ﾠ attempted	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ draw	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ
imbalance	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ politics,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ97	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
critical	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“big	 ﾠbunga”	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠculture	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ years	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ “bunga”	 ﾠ
translates	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“men”,	 ﾠor,	 ﾠas	 ﾠSutton	 ﾠ(2009,	 ﾠp.28)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ“penis”.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠLangton,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpatterned	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhands	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠmen	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠwomen)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠas	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠtactics	 ﾠof	 ﾠbullying,	 ﾠ“personal	 ﾠaggrandisement”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“political	 ﾠtheatre”,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
consistently	 ﾠ “failed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ leadership	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ pressing	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
communities”	 ﾠ (2008,	 ﾠ p.49).	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ result,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ big	 ﾠbunga	 ﾠ way	 ﾠhas	 ﾠboth	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
effective	 ﾠ marginalisation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ women’s	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ arenas	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠand	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠdeterioration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠlife	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠits	 ﾠhold,	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘lateral’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘vertical’	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ extent	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠ virtually	 ﾠ synonymous	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ life	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ today.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ
‘vertical’	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠforms	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠauthoritative	 ﾠ(colonial,	 ﾠstate)	 ﾠ
structures,	 ﾠ institutions,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ replete	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐destructive	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠ‘lateral’	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠLangton	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdestructive.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠLangton,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ forms:	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ physical,	 ﾠ sexual,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ assault	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
abuse,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ subverted	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ malicious	 ﾠ gossip,	 ﾠ innuendo,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ
assassination.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠare	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠdamaging,	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠtrauma	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠprofoundly	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠat	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠLangton	 ﾠargues	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠharms	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠfelt,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsevere	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠby	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠand	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ part,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ severity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ lateral	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ
disastrously	 ﾠ compounded	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ histories	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ gender-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠ abuses	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠhave	 ﾠendured	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhands	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠmen	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
sexual	 ﾠ exploitation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ abuse	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ men	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
documented	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearliest	 ﾠdays	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠentangled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
racist	 ﾠ preconceptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ inferiority	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ‘less-ﾭ‐than-ﾭ‐human’	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠand	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAndrews	 ﾠ
1997;	 ﾠAtkinson	 ﾠ2002;	 ﾠReynolds	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠabuses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
enacted	 ﾠby	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠmission	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
police	 ﾠ officers	 ﾠ (see,	 ﾠ e.g.	 ﾠ HREOC	 ﾠ 1991),	 ﾠ combined	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ racism	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bias	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ(Behrendt	 ﾠ2003;	 ﾠBlagg	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠ
Cunneen	 ﾠ 2006),	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ resulted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ crimes	 ﾠ going	 ﾠ unaddressed	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ98	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
reported	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ resulting	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ (direct	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ indirect)	 ﾠ trauma	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ victims.	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsame	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘justice’	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactive	 ﾠface	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠof	 ﾠchild	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠpursued	 ﾠby	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠso,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠacts	 ﾠconfined	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannals	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
stand	 ﾠas	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠand	 ﾠactive	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlives	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐founded)	 ﾠdistrust	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠgo	 ﾠunaddressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠare	 ﾠmade	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠinterferes	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
places	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠon,	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsolidarity.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠ obvious	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reporting	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ crimes	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ disruption	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠstability	 ﾠand	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠif	 ﾠperpetrators	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠincarceration	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠpunitive	 ﾠmeasures.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdilemmas	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠby	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠare	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
deepened	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠtension	 ﾠand	 ﾠanimosity	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpertinence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠor	 ﾠremote	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠaligned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠmen	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadded	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠand	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ negatively	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ over,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
determination,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠperpetrators	 ﾠare	 ﾠleading	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
prominent	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠfigures.	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠinattentiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisproportionate	 ﾠburdens	 ﾠof	 ﾠlateral	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠ experienced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
(colonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠpatriarchal)	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠmainstream	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprevalence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmale	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpersistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmale-ﾭ‐dominated	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠculture	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsustained	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforefront	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
helped	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠasymmetry	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠadvancements	 ﾠachieved.	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠillustrative	 ﾠexample	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠlies	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
sites	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠand	 ﾠspiritual	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnow	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
land	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ communities,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ enable	 ﾠ claimants	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prevent	 ﾠ99	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(sometimes	 ﾠindefinitely)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠor	 ﾠexploitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠlands	 ﾠif	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠuses	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠunacceptable	 ﾠviolation	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠimportance.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproven	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠsites,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠland	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
failed	 ﾠor	 ﾠstalled.	 ﾠNotwithstanding	 ﾠits	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstitutionally	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠentrenched	 ﾠgender	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠcultures	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontinent,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠand	 ﾠmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠpossess,	 ﾠdevelop,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisseminate	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ spiritual	 ﾠ life	 ﾠ (Moreton-ﾭ‐Robinson	 ﾠ 2005;	 ﾠ Toussaint	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ
2001).	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ‘gendered	 ﾠknowledges’	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠwith	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsacred	 ﾠsites	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
history,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠroles	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠpossessed	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠby	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠgender.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠmale	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
generally	 ﾠforbidden	 ﾠor	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠat	 ﾠ‘women’s	 ﾠsites’,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠmale	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠ
significance	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsite	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
others.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ gendering	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ knowledge	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ place)	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
relevance	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠto	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispossession	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
recapture	 ﾠland	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠand	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠ
importance.	 ﾠPresently,	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠis	 ﾠfraught	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ thing,	 ﾠ gaining	 ﾠ protection	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ site	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ
usually	 ﾠ depends	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ (Western)	 ﾠ anthropological	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
plausibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ claimed	 ﾠ sacred	 ﾠ nature.	 ﾠ Aside	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ obvious	 ﾠ tensions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
accompany	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ sources	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠ expertise	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
qualified	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ issues,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ moreover,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠholds	 ﾠrightful	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠjudgement	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlands	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
reliance	 ﾠon	 ﾠanthropological	 ﾠtestimony	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠ ways.	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ wide	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Western	 ﾠ anthropologists	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
historically	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠbaggage	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdocumenting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
roles	 ﾠof	 ﾠmen	 ﾠand	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠWhilst,	 ﾠas	 ﾠToussaint	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
(2001)	 ﾠ observe,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ anthropological	 ﾠ investigations	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ somewhat	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠinsightful	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgender	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠthan	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
critics,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ certainly	 ﾠ true	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠas	 ﾠlesser	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠ “excluded	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ knowledge,	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ authority”	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ cultures	 ﾠ (Toussaint	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2001,	 ﾠ p.159).	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ
proneness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ write	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ anthropological	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ100	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
complexity	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠhas	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠresistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠgaze	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠDeborah	 ﾠBird	 ﾠRose	 ﾠ
(2001)	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠin	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠtraditions	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
correspond	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠcontent),	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcultures	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠoften	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠdifferent:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
purposeful	 ﾠwithholding	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠresistance.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
commonly	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsubtleties	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠdifference,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠanthropological	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ societies,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ claimed,	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ omissions	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
women’s	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠa	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
bring	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt’s	 ﾠattention	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠneed	 ﾠarises.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsacred	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠsites	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠprove	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt’s	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Arguably	 ﾠ nowhere	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ evidenced	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ infamous	 ﾠ
‘Hindmarsh	 ﾠAffair’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1990s,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ construction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bridge	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ mainland	 ﾠ Goolwa	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Hindmarsh	 ﾠ Island	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ South	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ sight	 ﾠ destroyed	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Langton	 ﾠ 1996;	 ﾠ
Watson	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠA	 ﾠRoyal	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠ
claim,	 ﾠ whereupon	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ judged	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ significance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ site	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ “secret	 ﾠ
women’s	 ﾠbusiness”	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfabricated	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠ
construction	 ﾠ (Watson	 ﾠ 2009).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ anthropological	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
women’s	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudgement,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
piecemeal	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsite	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrevealed.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠ
reticence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaimants	 ﾠto	 ﾠshare	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsite	 ﾠwas	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpause	 ﾠ
indicating	 ﾠa	 ﾠcreative	 ﾠact,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanufacturing	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠIts	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠa	 ﾠprotective	 ﾠact	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠaccommodated.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
male-ﾭ‐dominated	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ arena	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ women’s	 ﾠ secrets	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ
demanded	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreleased,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaimants	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠconsideration.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwomen,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbreak	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠon	 ﾠsacred	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠplace	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠjeopardy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
court,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreluctance	 ﾠto	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ“secret	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠbusiness”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠentirety	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠat	 ﾠonce	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcould	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuspicion,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuggestive	 ﾠof	 ﾠinauthenticity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
deceit.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠHindmarsh	 ﾠAffair	 ﾠexemplifies	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbroader,	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ knowledge	 ﾠ
relating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘men’s	 ﾠdomain’	 ﾠis	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfamiliar,	 ﾠevidence-ﾭ‐
based,	 ﾠand	 ﾠintegral	 ﾠto	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠcontinuance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘women’s	 ﾠ101	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
domain’	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠafresh	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠ(Rose	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠMoreton-ﾭ‐Robinson	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ indicative	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ pattern	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ misrecognition	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ bears	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ
disproportionately	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
pattern	 ﾠof	 ﾠmale	 ﾠprivilege	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠon	 ﾠjust	 ﾠabout	 ﾠany	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠinterpretation,	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠ perpetuated	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ strengthened	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ patriarchal	 ﾠ history	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ composition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Settler	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocieties,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠmen	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpassive	 ﾠparties	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubordination	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠauthority;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoften	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠup	 ﾠactive	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠof	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote,	 ﾠseen	 ﾠit	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠattention	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠfact	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐
faceted	 ﾠsubordination	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠprominence	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠserious	 ﾠ
concern	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠvisibility	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠMarcia	 ﾠLangton,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
criticises	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ “plight	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ children	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ remote	 ﾠ
areas”	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“parlour	 ﾠgames”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐hand	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ knowledge	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ
specifically	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“Aboriginal	 ﾠradicals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsouth”	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.63).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠNorthern	 ﾠTerritory	 ﾠ
Intervention,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ Langton	 ﾠ notes,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ condemned	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ purely	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ violating,	 ﾠ
whereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠand	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ
affected	 ﾠby	 ﾠit	 ﾠare	 ﾠmarkedly	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠconstructed.	 ﾠLangton’s	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠvisibility	 ﾠalone	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠenough.	 ﾠToo	 ﾠoften,	 ﾠ“[t]he	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
vulnerable	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ absent,	 ﾠ except	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ symbols	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fantasia”	 ﾠ (Langton	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ p.59),	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠ appropriated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ideological	 ﾠ agendas	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
little	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠor	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠownership.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠpersist	 ﾠas	 ﾠdiscourses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠoutwardly	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠaround	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
emancipation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ guilty	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ enacting	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ failing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disturb	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
patterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠaround.	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠremote	 ﾠareas	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠface	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcampaigns	 ﾠ–	 ﾠare	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐represented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstruggles.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠalignment	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠassumed,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠ(con)test	 ﾠthese	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms	 ﾠare	 ﾠlimited.	 ﾠ102	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The	 ﾠ examples	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ brief	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ respects,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠsuperficial	 ﾠsnapshot	 ﾠof	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠplays	 ﾠout	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
emerge	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠlimitations,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠevery	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle,	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠabound	 ﾠand	 ﾠserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠand	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠstruggles.	 ﾠPotentialities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠenacting	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
linger	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠno	 ﾠcircumstance	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠand	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
purely	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠinfluences,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinuances	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
oppressive	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠor	 ﾠculture.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmark	 ﾠan	 ﾠextricable	 ﾠconfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ resists	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ isolate	 ﾠ individual	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ causes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
uncontroversial	 ﾠfashion.	 ﾠ
4.7	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠ
demonstrates	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠentanglement	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ
areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ struggle,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discontents	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠraise	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠaround	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠordering	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
time	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠways	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormality.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ secure	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ physical,	 ﾠ cultural,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ landscape,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
recapture	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ autonomy,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ suppressions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ voice,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ recovery,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠentrenched	 ﾠassumptive	 ﾠframeworks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
seem	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐equipped	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠ(let	 ﾠalone	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto)	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ injustices	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ claim.	 ﾠ What	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ more,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ scenes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ
abnormality	 ﾠare	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠentangled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠstreams	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcut	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠ
disturbing	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ presumptions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘normal’	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
dispute	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠ
range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ importantly	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
(though	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunrelated)	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
standardly	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonialism,	 ﾠand	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
aspirations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠacross	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
radical	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ stable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ uncontroversial	 ﾠ ground	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ
parameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠrevealed.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjuries	 ﾠ103	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
experienced,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠovercoming	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealised,	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠpervade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠ
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5 
The	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠ
5.1	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
Internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠbecause,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠformal	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
formed	 ﾠa	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
colonial-ﾭ‐Settler	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠ
nullius	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠhere;	 ﾠcertainly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠtoo.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠnowhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpoignantly	 ﾠdisplayed	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRoyal	 ﾠProclamation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1763,	 ﾠissued	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠstem	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
flow	 ﾠof	 ﾠsettlement	 ﾠonto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠlands	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠits	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠas	 ﾠundisputed	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continent	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ end	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ French	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ War.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Proclamation	 ﾠdecreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠlands	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhenceforth	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠceded	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠopen	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠthus	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠtraction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexpressly	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“sovereignty,	 ﾠ
protection,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdominion”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCrown.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠassertion	 ﾠof	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠtitle	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠlands	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠconspicuously	 ﾠunderstated	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠlies	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProclamation	 ﾠ
arose	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠinability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠnations	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠappease	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
provoke	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠ(Lawrence	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠassertions	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
doctrine	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforemost	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠtook	 ﾠits	 ﾠlead	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠto	 ﾠcolonial-ﾭ‐106	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Settler	 ﾠ sources,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ assumed	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ possess	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ North	 ﾠ American	 ﾠ
continent	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠentirety	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠimagined	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhad	 ﾠwon	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
seeing	 ﾠoff	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcompetitors,	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrance.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠseek	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠfurtherance	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠensuing	 ﾠcenturies	 ﾠ(albeit	 ﾠrather	 ﾠinconsistently),	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProclamation	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsuperimposed	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commitments	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius.	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthis	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠterra	 ﾠnullius	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠ entanglement	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ colonial-ﾭ‐
Settler	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠto	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠdegrees	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠformal	 ﾠstructuring	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Australian	 ﾠ context.	 ﾠ Though,	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ times,	 ﾠ treaty	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ done	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ shield	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
acute	 ﾠfrauds	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐building	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
inflicted,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ retained	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ traction	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ utilised	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠera	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpose	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠabuses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠenacted	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustified.	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠof	 ﾠmost	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
regard	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠtreaties	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠpast	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠrecognition)	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠlands	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠabsolute	 ﾠsovereignty.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠtreaties	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠused	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠfor	 ﾠland	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ North	 ﾠ
American	 ﾠcontinent	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠEuropeans	 ﾠarrived,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnever	 ﾠknowingly	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
willingly	 ﾠsurrendered	 ﾠ(Tully	 ﾠ1995;	 ﾠTurner	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠ
figured,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contents	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ treaties	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ honoured,	 ﾠ
ignored,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ misinterpreted	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ course	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ history	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ
importance.	 ﾠEqually,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfigured	 ﾠhistorically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
sign	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠtreaties	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠuncontentious)	 ﾠ
feature	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ say	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ matters	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ sections	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
chapter.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠ
feature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
investigation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ today	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disturb	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ conventions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ practice.	 ﾠ Before	 ﾠ moving	 ﾠ on,	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however,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠagain	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠ
employed	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠcultural-ﾭ‐historical	 ﾠgroupings	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
recognised	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext:	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations,	 ﾠInuit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠMétis.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠgroupings	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠany	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠhomogeneity	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrefer,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠin	 ﾠhistorical,	 ﾠgeographical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
groupings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠidentification	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠmost	 ﾠoften	 ﾠturns.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenerality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
policies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ typically	 ﾠ fix	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ gaze.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ follow	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ convention	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ follows,	 ﾠ using,	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ relevant,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ ‘First	 ﾠ Nations’,	 ﾠ ‘Inuit’,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
‘Métis’	 ﾠto	 ﾠmark	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecificity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠand	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠI	 ﾠoffer,	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠas	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnecessary.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠI	 ﾠagain	 ﾠ
follow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconvention	 ﾠof	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ(capitalised)	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwith	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠis	 ﾠoccasionally	 ﾠat	 ﾠodds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ ‘Aboriginal’,	 ﾠ ‘Native’,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lesser	 ﾠ extent,	 ﾠ
‘Indian’	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠsides,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠoften	 ﾠpertain	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠ‘Aboriginal	 ﾠrights’,	 ﾠ‘Aboriginal	 ﾠtitle’).	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠterms	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠareas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠconformance	 ﾠseems	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
mark	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠI	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠI	 ﾠmake	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
attempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠalter	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠsources	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshare	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconvention.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.2	 ﾠPresence	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ today	 ﾠ constitutionally	 ﾠ recognised	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ possessing	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ statuses	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ enjoyed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ
Canadians.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠ reflects	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ combination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ factors,	 ﾠ including:	 ﾠ (1)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠ
autonomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlands	 ﾠand	 ﾠwaters	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovinces	 ﾠand	 ﾠterritories	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanada;	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠfiduciary	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘protect’	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠ–	 ﾠset	 ﾠin	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRoyal	 ﾠProclamation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
1763	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ enshrined	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ section	 ﾠ 91(24)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canada’s	 ﾠ founding	 ﾠ legislation,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Constitution	 ﾠ Act,	 ﾠ 1867;	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ (3)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ relevance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ treaty	 ﾠ
agreements	 ﾠentered	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsince)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠcoincide	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘Aboriginal	 ﾠrights’,	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠits	 ﾠ108	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repatriation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1982,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠaffirmed	 ﾠin	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ35(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠConstitution,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠsimply):	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠaboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaboriginal	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
hereby	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠand	 ﾠaffirmed.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠentrenchment	 ﾠof	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠrights	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠJust	 ﾠa	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwas	 ﾠactively	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ assimilation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ eradication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
differentiated	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstatuses.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexemplified	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠissued	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Liberal	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠof	 ﾠPierre	 ﾠTrudeau	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1969,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠset	 ﾠforth	 ﾠa	 ﾠvision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
state-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠstripped	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatuses,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠbuilt	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠa	 ﾠradical	 ﾠequality	 ﾠof	 ﾠcitizenship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠall	 ﾠCanadians.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
paper	 ﾠput	 ﾠit:	 ﾠ
Indian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠCanadians	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠwith	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠby	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠsince	 ﾠEuropeans	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Canada.	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndians	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠdisadvantaged	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
apart.	 ﾠ
(Government	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ1969)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ“special	 ﾠtreatment”	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhere	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ shaped	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ treaty	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ fiduciary	 ﾠ obligations,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠhad	 ﾠseen	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠrhetorically	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠaction	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ‘special’	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠa	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠprovocative	 ﾠturn	 ﾠof	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscrimination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhad	 ﾠactually	 ﾠso	 ﾠoften	 ﾠentailed.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
history,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠup	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠhad	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠa	 ﾠkey	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
task	 ﾠas	 ﾠ(more	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐positioned)	 ﾠguardian	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ everything	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ‘civilise’	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Euro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠ
society.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenforcement	 ﾠof	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠaggressive	 ﾠ
assimilation	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠon	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠindependence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠ
specifically	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠcohesion	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠerode	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠidentities.	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Arguably	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ striking	 ﾠ example	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ latter,	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
comprehensiveness	 ﾠand	 ﾠsheer	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct,	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1876	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
still	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ(albeit	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmodified	 ﾠform).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
legislation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠarose	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠfiduciary	 ﾠ
obligations	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ applied	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ First	 ﾠ Nations,	 ﾠ treating	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ effectively	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
homogenous	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ(Belanger	 ﾠ&	 ﾠNewhouse	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠAct	 ﾠprincipally	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ
First	 ﾠNations	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“wards	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate”	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠto	 ﾠopen	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠlives	 ﾠand	 ﾠlands	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠintrusive	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmanagement.	 ﾠIts	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
until	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ recently	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ covered	 ﾠ virtually	 ﾠ every	 ﾠ aspect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ community	 ﾠ social,	 ﾠ political,	 ﾠ
economic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠlife	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠlands	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠhad	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠ reduced	 ﾠ (Tully	 ﾠ 1995),	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intention	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ motion	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ
dissolve	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ identities	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ eliminate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ
burdens	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ represented.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ process,	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthreatened	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠminimised.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthose	 ﾠregistered	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
full	 ﾠcitizenship	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ–	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠenfranchisement	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠown	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠ(Blackburn	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
voluntarily	 ﾠde-ﾭ‐registering	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘Indian’	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvoluntarily	 ﾠde-ﾭ‐registered	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contravening	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ Act),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ losing	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ special	 ﾠ
entitlements	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠNotably,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
reserve	 ﾠ lands	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ actively	 ﾠ participate	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ arenas	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠ life.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ although	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ carried	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ injurious	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠto	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠfamilies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ pressing	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ultimate	 ﾠ eradication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ differentiated	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
statuses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcoercively	 ﾠsituating	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
positions	 ﾠ whereby	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ justification	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ removal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ special	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
enforced,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ ultimately,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ assumed,	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
obsolescence	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠresidual	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠidentities.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ destructive	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ intent,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ remained	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠtoday)	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstatuses	 ﾠ
amongst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThough	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intention	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ eliminating	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ category	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠturning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠ–	 ﾠits	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠ110	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠstill	 ﾠpowerfully	 ﾠreflects,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠways	 ﾠprotects,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠit	 ﾠapplies.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
intrusive	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsince	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrepealed	 ﾠand,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠmany	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠ
still	 ﾠresent	 ﾠits	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠform,	 ﾠothers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfound	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠresource	 ﾠin	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ areas.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
ambivalence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples)	 ﾠtoday:	 ﾠ
standing	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ symbol	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ weapon	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Euro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠcolonialism,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
embodying	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreserving	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdistinctiveness	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
protect.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1969	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠproposed,	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepeal	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubsume	 ﾠall	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmainstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ marking	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ step	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ culmination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state’s	 ﾠ long-ﾭ‐
running	 ﾠassimilative	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠstep	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠit.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠdid	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠretention	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ progressive	 ﾠ stance	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ history	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
differentiated	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ statuses	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ rights.	 ﾠ On	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ terms,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠequal	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfullest	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠequality	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠpossess.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠpresumption,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠseemingly	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠas	 ﾠunavoidable,	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simultaneously	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ full	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ
society	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠrights.	 ﾠ
Unsurprisingly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ vision	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ White	 ﾠ Paper	 ﾠ held	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ sway	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ leaders	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ voices.	 ﾠ Legislating	 ﾠ away	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ name	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “equality”	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ widely	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ thinly-ﾭ‐veiled	 ﾠ
“programme	 ﾠof	 ﾠextermination	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠassimilation”	 ﾠ(Harold	 ﾠCardinal	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠTurner	 ﾠ
2006,	 ﾠp.25)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠextinguish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
legitimacy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠto	 ﾠpose,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠmark	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
irreparable	 ﾠ rupture	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ connections	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ (Cardinal	 ﾠ 2000).	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ producing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ desired	 ﾠ outcome	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ finally	 ﾠ subsuming	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcommunity,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ
instead	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠand	 ﾠadded	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠ impetus	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ debates	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ (Belanger	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ111	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Newhouse	 ﾠ2004;	 ﾠJull	 ﾠ2001).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠresurgence	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠland	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠcases	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
provincial	 ﾠand	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠMcNeil	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
inclusion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ section	 ﾠ 35(1)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ repatriated	 ﾠ Constitution	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ aided	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
continuing	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubstantiate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠrights	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ
Besides	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠera	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispute,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠepisode	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠ
insomuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠclear	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
run	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ today.	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ heart	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
matter	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ manner	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples’	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠincorporation	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalways	 ﾠcentred	 ﾠon	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
groups,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ equal	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ (though	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ identical	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ form)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ claimed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ
colonisers	 ﾠand	 ﾠsettlers	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
disputants,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ underpin	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠand	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠrights	 ﾠgain	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠmeaning.	 ﾠThough,	 ﾠundoubtedly,	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠ
worked	 ﾠto	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐interpret,	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐define,	 ﾠlimit,	 ﾠor	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠignore	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignties	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ250	 ﾠyears	 ﾠor	 ﾠso	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘domesticate’	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeliminated	 ﾠoutright	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdulled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
felt	 ﾠand	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠthemselves.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ denial	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ continues	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ meet	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
sovereignty	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠis	 ﾠglimpsed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthat	 ﾠepisode	 ﾠ
arguably	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠan	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
considerably	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ overt	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ typical	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ era,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ difficulty	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
illustrates	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ reconciling	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state’s	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ impulses	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ liberal	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
understandings	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ continues	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ
relevance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Dale	 ﾠ Turner	 ﾠ (2006)	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ useful	 ﾠ discussion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ aspect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠ context.	 ﾠ Assessing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ developments	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ liberal	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠ liberal)	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ space	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ differentiated	 ﾠ
statuses	 ﾠand	 ﾠrights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccommodated,	 ﾠTurner	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ112	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ approaches	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ receptive	 ﾠ of,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ generous	 ﾠ
towards,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠ–	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠas	 ﾠmany	 ﾠCanadians	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ
too	 ﾠgenerous	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
sovereignty	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠto	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠrights.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠostensibly	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠof	 ﾠliberalism	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
“fundamental	 ﾠdisrespect”	 ﾠinsomuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubvert	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples’	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
expressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠthey	 ﾠface	 ﾠ(Turner	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠp.69).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here,	 ﾠTurner	 ﾠexamines	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠWill	 ﾠKymlicka	 ﾠ(1989;	 ﾠ1995)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
constructs	 ﾠa	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠdefence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠextending	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠ lands	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ resources.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ Kymlicka’s	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ goes	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
currently	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠdecidedly	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviews	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠarena	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠ
Turner	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ falls	 ﾠ short	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ adequate	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
sovereignty	 ﾠclaims.	 ﾠPrincipally,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠKymlicka	 ﾠgives	 ﾠ
rests	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ ahistorical	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ rationality,	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ excludes	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ defining	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ responds.	 ﾠ Kymlicka	 ﾠ
presents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠare,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠ‘owed’	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠincorporation	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgross	 ﾠ
violences	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ accompanied	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ resulted	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ process.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ underlying	 ﾠ
impulse,	 ﾠTurner	 ﾠfinds,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreparative	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rationally	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ theory	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ distributive	 ﾠ justice.	 ﾠ That	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ say,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
distinctive	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisadvantages	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
distresses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation,	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
account,	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠderives	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupremacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsovereignty.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
rights	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ albeit,	 ﾠ perhaps,	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ extensive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ useful	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠemanate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠorder	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠmeted	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠ
truly	 ﾠmark	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠexternally	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠ
rooted	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠTurner,	 ﾠKymlicka’s	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠahistorically:	 ﾠthough	 ﾠprofessing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ drive	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ present,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ
nevertheless	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐inscribes	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ dimension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ injustices	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ fundamentally	 ﾠ
misrecognising	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ113	 ﾠ
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with	 ﾠit.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠit	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠsanctions	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
state-ﾭ‐building	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlie	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠsympathises	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠplights	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠ
Understanding	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ suppressive	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ progressive	 ﾠ
liberal	 ﾠ justifications	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ differentiated	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ illustrates	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
depths	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccommodating	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠruns	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecuring	 ﾠof	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠrights	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠclass	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rights	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠbelies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠremain	 ﾠsubstantively	 ﾠ
undefined	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrecognition.	 ﾠQuite	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠrights	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
mean	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand,	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
class	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ citizen	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ connection	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠ–	 ﾠremains	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠcontested.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ steadfastly	 ﾠ unwilling	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ unable)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ entertain	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Aboriginal	 ﾠrights	 ﾠcan	 ﾠderive	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠactive	 ﾠand	 ﾠunrelinquished	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
obsolete,	 ﾠdissolved,	 ﾠor	 ﾠdomesticated	 ﾠ–	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignty.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
profound	 ﾠ disparity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ conceived	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
implications	 ﾠunderstood.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠin	 ﾠTurner’s	 ﾠview:	 ﾠ
[U]ntil	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠas	 ﾠequals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
meaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠ–	 ﾠlegislative	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeanings	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠas	 ﾠfound	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ35(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠwill	 ﾠremain	 ﾠundefined	 ﾠand	 ﾠelusive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠmakers.	 ﾠ
(2006,	 ﾠp.67) 
Insofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠrights	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠmark	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirected,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠthey	 ﾠface.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠunderlining	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠby	 ﾠno	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠuncommon	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠfull	 ﾠsecession	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ underpin	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ sovereignty.	 ﾠ Many	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ
argue	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘re-ﾭ‐found’	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ relationship	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠon	 ﾠmore	 ﾠjust,	 ﾠrespectful,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠbases	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ case,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ resistance	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ114	 ﾠ
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progressive	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠor	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
options	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠin	 ﾠeither	 ﾠdirection,	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ unproblematised.	 ﾠ Many	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ individuals,	 ﾠ families,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠprofess	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠidentifications	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠ
live)	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠIndigeneity.	 ﾠMany,	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmost,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠregard	 ﾠfull	 ﾠ
citizenship	 ﾠrights	 ﾠas	 ﾠCanadians	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠimportance,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpress	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
multiple,	 ﾠ overlapping,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ differentiated	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ citizenship	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ nationalities	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Blackburn	 ﾠ 2009).	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ regularly	 ﾠ refuse	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ‘Canadian’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ anything	 ﾠ like	 ﾠ mutually	 ﾠ exclusive	 ﾠ
categories	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ identity,	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ conceptually	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ practically,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
radical	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠways	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠallow.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠair	 ﾠof	 ﾠtension	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠshape	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠas	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠnot	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠparty	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠhave	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠ‘modern	 ﾠtreaties’	 ﾠor	 ﾠ‘comprehensive	 ﾠagreements’	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ secure	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ presences	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ land,	 ﾠ protect	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ
interests,	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ compensation,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ move	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
government.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠundisputed	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠ–	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠrecognitions	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠpositioning	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠas	 ﾠsubordinate	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠupon,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
highly	 ﾠ charged	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ proves	 ﾠ consistently	 ﾠ divisive.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ
doubtful	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠdiminution	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠway	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠeven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmost	 ﾠactively	 ﾠpursued	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠagreements,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
doing	 ﾠso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠ(what	 ﾠare	 ﾠseen	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe)	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠserve	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecure	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠand	 ﾠCorntassel	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠTully	 ﾠ2000),	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠresonate	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ decolonising	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpresences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfraught	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠand	 ﾠuncertainty.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.3	 ﾠControl	 ﾠ
Since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1980s,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠacross	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrecaptured	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ reduced	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interference	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ
authorities	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social,	 ﾠ political,	 ﾠ economic,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ life.	 ﾠ This	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trend	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐empowerment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbolstered	 ﾠby	 ﾠformal	 ﾠstate	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐
1990s,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠback	 ﾠof	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠand	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRoyal	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠon	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠPeoples	 ﾠ(RCAP),	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
understood	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“inherent”	 ﾠright	 ﾠand,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ35(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ‘inherent’	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠright	 ﾠinfers	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ
though	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠis	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠand	 ﾠaffirmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
constitutional	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠit.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠinherited	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ virtue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠ autonomy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
ancestors,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ lies,	 ﾠ therefore,	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ systems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ (Borrows	 ﾠ
2010).	 ﾠSecuring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠwas	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state’s	 ﾠclear	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘contingent’	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠrender	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ dependent	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ supremacy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ
sovereignty	 ﾠ(Morse	 ﾠ1999).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠformal	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠrights	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠheralded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠvictory	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠstep	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisempowerments	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Euro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠvery	 ﾠclear	 ﾠin	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ
nation	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠshould	 ﾠenhance	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠof	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠfederation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Aboriginal	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠisolation,	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
apart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ
(Government	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ2010)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmessage	 ﾠis	 ﾠunambiguous:	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠelse	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠentail	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfer,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
government	 ﾠrights	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠand	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠstarkly	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecognising	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘inherent	 ﾠright’,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
formal	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ something	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ continually	 ﾠ
demonstrated	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ30	 ﾠyears	 ﾠor	 ﾠso,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠcoupled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠpresumptions,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinclination	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“rules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame”,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak,	 ﾠ116	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of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ (Irlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠ 2009,	 ﾠ p.61).	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ acting	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ lives	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ monopolising	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ
effective	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ possible,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ determine	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ
freedom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠare	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠnegotiation	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠto	 ﾠset	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠapprove	 ﾠor	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ proposes	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ members.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ dictates	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
timeframe	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnegotiation	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconcluded,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠconducted,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠvalid	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
‘legitimate’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘illegitimate’	 ﾠ negotiating	 ﾠ partners,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ besides	 ﾠ
(Irlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠRegan	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrule-ﾭ‐setting	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠ
distributions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ possible,	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ essentially	 ﾠ
unaltered	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠall	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbureaucratic	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ administrative	 ﾠ restructuring	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ occur,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐governing	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠremains	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠintact.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapability	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠright	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠ
light	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ underlying	 ﾠ sovereignty)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ intervene	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ affairs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ unilaterally	 ﾠ determined	 ﾠ basis.	 ﾠ Although	 ﾠ
episodes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ interference	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ infrequent	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
government,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ interference	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ basically	 ﾠ undisturbed,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
governing	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠremain	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠreal	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠmany	 ﾠto	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠvehicle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠovercoming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠdisempowerment.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠ
puts	 ﾠit,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacute	 ﾠdisempowerments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠremoved,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
government	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠstill	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠchain	 ﾠ“strung	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindigenous	 ﾠneck”,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ“offers	 ﾠmore	 ﾠroom	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ…	 ﾠstill	 ﾠties	 ﾠour	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpulls	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠend”	 ﾠ(2009a,	 ﾠp.11).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ seriously	 ﾠ disturb	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠsuppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠin	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrespects	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠinfringements	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples.	 ﾠ
David	 ﾠNadasdy	 ﾠ(2012)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠ
treaty	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYukon.	 ﾠNadasdy	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠissue	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ
expectations	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ attaches	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ virtue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ117	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dominant	 ﾠ‘rule-ﾭ‐setting’	 ﾠposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠshape	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐governing	 ﾠpolities	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠ recognisable	 ﾠ image.	 ﾠ Typically,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ demands	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ jurisdictional	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠliving	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠrights	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive)	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠa	 ﾠstably	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠland	 ﾠ
base.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ initially	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ uncontroversial	 ﾠ requirements,	 ﾠ
Nadasdy	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠlands	 ﾠand	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠ serve	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reinforce	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ acts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ strategies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
disempowerment. The	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhis	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservance	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Yukon	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠdivisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhold	 ﾠprominence	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠregion	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠwere	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
earlier	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠand	 ﾠbureaucratic	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠ‘Indian	 ﾠBands’	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠonly	 ﾠloose	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠto	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐
existing	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐political	 ﾠconfigurations,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠbased	 ﾠaround	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
freedom	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ regularity)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ movement	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ association	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
communities.	 ﾠConstituted	 ﾠas	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠunits,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
demarcated	 ﾠ membership,	 ﾠ reserve	 ﾠ lands,	 ﾠ council,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ chief,	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ Bands	 ﾠ created	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ membership	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ previously	 ﾠ figured	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
relationships. 
Although	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnow	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠor	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
negotiating	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government,	 ﾠNadasdy	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontinuity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexists	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeography	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐governing	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
Indian	 ﾠBand	 ﾠpredecessors.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdemanding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
government	 ﾠ conform	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ standards	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ organisation	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
requirement	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠclear	 ﾠand	 ﾠstable	 ﾠjurisdictional	 ﾠboundaries	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠexerts	 ﾠ
pressure	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adopt	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ unjustly	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ past.	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNadasdy: 
Land	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ formalizing	 ﾠ
jurisdictional	 ﾠ boundaries	 ﾠ among	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐existing	 ﾠ First	 ﾠ Nation	 ﾠ polities;	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
mechanisms	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ creating	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ administrative	 ﾠ systems	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
polities	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbeing.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreements,	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠand	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
language	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ sovereignty,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ premised	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ assumption	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ First	 ﾠ Nations	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscrete	 ﾠpolitico-ﾭ‐territorial	 ﾠentities	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠqualify	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ
(2012,	 ﾠp.503:	 ﾠoriginal	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In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernmental	 ﾠpower	 ﾠis	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“currency	 ﾠof	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠ
sovereignty”	 ﾠ(Nadasdy	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠp.528),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠclose	 ﾠrestrictions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐governing	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ polities	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ assume.	 ﾠ Otherwise	 ﾠ put:	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘self’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘government’	 ﾠ
conform	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠexpectations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠconjunction	 ﾠfeeds	 ﾠneatly	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
jurisdictional	 ﾠmatrix	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule-ﾭ‐setting	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠput	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat:	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ
implicitly	 ﾠdevalue	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐political	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresemble	 ﾠor	 ﾠfit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ Euro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠ preference	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ territorial	 ﾠ sovereignty;	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ actively	 ﾠ inhibit	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ models;	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ (3)	 ﾠ create	 ﾠ (potentially)	 ﾠ artificial	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
coercively	 ﾠ arranged	 ﾠ divisions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ identity,	 ﾠ power,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ
forced	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ draw	 ﾠ externally	 ﾠ demanded	 ﾠ lines	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ socio-ﾭ‐political	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ geographical	 ﾠ
landscape.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
control	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ coercive	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ eras	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
control)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠconcern,	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠis	 ﾠhere	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
tacitly	 ﾠ contained	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ structuring	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ relationship	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
administered	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ structure.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ enactment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ oppression	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
becoming	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐inflicted	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocalised,	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ(perhaps)	 ﾠless	 ﾠacute	 ﾠbut	 ﾠever	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
entrenched	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disempowerment.	 ﾠ Insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ naturalises	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
renders	 ﾠinvisible	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠsuppressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠits	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
replicate	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠand	 ﾠremove.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ acknowledge,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ (perhaps	 ﾠ many)	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠacross	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠgained	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“currency	 ﾠof	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠsovereignty”	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ fit	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
understandings	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ raised	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Nadasdy	 ﾠand	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠinconsequential	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecapturing	 ﾠ
tangible	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovincial	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠwell	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠplans	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenable	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠto	 ﾠsafeguard	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠstill	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
daily	 ﾠ disempowerment	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ great	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ necessitate	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ recapturing	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
modicum	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠby	 ﾠany	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠavailable.	 ﾠColonial	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhad	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠassured	 ﾠpathway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠovercoming	 ﾠit.	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For	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisempowerment,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠ turn	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ Inuit	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ control.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ discussing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ successes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠ Inuit	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ pushing	 ﾠ forward	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ agenda	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ led	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Nunavut	 ﾠ territory	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 1999	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ which	 ﾠmay	 ﾠyet	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ
autonomy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNunavik	 ﾠregion	 ﾠin	 ﾠnorthern	 ﾠQuebec)	 ﾠFrances	 ﾠAbele	 ﾠand	 ﾠThierry	 ﾠRodon	 ﾠ
note	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠon	 ﾠsecuring	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“sufficient	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination”	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ generations	 ﾠ (2009,	 ﾠ p.125).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so,	 ﾠ Inuit	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
actively	 ﾠ engaged	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ traditions	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
negotiating	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠfull	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠ(Abele	 ﾠ&	 ﾠRodon	 ﾠ
2009).	 ﾠThey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbuilt	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠstill	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
northern	 ﾠregions	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
jurisdictional	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠlands	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrictest	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
government,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠregional	 ﾠpolitics.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠaccomplishment	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠa	 ﾠprogression	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
whilst	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ marking	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ culmination.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ widely	 ﾠ regarded	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠgenerations	 ﾠof	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠan	 ﾠaltered	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠbuilt	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠachievements	 ﾠof	 ﾠpast	 ﾠgenerations.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠgained	 ﾠmay	 ﾠfit	 ﾠinto	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeld	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠframework,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠso	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠnew	 ﾠand	 ﾠunforeseen	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprogress.	 ﾠ
Irlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠsentiments	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDene	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNation	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠNorthwest	 ﾠTerritories,	 ﾠwhere,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠfew	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠ
stage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ decolonisation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ achievement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ equitable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
mutually	 ﾠrespectful	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ tool	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ possibilities	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ assist	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠto	 ﾠregain	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐direction	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠever)	 ﾠfit	 ﾠneatly	 ﾠor	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ single	 ﾠ discernible	 ﾠ mould.	 ﾠ Though	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ aspirations,	 ﾠ strategies,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
successes	 ﾠ involved	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ broadly	 ﾠ consistent	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠmistake	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtransferences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
formal	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmade	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcases	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmark	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
far	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠpitched	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisempowerment.	 ﾠIt	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should	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠappears	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ here)	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ territorially	 ﾠ concentrated	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ groups,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠso	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ
needs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ urban	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ populations	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ dispersed	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ wide	 ﾠ
geographical	 ﾠareas.	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠhas	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠ
disempowerment	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ(Belanger	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠclear	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠmark	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠcourse)	 ﾠshould	 ﾠmean	 ﾠor	 ﾠentail	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠalone	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠabove. 
Despite	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrecapturing	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
level,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠremain	 ﾠfraught	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtension.	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠbound	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠaround	 ﾠan	 ﾠunyielding	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsovereignty,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ enactment	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ maintenance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
disempowerment	 ﾠin	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disempowerment	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ problematically	 ﾠ limited.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ
disputants,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ looking	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ favourable	 ﾠ
perspectives,	 ﾠ unjust	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ unacceptable	 ﾠ suppressions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐direction	 ﾠ
continue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠformal	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐control	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealised	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchannels	 ﾠ
currently	 ﾠopen	 ﾠis	 ﾠintensely	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠcontested,	 ﾠas	 ﾠare	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠwill	 ﾠor	 ﾠshould	 ﾠlook	 ﾠlike	 ﾠand	 ﾠinto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠfit.	 ﾠ
5.4	 ﾠVoice	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiduciary	 ﾠrelationships.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠbase	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠ
recognition	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠimmensely	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠregain	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsecure	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhelped	 ﾠto	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ voice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ directions.	 ﾠ Specifically,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ helped	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
dynamic	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠimperative	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsecure	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠreinforce	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
claimed	 ﾠdistinctiveness	 ﾠas	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐
nation	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠthey	 ﾠprofess	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfallen	 ﾠ121	 ﾠ
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both	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ promoting	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠon	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠas	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠactive	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠfar	 ﾠback	 ﾠas	 ﾠ1921,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠChief	 ﾠDeskaheh,	 ﾠSpeaker	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSix	 ﾠ
Nations	 ﾠ Council,	 ﾠ travelled	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Europe	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ generate	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ
awareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanada’s	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠnations	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠviolation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
treaty	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠCorntassel	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠresurgence	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠ–	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠactive	 ﾠin	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠpromoting	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠstage.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
drafting	 ﾠand	 ﾠpromotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠUNDRIP,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ (particularly)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ UN	 ﾠ Permanent	 ﾠ Forum	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ Issues	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ
bodies.	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠactively	 ﾠpursued	 ﾠtrans-ﾭ‐border	 ﾠforms	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ organisation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ located	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠCircumpolar	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ(ICC),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠformed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate-ﾭ‐
1970s	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐governmental	 ﾠ organisation	 ﾠ representing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Inuit	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
Alaska,	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠGreenland,	 ﾠand	 ﾠRussia,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠvery	 ﾠactive	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
promoting	 ﾠ environmental,	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ rights,	 ﾠ social,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ affecting	 ﾠ Inuit	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnow	 ﾠattained	 ﾠconsultative	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠNations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
ICC	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠa	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠon	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevels,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠin	 ﾠland	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ
negotiation	 ﾠprocesses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ trans-ﾭ‐border	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
crucial,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ community	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ sensitively	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ encouraging	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ scrutiny	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
conduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠRapporteur	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFood,	 ﾠ
Olivier	 ﾠDe	 ﾠSchutter,	 ﾠvisited	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ visit)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ expressed	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ concern	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ hunger	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ food	 ﾠ
insecurity	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠ(United	 ﾠNations	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠFurther,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
UN	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠRapporteur	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRights	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠPeoples,	 ﾠJames	 ﾠAnaya,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠvisited	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ (admittedly,	 ﾠ alongside	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ developments)	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ122	 ﾠ
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wide-ﾭ‐range	 ﾠof	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠ
insufficiency	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ effectively	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ (United	 ﾠ
Nations	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠequate	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
binding	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠnor	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠtranslate	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠat	 ﾠground	 ﾠ
level,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ neither	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contributions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ observers	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ
controversy	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠperspectives,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproven	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠ
broad	 ﾠand	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠissues	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ success	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ generating	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ engage	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ audiences,	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ home	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ abroad,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
bringing	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrights	 ﾠviolations	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ activity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ arenas	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ closely	 ﾠ connected	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠactive	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘domestic’	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠof	 ﾠprovincial	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
federal	 ﾠ politics.	 ﾠ Probably	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ greatest	 ﾠ prominence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ vein	 ﾠ to-ﾭ‐date	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
organisations	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAssembly	 ﾠof	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠNations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMétis	 ﾠNational	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠ
Tapiriit	 ﾠ Kanatami,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Congress	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ Peoples,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Native	 ﾠ Women’s	 ﾠ
Association	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canada,	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ representing	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠlands.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠso,	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠcouple	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠcall	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠassured	 ﾠformal	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ influential	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ politics.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ 1991	 ﾠ Royal	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠon	 ﾠElectoral	 ﾠReform	 ﾠand	 ﾠParty	 ﾠFinancing,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ dedicated	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ constituencies	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
persistent	 ﾠ underrepresentation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ population	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ legislative	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠ (Niemczak	 ﾠ 2008;	 ﾠ Williams	 ﾠ 2005).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dedicated	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ featured	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ negotiations	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ constitutional	 ﾠ change	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
1992	 ﾠ Charlottetown	 ﾠ Accord,	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ expanded	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommons	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSenate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
creation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ consultative	 ﾠ body	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Supreme	 ﾠ Court	 ﾠ (Niemczak	 ﾠ 2008;	 ﾠ
Williams	 ﾠ 2005).	 ﾠ Although	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ proposed	 ﾠ constitutional	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Charlottetown	 ﾠ
Accord	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ ultimately	 ﾠ defeated	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ referendum,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ topic	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dedicated	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ remained	 ﾠ prominent,	 ﾠ featuring	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ final	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
RCAP	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 1996	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ notion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ separate	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ parliament	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ stronger	 ﾠ
legislative	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠwas	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ1.3).	 ﾠ	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Although	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠformal	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠhas	 ﾠyet	 ﾠto	 ﾠactually	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealisation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ politics,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
nevertheless	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontroversy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsurrounds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ widely	 ﾠ held	 ﾠ concern	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ (especially)	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
‘improvements’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠframework	 ﾠ of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠ risks	 ﾠ becoming	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐defeating	 ﾠ endeavour	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ decolonising	 ﾠ
struggles.	 ﾠConcern	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferentiated	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstatuses	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠworked	 ﾠso	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffirm,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthus	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠabate	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice.	 ﾠ Importantly,	 ﾠ too,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ expressing	 ﾠ
them,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ conceptual	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠfull	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠorder	 ﾠand	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠforms	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠexclusive	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠprincipally	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠsome	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠ
(e.g.	 ﾠ Kymlicka	 ﾠ1995;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠsee	 ﾠWilliams	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Euro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠ
grounded	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ real	 ﾠ experience.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ language	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ inclusion	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ citizenship	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
intrinsic	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassimilatory	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ150	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠso,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwitnessed	 ﾠin	 ﾠacute	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1969	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘equal	 ﾠcitizenship’	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdistinctiveness	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
helped	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ generate	 ﾠ widespread	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ deep	 ﾠ suspicion	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠ participation	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠTaiaiake	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠ(2009a),	 ﾠexpressing	 ﾠ
concern	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠact	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠexacerbate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassimilatory	 ﾠimpetuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠdomination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Yet,	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time,	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ contend	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
engagement	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠessential	 ﾠif	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ sufficient	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠeffectively.	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠBorrows	 ﾠ(2002),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠ‘Indigenous	 ﾠaffairs’	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠin	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠ
autonomy	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠrealising	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“Canadian	 ﾠaffairs”	 ﾠ(2002,	 ﾠp.146).	 ﾠBorrows’	 ﾠhope	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ124	 ﾠ
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that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ determination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ practices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
citizenship	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ “may	 ﾠ generate	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ attentiveness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ uses	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
cultural	 ﾠ practices	 ﾠ preferred	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ Aboriginal	 ﾠ peoples”	 ﾠ (2002,	 ﾠ p.146),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrole	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠmanaging)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
threat	 ﾠof	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠassimilatory	 ﾠforces	 ﾠand	 ﾠdenigrations	 ﾠof	 ﾠland.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ
bound	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠframework	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠalready	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠact	 ﾠto	 ﾠreshape	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ vital	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
determination	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠfutures,	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ matter	 ﾠ intensely	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sustainability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ autonomous	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠcontroversies	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
voice	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠa	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐dimensional	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠof	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠnormalities.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠone	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠassertions	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ gradual	 ﾠ destabilisation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ shielded	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
supported	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠ in	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ bolster	 ﾠ
resistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘domesticate’	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠidentities.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ realised	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ success	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ gaining	 ﾠ
recognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠstage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠ
bringing	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
state.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠenabled	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠto	 ﾠform	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐
border	 ﾠalliances	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseparations	 ﾠinvoked	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠstate	 ﾠborders	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠCircumpolar	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠaptly	 ﾠ
demonstrates.	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmaintained	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠany	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ uncontroversial	 ﾠ
grounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠframework	 ﾠactually	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠto	 ﾠinhibit	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrespects	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcritics,	 ﾠaccordingly,	 ﾠ
posit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠproximity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠ
connotations	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ rejected,	 ﾠ others	 ﾠ contend	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ
inclusion	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reshape	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠ framework	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disturb	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
citizenship	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠordering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ authoring	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ125	 ﾠ
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directed.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠNot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠare	 ﾠproclivities	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠ
disturbance,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
direction	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
orientate	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.5	 ﾠRecovery	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ populations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ patterns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
disadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠsuffering.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ
shows	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
likely	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠin	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠpoverty	 ﾠ(Adelson	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠWilson	 ﾠ&	 ﾠMacdonald	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠto	 ﾠlack	 ﾠ
adequate	 ﾠhousing	 ﾠ(Statistics	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ2006),	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ employment	 ﾠ (Ball	 ﾠ 2004;	 ﾠ Usalcas	 ﾠ 2011).	 ﾠ Infant	 ﾠ mortality	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠlife	 ﾠexpectancies	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ (Statistics	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ 2006;	 ﾠ Tjepkema	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2011),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ suffer	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ chronic	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ (Adelson	 ﾠ 2005;	 ﾠ
Frohlich	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2006;	 ﾠTjepkema	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠsuicide	 ﾠrates	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠreached	 ﾠnear-ﾭ‐catastrophic	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ(Regan	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠTousignant	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2013;	 ﾠTjepkema	 ﾠet	 ﾠ
al.	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠfew	 ﾠlives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtouched	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠway	 ﾠby	 ﾠalcohol	 ﾠand	 ﾠdrug	 ﾠ
misuse	 ﾠ(Bopp	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠfall	 ﾠvictim	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
violent	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠhomicide	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠor	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ(Bopp	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2003),	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisproportionate	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠstate	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcustody	 ﾠor	 ﾠcare	 ﾠ
(Dauvergne	 ﾠ 2012;	 ﾠ Farris-ﾭ‐Manning	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Zandstra	 ﾠ 2003).	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ
exacerbated	 ﾠby	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠadded	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠto	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
strained	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemographics	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
communities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcritics,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroot	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ
lies	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
economic,	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
(Alfred	 ﾠ2009a;	 ﾠKirmayer	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsustained	 ﾠdisplacement	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisempowerment	 ﾠ
strategies	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠ
pursuit	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ aggressive	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ assimilation,	 ﾠ produced	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ broad	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ damaging	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠin	 ﾠ126	 ﾠ
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this	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ symbolically	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ profundity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ has	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresidential	 ﾠschool	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrand	 ﾠproject	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠengineering	 ﾠ(spanning	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐C19th	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ1980s	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
few	 ﾠcases),	 ﾠpremised	 ﾠon	 ﾠideals	 ﾠof	 ﾠassimilation.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcentred	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoerced	 ﾠmanufacture	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
physical,	 ﾠ emotional,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ distance	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ children	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
families	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠChildren	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ languages	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ partaking	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ practices.	 ﾠ Many	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠnew	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠnames	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmade	 ﾠto	 ﾠdress	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehave	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ children.	 ﾠ Contact	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ relatives	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ severely	 ﾠ restricted	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ
prevented	 ﾠentirely,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsiblings	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠclose	 ﾠrelatives	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠschool	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠCastellano	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
2008).	 ﾠAll	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsuppressive	 ﾠactions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresistance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
children	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ re-ﾭ‐education	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ norms,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ enforced	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
frequently	 ﾠbrutal	 ﾠfashion.	 ﾠPhysical,	 ﾠemotional,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsexual	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsystemic	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ residential	 ﾠ schools,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ overwhelming	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ children	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ
exposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtrauma	 ﾠ(Castellano	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠFlisfeder	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠStout	 ﾠand	 ﾠKipling	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠstate	 ﾠassault	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠ
integrity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ communities,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ damaging	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ residential	 ﾠ schools	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠdramatically	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwider-ﾭ‐scale	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠdestruction	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwere	 ﾠembedded.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassimilative	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools	 ﾠwere,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
part,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ resounding	 ﾠ failure,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ children	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ did	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ adopt	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ
identities	 ﾠand	 ﾠnor	 ﾠdid	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠintegrate	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠimagined,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠschools	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠLeroy	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠBear	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“cultural	 ﾠ
pollution”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstill	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ(quoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠ
p.11).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ violences	 ﾠ enacted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ serving	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ acute	 ﾠ
assimilative	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Euro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ created	 ﾠ unprecedented	 ﾠ scenes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
personal	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ distress	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ worked	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ diminish	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
capabilities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ deal	 ﾠ effectively	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ experiences.	 ﾠ Individuals	 ﾠ
leaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools	 ﾠwere	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcaught	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠworlds:	 ﾠstill	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠdiscrimination	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠyet	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠalienated	 ﾠand	 ﾠdetached	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠfamilies.	 ﾠA	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠwere,	 ﾠ
accordingly,	 ﾠdeprived	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
traumas	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ experienced	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ uncertainties	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ difficulties	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ
faced.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠimbalance	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠstate	 ﾠactions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
reinforcing	 ﾠ impetus,	 ﾠ replicating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ embedding	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ unresolved	 ﾠ127	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psychological	 ﾠtraumas	 ﾠof	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠsuffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠone	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext.	 ﾠFamilies,	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
entire	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthrown	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauspices	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuro-ﾭ‐
Canadian	 ﾠ governance,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ pattern	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘pollution’	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ partially	 ﾠ glimpsed	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterrupt	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcycles	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
cultural	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forefront	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ present.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ critics	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ sought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ highlight	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ disparities	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ overly	 ﾠ reductive	 ﾠ conceptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ coming	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European-ﾭ‐Settler	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfocusing,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠon	 ﾠbiomedical	 ﾠindicators	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ signalling	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
expansive	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ holistic	 ﾠ conceptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ emanating	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ
Corntassel	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
historically	 ﾠ preferred	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ powerful	 ﾠ indication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disadvantage,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ approaches	 ﾠ nevertheless	 ﾠ insufficiently	 ﾠ
capture	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ depth	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ experienced	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ energies	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠinappropriate	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠ(Adelson	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsucceeded	 ﾠin	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠquite	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
era	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotable	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous-ﾭ‐devised	 ﾠand	 ﾠ–implemented	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservice	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ
(Hylton	 ﾠ1999).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠwas	 ﾠaided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠRCAP	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ mid-ﾭ‐1990s	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ recommendations	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ move	 ﾠ away	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠand	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠpaternalistic	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ devise	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ equitable	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ
disadvantage	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ collaboration	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ groups.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ
recommendations	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ led	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ establishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dedicated	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠincluding,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠmost	 ﾠnotably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠHealing	 ﾠFoundation	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠundertook	 ﾠan	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
sensitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠ(Kirmayer	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠnotwithstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠimprovements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠrepresent,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠremain	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠprecarious	 ﾠand	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠ governments.	 ﾠ Indigenous-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠ programmes	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ extended	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ
opportunity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ prove	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ value,	 ﾠ typically	 ﾠ remaining	 ﾠ
vulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcut	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ128	 ﾠ
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official	 ﾠbudgets	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠstretched.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
uncertain	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠunreliable	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠremain	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠupon	 ﾠcapricious	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠand	 ﾠfacilitation.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠheld	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmore	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠto	 ﾠshift	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠof	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ‘ownership’	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ(Archibald	 ﾠ2006)	 ﾠ. 
Arguably	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ challenging,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ continuing	 ﾠ prevalence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ voices	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
contest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠcan	 ﾠever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ effect.	 ﾠ Taiaiake	 ﾠ
Alfred,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠbesetting	 ﾠOnkwehonwe	 ﾠ[Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples]	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
logical	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠor	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠto	 ﾠunresolved	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
injustices.	 ﾠPeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠindigenous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠcomplexes	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehaviour	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
mental	 ﾠ attitudes	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ reflect	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ situation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ flow	 ﾠ unhealthy	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
destructive	 ﾠbehaviours.	 ﾠ
(2005,	 ﾠp.163)	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠAlfred,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠhad	 ﾠan	 ﾠenormously	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfelt),	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsensitivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐devised	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠprogrammes.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠ
suffering	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠactively	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠday-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ inadvertent	 ﾠ ways,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠdisconnection	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
land	 ﾠand	 ﾠculture,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠsuppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠis	 ﾠpropelled.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠattending	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ
continues	 ﾠto	 ﾠarise.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
looking	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
relationships	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠfall	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠonto	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘change’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘adapt’	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
circumstances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ modern	 ﾠ Canada,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ directed	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ
problematising	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠunsettling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
compelled	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adapt	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ place.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Alfred	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ others	 ﾠ (e.g.	 ﾠ129	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Corntassel	 ﾠ 2008;	 ﾠ 2012;	 ﾠ Irlbacher-ﾭ‐Fox	 ﾠ 2009),	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ path	 ﾠ risks	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas,	 ﾠarguably,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠis	 ﾠdone	 ﾠto	 ﾠostensibly	 ﾠ
address	 ﾠit. 
There	 ﾠare,	 ﾠevidently,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
suffering	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠand	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠforcefully	 ﾠcite	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ(rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠEuropean)	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠshape	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
initiatives	 ﾠ designed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ encounter	 ﾠ
difficulties	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠabout	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
dominance	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ lives,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ works	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ render	 ﾠ Indigenous-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠ
responses	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ vulnerable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ changing	 ﾠ attitudes	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ priorities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ
governance.	 ﾠDifficulties	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠsuperimposed	 ﾠonto	 ﾠstreams	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠ
concern	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠcan	 ﾠever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ shadow	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ sovereignty.	 ﾠ Particularly	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ proponents	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ so-ﾭ‐termed	 ﾠ
‘traditionalist’	 ﾠresurgence	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
turning	 ﾠ away	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ radical	 ﾠ fashion	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ rejuvenating	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
societies	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠand	 ﾠstrengths	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ(Alfred	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠ2009a;	 ﾠCorntassel	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠ
deep	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
progress	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ
5.6	 ﾠEquality	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
displacement,	 ﾠ disempowerment,	 ﾠ suffering,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ suppressions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ voice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ differ	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠways	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstandardly	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠEuro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
claimed	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ histories	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ interference	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠsocietal	 ﾠdisruptions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
resulted,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠuniformly	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠby	 ﾠall	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠtended	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisproportionate	 ﾠburden	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠforces	 ﾠ
involved.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠsubjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠunique	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
discriminatory	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠand	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
exposure	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ violent	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ processes.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ
finding	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠdisadvantaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠ–	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
Indigenous	 ﾠmen	 ﾠand	 ﾠwomen,	 ﾠand	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠmen	 ﾠ–	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ130	 ﾠ
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occupy	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠvulnerability,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
personal	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠtrauma	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwitness,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ family	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ pervade	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ (Anderson	 ﾠ 2000;	 ﾠ
Culhane	 ﾠ2003;	 ﾠCzyzewski	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠand	 ﾠmurdered	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠ (Brennan	 ﾠ 2011),	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ statuses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
comparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ(Bourassa	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2004)	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠrender	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmainstream	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdialogues	 ﾠabout	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ(Lawrence	 ﾠ&	 ﾠAnderson	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ
Over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ past	 ﾠ few	 ﾠ decades,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ strategy	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ seeking	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ tackle	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐faceted	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠ faced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ stark	 ﾠ contrast	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ traditional	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ societies.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ
energy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoppressive	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐
cultural	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ normalised	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ community	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ arisen	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distorting	 ﾠ influences	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ
intentions)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Euro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠ colonialism.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ this,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
supporters	 ﾠhave	 ﾠforcefully	 ﾠchallenged	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
enjoyed	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠmen	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠan	 ﾠauthentic	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠarrangement.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
sought	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrace	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠand	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ (along	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ traders	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ colonists	 ﾠ before	 ﾠ them)	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
effected	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deep	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ sustained	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ societal	 ﾠ functioning	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ
gender	 ﾠ(Green	 ﾠ2007;	 ﾠSt.	 ﾠDenis	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
rested	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmost	 ﾠacutely	 ﾠ
felt	 ﾠ by,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ directed	 ﾠ towards,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ violences	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdisruptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
distortions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisempowerment,	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠdisconnections	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠland,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcausing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠculture	 ﾠand	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
aspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwomen.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ arguments	 ﾠ tends	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ lie	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ differences	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ socio-ﾭ‐cultural	 ﾠ configurations	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠgender	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropeans	 ﾠSettlers	 ﾠin	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠAmerica.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠin	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠheld	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠautonomy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
status	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrespects	 ﾠare)	 ﾠfar	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ (Alfred	 ﾠ 2009a;	 ﾠ Sunseri	 ﾠ 2011;	 ﾠ Tobe	 ﾠ 2000).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ societies,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ select	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ131	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dismiss	 ﾠleaders,	 ﾠto	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠwar	 ﾠ(Alfred	 ﾠ2009a;	 ﾠSunseri	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThough	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠgender	 ﾠroles	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠ normally	 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐established	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ prominent	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
roles	 ﾠwere,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠclaimed,	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠvalue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠcases	 ﾠactually	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠunique	 ﾠlife-ﾭ‐giving	 ﾠand	 ﾠnurturing	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠ (Lavell-ﾭ‐Harvard	 ﾠ&	 ﾠLavell	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
inevitably	 ﾠarose	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐colonial	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsophisticated	 ﾠ
mechanisms	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠswift	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠmanner,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠand	 ﾠreciprocity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlay	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
ordering	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠ(Alfred	 ﾠ2009a).	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ traditional	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ societal	 ﾠ ordering	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ came	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ pressure,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrival	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠfur	 ﾠtraders,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠstatuses	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠ autonomy	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ steadily	 ﾠ undermined	 ﾠ ever	 ﾠ since.	 ﾠ Arguably,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ
initially	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠby	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠinadvertent	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠfur	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
capital-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠstructuring	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠenabling	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠ
purchase	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠhad	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠprovided,	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdevaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠ skillsets	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ public-ﾭ‐private	 ﾠ divide	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ increasingly	 ﾠ consigned	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘domestic’	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠ(Anderson	 ﾠ2000;	 ﾠLaRocque	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠWith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠradically	 ﾠundermined,	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠfound	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠin	 ﾠnew	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ incipient	 ﾠ pressures	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ were,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmultiplied	 ﾠas	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠproject	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continent	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ fashion.	 ﾠ Guided	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ patriarchal	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ newcomers	 ﾠ showed	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ regard	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nuances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ existed	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
engaged.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠentered	 ﾠinto	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠand	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
men,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ refused	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ acknowledge	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ female	 ﾠ
authority.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠera	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠguided	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ entrenched	 ﾠ patriarchal	 ﾠ thinking	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ men	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
consolidate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoppressive	 ﾠhold	 ﾠover	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠas	 ﾠanything	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
nature.	 ﾠ Andrea	 ﾠ Smith	 ﾠ (2005),	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ contends	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ powerful	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠthreatened	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠ‘natural’	 ﾠinferiority	 ﾠand	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠand	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
men	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ repercussions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘new’	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘old’	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
immense.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ separation	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ early	 ﾠ132	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relationships,	 ﾠpatriarchal	 ﾠimperatives	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠunambiguously	 ﾠentwined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠlives	 ﾠand	 ﾠlands.	 ﾠAttacking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠlife	 ﾠwould	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
weakening	 ﾠ resistance	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pressures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ settlement	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ acquisition.	 ﾠ Thus,	 ﾠ actions	 ﾠ
directed	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠattacking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
regular,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠcharacteristic,	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠ
Undoubtedly,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsustained	 ﾠand	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ regard	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ directed	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Indian	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sexist	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠ ‘status’	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ First	 ﾠ Nations.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ history,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
register	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘Indian’	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrights	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ“dependent	 ﾠon	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠmale	 ﾠIndian,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchild	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmale	 ﾠIndian,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠwife	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmale	 ﾠIndian”	 ﾠ(McIvor	 ﾠand	 ﾠGrismer	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠ
Nations	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠmarrying	 ﾠ‘non-ﾭ‐status’	 ﾠmen	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠregistered	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ lost	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ First	 ﾠ
Nation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdid	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
lost	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠon	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠBand	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠany	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠor	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠrights.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠmen	 ﾠ
registered	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠwho	 ﾠchose	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarry	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠretained	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ passed	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ spouse	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ children.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ
discriminatory	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠthousands	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠleft	 ﾠeconomically,	 ﾠsocially,	 ﾠand	 ﾠemotionally	 ﾠisolated.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ pattern	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ obvious	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ discrimination	 ﾠ persisted	 ﾠ until	 ﾠ 1985	 ﾠ when,	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ
sustained	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ
arena	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠLawrence	 ﾠ2003),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠwas	 ﾠamended	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠBill	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐31.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠaltered	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ enable	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ lost	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ
marriage	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠreclaim	 ﾠit	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregistered	 ﾠon	 ﾠBand	 ﾠ
membership	 ﾠlists.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠten	 ﾠyears	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintroduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐31,	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠ
100,000	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ regain	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ previously	 ﾠ denied	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
discriminatory	 ﾠ grounds	 ﾠ (Switzer	 ﾠ 1997).	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ immediately	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Bill’s	 ﾠ
introduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1985	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠof	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ350,000	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠregistered	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠreclaiming	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠis	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠ(Lawrence	 ﾠ
2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Yet,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠsome	 ﾠheralded	 ﾠthis	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠdiscrimination	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠstep	 ﾠ
forward,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinflux	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠserious	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difficulties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalready	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
overstretched	 ﾠ (Carey	 ﾠ 2012;	 ﾠ Simpson	 ﾠ 2007).	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ Band	 ﾠ councils	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
generally	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ built	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ male-ﾭ‐dominated	 ﾠ hierarchies	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ sought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠby	 ﾠimposing	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠcodes	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠenabled	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠreminiscent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐
1985	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠand	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠracist	 ﾠand	 ﾠsexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(Green	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ descendants)	 ﾠ deregistered	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discriminatory	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠlegislative	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠmarginalised	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
removal	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠactuality,	 ﾠBill	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐31	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfully	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbiases	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct.	 ﾠ
Rather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinheritance	 ﾠof	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
travel	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠalong	 ﾠpatrilineal	 ﾠlines	 ﾠthan	 ﾠalong	 ﾠmatrilineal	 ﾠones.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdiscriminatory	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmost	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠBill	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐3	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
implemented	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfallen	 ﾠdrastically	 ﾠshort	 ﾠof	 ﾠtackling	 ﾠgender	 ﾠinequalities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Act,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcause,	 ﾠand	 ﾠleave	 ﾠunaddressed,	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠ
disproportionately	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ(Lavoie	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠ
Palmater	 ﾠ2014;	 ﾠSimpson	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠAct	 ﾠsits	 ﾠas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠexample	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠan	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠvisible,	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐documented,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠillustrative	 ﾠone	 ﾠ–	 ﾠof	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠworked	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
undermine,	 ﾠparticularly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen.	 ﾠComparable	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
discrimination	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠMétis	 ﾠand	 ﾠInuit	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠ
defined	 ﾠgroup,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“historically	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdenied	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthat	 ﾠothers	 ﾠtake	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ[Canada],	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdevastating	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠlevel”	 ﾠ(Lavell-ﾭ‐Harvard	 ﾠ&	 ﾠLavell	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠ
p.185).	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ devastating	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ exacerbated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ
discriminations	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ acted	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ comprehensive	 ﾠ
distortions	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠgender	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠEuro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbrought.	 ﾠ
Patterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠtroubling	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠage,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠcases	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthree	 ﾠinterrelated	 ﾠpathways	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠ
society	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular:	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠworking	 ﾠto	 ﾠplace	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠ distance	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ voice	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state,	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ leaving	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ prone	 ﾠ to	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serious	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disadvantage	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ patterns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ lateral	 ﾠ violence;	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ attacking	 ﾠ (via	 ﾠ
women)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ strength	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ identities,	 ﾠ cultures,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
societal	 ﾠforms	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠand	 ﾠworking	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠto	 ﾠenforce	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠand	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠrights;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠfracturing	 ﾠforce	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
broadly	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠaligned	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠare	 ﾠpitted	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ resonance	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ
progressing	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠSharon	 ﾠMcIvor	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintroduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠBills	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐31	 ﾠand	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐3,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example:	 ﾠ
[T]he	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ advance	 ﾠ women’s	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ individual	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
pitted	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠand	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠpatriarchy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠother	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshare	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
women’s	 ﾠequality.	 ﾠ
(Quoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠHuhndorf	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSuzack	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠp.6)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
oppression	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ provoke	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ consternation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ seem,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ engaged	 ﾠ
perspectives	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠto	 ﾠjeopardise	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠdecolonising	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠand	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
recapture	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ control.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ
openly	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠrationales	 ﾠof	 ﾠexposing	 ﾠand	 ﾠconfronting	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdistortions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠand	 ﾠculture,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠan	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠ
aspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecolonisation,	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠgendered	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠprovoke	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
great	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimosity	 ﾠand	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ tension	 ﾠ is	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠevident	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
‘White’	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogressing	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠwomen’s	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ concrete	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state’s	 ﾠ sovereignty	 ﾠ framework.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ
Charter	 ﾠof	 ﾠRights	 ﾠand	 ﾠFreedoms,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠconstitutionally	 ﾠcommits	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠrecognising	 ﾠand	 ﾠguaranteeing	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠoppression.	 ﾠMany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠminimum,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCharter	 ﾠmust	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠfully	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ communities,	 ﾠ regardless	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
autonomy	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠviolations	 ﾠof	 ﾠequal	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ (Shaw	 ﾠ 2007).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ appeals	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ135	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠperilously	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠlegitimising	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ reinforcing	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ underlying	 ﾠ vulnerability	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
arbitrary	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠhostility	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠsections	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ society.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ few	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ seeking	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠor	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto,	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠ
decolonising	 ﾠstruggles;	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠrealised	 ﾠor	 ﾠaccepted.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠappropriating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠthese	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
prevent	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ marginalised	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discourse	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠambivalent	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠaround	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠexacerbated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠproliferates	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfighting	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠpatriarchy	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpressly	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠrecovering	 ﾠ‘traditional’	 ﾠor	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐
colonial	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
establishing	 ﾠnew	 ﾠparadigms	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠfashioning	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠequality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbear	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠresemblances	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
‘Western’	 ﾠfeminist	 ﾠagendas.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠhonouring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘old’	 ﾠor	 ﾠ‘authentic’	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠforms	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠor	 ﾠpreferring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
construction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘new’	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠfit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘modern’	 ﾠworld	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensibilities	 ﾠ(Green	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠ
Rather,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠpitched	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
traditional	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcircumstances.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ multi-ﾭ‐faceted	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ reveal	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deeply	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ
character	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtoday.	 ﾠ
Exclusionary	 ﾠforces	 ﾠrun	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispute	 ﾠand	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustices	 ﾠ experienced	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ addressing	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ possibly	 ﾠ
overcoming	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ occur.	 ﾠ Whilst,	 ﾠ historically,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ
peripheralised	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ context,	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ understandings	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠwider	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear.	 ﾠ
5.7	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ challenges	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ normality.	 ﾠ Efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ assert,	 ﾠ secure,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ embody	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presence,	 ﾠ136	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
control,	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠare	 ﾠeach	 ﾠreplete	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdisturb	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptive	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife	 ﾠin	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ
Whilst	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ are,	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ doubt,	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ directed	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
prevailing	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠframework	 ﾠ and	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠlanguages	 ﾠ of	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠseem	 ﾠeven	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠin	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrespects,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
bounds	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ dramatically	 ﾠ exceeded.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ realise	 ﾠ
progress	 ﾠon	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintelligibly	 ﾠand	 ﾠconvincingly	 ﾠraised	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠthose	 ﾠchannels	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠ(often	 ﾠsimultaneously)	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠresoundingly	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐accounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠbounds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠtimes,	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ crucial	 ﾠ differences	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
overcome	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠEuro-ﾭ‐Canadian	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠhas	 ﾠimpacted	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠways	 ﾠon	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠaccordingly,	 ﾠno	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠbracket.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ disturbed	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠare	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
struggles.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ display	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ broad	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠand	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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The	 ﾠ preceding	 ﾠ chapters	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ directed	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ introducing	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ clarifying	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsequently	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠit	 ﾠinto	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective’s	 ﾠ sensitivity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ entanglements	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐
order	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ first-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ constructing	 ﾠ
sophisticated	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠpictures	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠ
bodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠdescribes.	 ﾠ 
In	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ reveal	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ profound	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ stable	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ uncontroversial	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠEfforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠunveil	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠentire	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
disturbance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ level.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ insight	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ exclusionary	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠconventions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjurious	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠ
Although	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠto	 ﾠquite	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠthey	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Canada.	 ﾠ Further,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ seen,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ scenes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ pertain	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ meeting	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ ‘Indigenous’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐Indigenous’	 ﾠ positions,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ138	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
manifest	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠalong	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠrelational	 ﾠaxes,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠbring	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠunderstandings,	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
being,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ Tendencies	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ assuming	 ﾠ
simple	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice\injustice	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ
continually	 ﾠ challenged	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ undermined	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ multiple	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ
overlapping)	 ﾠdirections.	 ﾠ 
This	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠexploration	 ﾠhas	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠa	 ﾠclearer	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠpervades	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
picture	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠ
Indeed,	 ﾠ arguably	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ pronounced	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ desire	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
encounter	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ abnormality	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ productive	 ﾠ manner.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ ‘reconstructive’	 ﾠ
counterpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
challenging	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠthought	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠare	 ﾠprogressed.	 ﾠFollowing	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
reconstructive	 ﾠjourney	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠvital	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠa	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ understand	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
sensitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠways.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtask	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠPart	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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6 
Responding	 ﾠto	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠ
6.1	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠconstructively	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ devoted	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ towards.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ
accompaniment	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠdiagnostic	 ﾠwork	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐standing	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ theorising	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ carries	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ genuine	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ practical	 ﾠ
application,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠacross	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠwritings	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠor	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ1995;	 ﾠ1997;	 ﾠ
2008;	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠand	 ﾠHonneth	 ﾠ2003;	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠand	 ﾠNicholson	 ﾠ1999).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠ
sharply	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠ‘Abnormal	 ﾠJustice’	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠhewn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠit	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgrown	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ sustained	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ conversations	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ
contemporaries.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠdialogues	 ﾠhave	 ﾠenabled	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠand	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠher	 ﾠvision	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠethical	 ﾠand	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠsense	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠcrucially,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠ
one.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchapter,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠand	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠ
work,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ attends	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ kinds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
‘abnormalities’	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠ elucidate	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ recommendations,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	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particularly	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠtest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠshe	 ﾠconstructs	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠbase	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠstated,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ see)	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ striking	 ﾠ resonance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ
approach:	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ voices,	 ﾠ values,	 ﾠ worldviews,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ practices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠheld	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠ(let	 ﾠalone	 ﾠequal)	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠasks	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
words,	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠtheorising,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠshe	 ﾠargues	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠemanates	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
speaks	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠways	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠof,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(‘Western’)	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠare	 ﾠso	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
pitched.	 ﾠHer	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠinescapably	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠand	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠ
one.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠand	 ﾠopenly	 ﾠacknowledged	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠintends.	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠby	 ﾠrevisiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠnodal	 ﾠschema	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘what’,	 ﾠ‘who’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ organises	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ recommendations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ ‘Abnormal	 ﾠ Justice’,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ
attempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠhow	 ﾠeach	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠterms	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠheld	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠendorsed	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠintention	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠ
puts	 ﾠforward	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠnuanced	 ﾠdirection:	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠa	 ﾠdestabilising	 ﾠforce	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ‘within’	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivilege	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠengage	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
seek	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠabsolved	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
criticism	 ﾠ borne	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Western	 ﾠ imperialism,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continued	 ﾠ colonisation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
knowledge-ﾭ‐worlds,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ exclusory	 ﾠ domination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discourse	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
criticisms	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠshared	 ﾠby	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ
today	 ﾠ–	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠresources	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠspace	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ accommodated	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ (though,	 ﾠ
perhaps,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠentirely)	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐imperialistic	 ﾠmanner.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Adopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠagitate	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠ
‘self-ﾭ‐problematising’	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠmight	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpose,	 ﾠchallenge,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfruitfully	 ﾠdirected.	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6.2	 ﾠIn	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠturns	 ﾠher	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠattentions	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ ‘substance’	 ﾠ
measured	 ﾠby	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ characterised	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ competing	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ conflicting	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexact	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠarticulated,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠ
mode	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠcombine	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠmultidimensional	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠontology	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠmonism”	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.403).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ argument	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard	 ﾠ relates	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ
“hermeneutical	 ﾠcharity”	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠviews	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.404).	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠstretch	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
array	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠalready	 ﾠactive	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠalways	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠarticulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠemerging.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠreceptiveness	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompelled,	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠthree	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠgenres	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ namely	 ﾠ redistribution,	 ﾠ recognition,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ gained	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
traction	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ enjoy	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ struggle	 ﾠ whereby	 ﾠ
disputants	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtoiled	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠor	 ﾠobscured	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠ
direct	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠattentions	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠdeficiencies	 ﾠin	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠgrammars.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
suggest,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisclosed	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarve	 ﾠout	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcealed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠgrammar(s)	 ﾠalone.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠbe	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠincomprehensiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠand	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ accord	 ﾠall	 ﾠirregular	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“presumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
intelligibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠvalidity”	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.404).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠhospitality	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠforeclosing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdissatisfied	 ﾠactors	 ﾠtest	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ established	 ﾠ grammars	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbounds,	 ﾠa	 ﾠhitherto	 ﾠunseen	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠfact	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠrevealed.	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠreceptiveness	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠ(potential	 ﾠor	 ﾠactual)	 ﾠmultiplicity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠenough.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠnonconforming	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠand	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠmight)	 ﾠpertain	 ﾠto	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previously	 ﾠunseen	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠevaluating	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmultiplicity.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
applied	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠ
merits	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ emerging	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ nonstandard	 ﾠ grammars.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Fraser,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ holding	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠevenly	 ﾠacross	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠchance	 ﾠof	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
innovative	 ﾠor	 ﾠunfamiliar	 ﾠarticulations	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdo	 ﾠrender	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠobscured	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvisible,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠare	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠordering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠoverlooked	 ﾠby,	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐
accounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwithin,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠgrammar(s)	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠputs	 ﾠforward	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrole	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠoccupied	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ thinking	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ has,	 ﾠ accordingly,	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ recurrent	 ﾠ feature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ
writing	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠ
“[a]ccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠall	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
participate	 ﾠas	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.405).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠregular	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠusage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠaround	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubtly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠto	 ﾠmost	 ﾠother	 ﾠappearances.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠits	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠ
guise,	 ﾠas	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠand	 ﾠArmstrong	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠnote,	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠ
parity	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠas)	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠegalitarian	 ﾠideal	 ﾠ(also	 ﾠ
Thompson	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠillustrated	 ﾠin	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠiteration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ “presupposes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ equal	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ worth	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ beings”	 ﾠ (Fraser	 ﾠ
2001,	 ﾠ p.30)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ oriented	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ conditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ equal	 ﾠ autonomy	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ actors,	 ﾠ
entailing	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠreal	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠpar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠothers	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ
2003,	 ﾠp.231n).	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuptake	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconsequently	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠactually	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠordering	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ societies,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ realistically	 ﾠ implemented	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Thompson	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Armstrong	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠZurn	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ‘Abnormal	 ﾠJustice’,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠleans	 ﾠmore	 ﾠupon	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠ
call	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstructural,	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
egalitarian	 ﾠ commitment	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ ever	 ﾠ really	 ﾠ wane,	 ﾠ but,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ tailoring	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘what’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ aspect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
foregrounded	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ justification	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ gives.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ aspect	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ rooted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ matters	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ whatever	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ precise	 ﾠ form,	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ145	 ﾠ
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fundamentally	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠan	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠor	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠto	 ﾠactually	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconvincingly	 ﾠinvoked	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisfortune	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠWere	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠroots	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠdimension,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠharm	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠand	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠper	 ﾠse	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfer	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
remedial	 ﾠ obligations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ onus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
‘balancing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscales’,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
really	 ﾠtalking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ relation	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ measured	 ﾠ ‘substance’,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ (contested)	 ﾠ
imbalance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠso	 ﾠever	 ﾠlocated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠits	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠto	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
directed	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ exactly	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ property	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ degree	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
independence	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ contestable	 ﾠ properties.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ cases,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ
seem,	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdenied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
par	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ others	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ regard,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ full	 ﾠ partners	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ identified	 ﾠ domain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
interaction.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠall	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdeserve	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠall	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠdisparities	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prominence,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ drawing	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ precise	 ﾠ fields	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
relations	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠobstacles	 ﾠto	 ﾠfully	 ﾠequal	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠare	 ﾠencountered.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠusage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠits	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠover	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
above	 ﾠits	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠegalitarian	 ﾠprescriptions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠordering.	 ﾠInspired	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠontologies	 ﾠand	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠpervade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
drive	 ﾠ uncertainty	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ
offers	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ“discursive	 ﾠspace”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠreceptive	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
accommodate,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmultiplicity	 ﾠand	 ﾠenable	 ﾠevaluative	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠacross	 ﾠit	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.407).	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠargument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcentralising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠattending	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispute.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ witnessed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ frequently	 ﾠ involve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ articulation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ irregular	 ﾠ conceptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice\injustice,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormalised	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠand	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠ liberal	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ them).	 ﾠ146	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Whilst,	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ doubt,	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ injuries	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ dissatisfactions	 ﾠ conveyed	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ pertain	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ material	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ status	 ﾠ inequality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
marginalisation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare,	 ﾠto	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠextents,	 ﾠcognisable	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠaddressable)	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠare	 ﾠthey	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠreducible	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠforms.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoften	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormalised	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfer	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
connected	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ otherwise	 ﾠ ill-ﾭ‐accounted	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ realms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
societal	 ﾠordering.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Yet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprecise	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdeviations	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐conformances	 ﾠactually	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
demand	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
easy	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ‘irregularities’	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfully	 ﾠconsistent,	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐configured,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
objectively	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠarticulations	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠare	 ﾠembroiled	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠmap	 ﾠnew	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
meaning	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ terrain.	 ﾠ Insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ
parity	 ﾠmight	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreceptive	 ﾠlayer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
evaluating	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠarising	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠactually	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠpertain	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠhitherto	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐accounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdeepen	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ nuance	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ accounted	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ dimensions),	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ
offers	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ resource	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ
establish	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ disputes.	 ﾠ What	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ more,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ
similarly	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠraising	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ‘within’	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠflow	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠallows	 ﾠa	 ﾠready	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ groups)	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
distinctive,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠunconnected,	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ holding	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ productive	 ﾠ evaluative	 ﾠ conjunction	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
injustice.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ promising	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ appears	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ respect,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcautious	 ﾠin	 ﾠhow	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcapitulate	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠvalidity.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
discontents	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ marginalisation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ oppression	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intellectual	 ﾠ
landscapes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderpin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
developing	 ﾠ here,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ justifications	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ puts	 ﾠ
forward,	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ involved	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ webs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ that	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Indigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠchallenge.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠand	 ﾠemancipatory	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠintentions,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠ
rooted	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘Western’	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠphilosophy.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠso	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ voice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ speaks	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ definite	 ﾠ structural	 ﾠ privilege	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ understand	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ suitability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ
reconstructive	 ﾠ recommendations	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ abnormalities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoliticality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠtheorising,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave.	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠcause	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhesitation	 ﾠhere	 ﾠmust	 ﾠaccompany	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentrenched	 ﾠ
imbalances	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditioning	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfully	 ﾠappreciated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠand	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠbranches	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠfield	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠis	 ﾠoverwhelmingly	 ﾠdominated	 ﾠby	 ﾠEurocentric	 ﾠlanguages,	 ﾠvalue-ﾭ‐
systems,	 ﾠ philosophical	 ﾠ histories,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ worldviews;	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ counterpart	 ﾠ dimensions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠhorizons	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠare,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠexcluded.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
stands,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠraise	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠare	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠto	 ﾠcouch	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠminimally	 ﾠsuited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontours	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
exclusionary	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠterrain,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠupon	 ﾠit.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠany	 ﾠrealistic	 ﾠhope	 ﾠof	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐accounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠor	 ﾠignored	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠprominence,	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ compelled	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ engage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ practices	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠconditioned	 ﾠat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoutset	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdisparity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
Dale	 ﾠ Turner	 ﾠ puts	 ﾠ it,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ ingrained	 ﾠ “asymmetry”	 ﾠ
insomuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠunder	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠto	 ﾠutilise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“normative	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ
culture	 ﾠto	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠworld	 ﾠviews	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠ frameworks”	 ﾠ (2006,	 ﾠ p.81).	 ﾠ Of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ successful,	 ﾠ engagement	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ contribute	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ destabilisation	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ modification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice\injustice,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ sort	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ
balancing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffending	 ﾠdomain(s)	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations.	 ﾠNotwithstanding	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
pertinent	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonus	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠonto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠto	 ﾠprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
plausibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ injustices	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ standard	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ nonstandard	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠpublic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠusing	 ﾠlanguages	 ﾠand	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠ148	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to	 ﾠ understand	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ assess	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ validity.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ opposite	 ﾠ arrangement,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠnever	 ﾠarises.	 ﾠ 
It	 ﾠremains	 ﾠquestionable	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠspace	 ﾠconfigured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠinterrupts	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdynamic.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
attempting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prise	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ exclusionary	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ conception	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠand	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreceptiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠcognitions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠspace	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠflawed	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠsuperimposed	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠand	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdisparity.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠmade	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ possessing	 ﾠ marginal	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ excluded	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠlanguages,	 ﾠever	 ﾠreally	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠ‘on	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms’.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conversation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠvoices	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
exposing	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ challenging	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ limitations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dominant	 ﾠ conception	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
considerably	 ﾠless	 ﾠassured	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠalters	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠasymmetries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠunderlie	 ﾠand	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ Insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ burden	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ proof	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ falls	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthey	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐addressed.	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ point,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ reasonably	 ﾠ interject	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ defence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ argue	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ anything	 ﾠ like	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ genuine	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠit	 ﾠreally	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfervently	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠThough,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠadmit,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
complex	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠassumed,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠ
complexity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ implementation	 ﾠ seriously	 ﾠ jeopardises	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle’s	 ﾠ universal	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠforce.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrux	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplaint	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠrevolve	 ﾠaround	 ﾠa	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠ
disparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappear	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ accurately	 ﾠ capture	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ investigation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ tackle	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ
parity’s	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠundermined;	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠand	 ﾠinventive	 ﾠin	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ implications	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ critique,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ run	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠappreciates.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ constructions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ apparently	 ﾠ universally	 ﾠ valid	 ﾠ normative	 ﾠ principles	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ
contribute	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠEdward	 ﾠSaid	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“flexible	 ﾠpositional	 ﾠsuperiority”	 ﾠof	 ﾠ149	 ﾠ
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Western	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠ(2003	 ﾠ[1978],	 ﾠp.7).	 ﾠSaid	 ﾠemploys	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
attempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠare	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstantly	 ﾠ(re)iterate	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(re)affirm	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠcentre-ﾭ‐
ground	 ﾠby	 ﾠdemonstrating	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠsuperiority	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘non-ﾭ‐Western’	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ thought.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ Said,	 ﾠ securing	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ functioning	 ﾠ superiority	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Western	 ﾠ intellectual	 ﾠ
horizons	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠflexible,	 ﾠadaptive	 ﾠin	 ﾠincorporating	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ situate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘Westerner’	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ “a	 ﾠ whole	 ﾠ series	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ
relationships…without	 ﾠever	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠhim	 ﾠ[sic]	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠupper	 ﾠhand”	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
‘non-ﾭ‐Westerner’	 ﾠ(2003,	 ﾠp.7).	 ﾠThough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠin	 ﾠSaid’s	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠconstructions	 ﾠof,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersuasions	 ﾠtowards,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrient,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalso	 ﾠholds	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠresonance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠcentralising	 ﾠimpetus	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠknowledges,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intimate	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthis	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaintenance	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠand	 ﾠcriticised.	 ﾠ
Linda	 ﾠ Tuhiwai	 ﾠ Smith	 ﾠ (2012),	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ calls	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ Western	 ﾠ
presumption	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠknowledge.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠuniversality,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
argues,	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠideas	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“available	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠall	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreally	 ﾠ‘owned’	 ﾠby	 ﾠanyone”,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“constantly	 ﾠ
[reaffirm]	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest’s	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠitself	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarbiter	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠas	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘civilized’	 ﾠknowledge”	 ﾠ(Smith	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠp.66).	 ﾠ
James	 ﾠYoungblood	 ﾠHenderson	 ﾠsees	 ﾠthis	 ﾠEurocentrism	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“cognitive	 ﾠlegacy”	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
colonialism	 ﾠand,	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠechoing	 ﾠSaid,	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“ever	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠcreativity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoppression	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples”	 ﾠ(2000,	 ﾠ
p.58).	 ﾠ Henderson	 ﾠ argues	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ‘progress’	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ paradigm	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
singularly	 ﾠ involve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ spread	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ innovative	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ emancipatory	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ
traditions	 ﾠand	 ﾠvoices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠas	 ﾠexclusionary	 ﾠor	 ﾠoppressive	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmanner.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ ‘progressive’	 ﾠ moments	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ primary	 ﾠ reference	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠthe	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠshortcomings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠact	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecentralise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠits	 ﾠseemingly	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplication,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠ
interrogated.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠreaffirmation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠ(re)sources	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠis	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠcriticised.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
superior	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠlanguages	 ﾠand	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐150	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐European	 ﾠequivalents	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠdisturbed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠneither,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠfact	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination. 
In	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠpostcolonial	 ﾠcritique,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠcarefully	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠstake	 ﾠin	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ(‘Western’)	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠposition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠforwarded	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠ
implicate	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpretensions	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠuniversality	 ﾠcome	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠcause	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwary	 ﾠof	 ﾠendorsing	 ﾠit	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
qualification.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠone	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠassuming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuniversality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠ
parity	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(even	 ﾠunwittingly)	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐inscribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositional	 ﾠsuperiority	 ﾠof	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠ
albeit	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ presented	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ consistent	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ expanded	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠdanger	 ﾠof	 ﾠfalling	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
circularity	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠit	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand,	 ﾠthus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
connected	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ cognisable	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ affirm	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ universal	 ﾠ
validity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprinciple.	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠto	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠ
to,	 ﾠand	 ﾠstem	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠaround	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠ
production,	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠinadvertently	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ seeking	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ principle,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ inevitably	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ
ourselves	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠagain	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠbehalf.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠseems	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠprincipally	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠsurprising.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠremains	 ﾠan	 ﾠexclusively	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐referential	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠ
language	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples),	 ﾠits	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠ
validity	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgranted.	 ﾠReliance	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonological	 ﾠdefence	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
precarious	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠstands	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestioning	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠhorizons.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠheed	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠ argument	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ hermeneutical	 ﾠ charity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ nonstandard	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ avoid	 ﾠ foreclosing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ151	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐accounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠstands	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein	 ﾠof	 ﾠcriticism,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠaccounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠany	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠrefuses	 ﾠor	 ﾠneglects	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠtradition. 
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmy	 ﾠintention	 ﾠto	 ﾠoverstate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcriticism.	 ﾠClearly,	 ﾠon	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ interpretation,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ represents	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ hugely	 ﾠ
promising	 ﾠ resource	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contending	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ abnormalities	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
substance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdisplays	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ(rather	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice)	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠassist	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
meaningful	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠand	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠacross	 ﾠa	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠof	 ﾠviews	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠunseen	 ﾠor	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐acknowledged	 ﾠharms	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjuries	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
attentions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠits	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠ
validity.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwell	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiscussion)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
implications	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentralising	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠthat	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
carry.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠsurely,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠabide	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠstandards,	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealised	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisparities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe)	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠare	 ﾠdestabilised	 ﾠand	 ﾠovercome,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠ
construction	 ﾠand	 ﾠdefence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠis	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠconvincingly	 ﾠ
absent	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdisparity.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠany	 ﾠdefence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠseems	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠinternally	 ﾠincoherent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠresting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbracketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
relations	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠentertain	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
standards	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ argued	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ suited	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
dispute	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠpretends.	 ﾠ
Perhaps	 ﾠunexpectedly,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠin	 ﾠencountering	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠlimitation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
participatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠits	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
diversified	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠexploration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠcoherently	 ﾠand	 ﾠconvincingly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠ
prescribed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ
outside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐problematising	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠput	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠuse.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠif,	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠlanguage,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠevaluative	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ152	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
disagreement	 ﾠand	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠstroke	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplied	 ﾠuniversality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtest	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘inward’	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
privilege	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠit	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠinto	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠarticulating	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
best	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
bodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound.	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ enabling	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ communicate	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contest	 ﾠ senses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠkinds,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠquestioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentrality	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠalso	 ﾠholds,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠinto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠsustain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprivileged	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠspace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠfully	 ﾠevacuated	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
bringing	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠ(potentially)	 ﾠexclusionary	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠsilently	 ﾠreinforcing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositional	 ﾠsuperiority	 ﾠof	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠI	 ﾠput	 ﾠ
forward	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠqualified	 ﾠone:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsympathetic	 ﾠtowards,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠaccept,	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠto	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠuniversality.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
harness	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠputting	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠresource	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠ disputes)	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ principle’s	 ﾠ capacity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ expose	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contingent	 ﾠ
aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ universality.	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ suggest,	 ﾠ therefore,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
prematurely	 ﾠ yield	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ normative	 ﾠ force	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity,	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ
overstretch	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠemancipatory	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠembrace	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpromising	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠadept	 ﾠat	 ﾠaccommodating	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ falsely	 ﾠ inferring	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ neutral	 ﾠ
ground	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠground	 ﾠdevoid	 ﾠof	 ﾠintrinsic	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠconsequences.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠin	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ continual	 ﾠ problematisation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ground	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ maintaining	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ resolute	 ﾠ
effectiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠshape	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin,	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
kinds,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts;	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmark	 ﾠthe	 ﾠculmination	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠresponse.	 ﾠProjected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ contested	 ﾠ dominance	 ﾠ onto	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ field	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute,	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
participatory	 ﾠparity’s	 ﾠmost	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠits	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠopen	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠthat	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprematurely	 ﾠ153	 ﾠ
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sacrificing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6.3	 ﾠIn	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Whilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠpromises	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠqualification)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
establish	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠspace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccommodating	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠirregularity	 ﾠof	 ﾠviews	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠconfront	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠoccupying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspace	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠconstituted.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠin	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ encountering	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
taken	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasure,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconflicting	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠvoices,	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
needs	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠcount	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconsiderations,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠthus,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
justice-ﾭ‐community	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be.	 ﾠ Whereas	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ former	 ﾠ grip	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Westphalian	 ﾠ paradigm	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ assumed	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ community	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ subjects	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠcoincided	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcitizenry	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠare	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠviews	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠbounding	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects.	 ﾠOften,	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠseek	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
only)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ redraw	 ﾠ Westphalian-ﾭ‐esque	 ﾠ borders	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ territorially	 ﾠ constituted	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ subjects,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ sometimes	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ invoke	 ﾠ altogether	 ﾠ different,	 ﾠ ‘trans-ﾭ‐
territorial’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘post-ﾭ‐territorial’	 ﾠ conceptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ community.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ suitable	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
theorising	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠaccordingly,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠcontends,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
responding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠabsorption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframe	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠand	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠfellow	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice.	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠrecommendation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reckon	 ﾠwith	 ﾠboth	 ﾠits	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsides,	 ﾠprescribing	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠonce	 ﾠ
“reflexive	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeterminative”	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.407).	 ﾠShe	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠ
open	 ﾠand	 ﾠattentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisframing	 ﾠare,	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ prepared	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ investigate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ justice-ﾭ‐frame	 ﾠ
currently	 ﾠ possessing	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ traction	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ constituted,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ novel	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠconfigurations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexivity	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠrests	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice-ﾭ‐frames	 ﾠare	 ﾠalways	 ﾠactually	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠ(rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
natural,	 ﾠessential,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfixed)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠare,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠembodying	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠborders	 ﾠof	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠand	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
impose.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠimportantly,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestphalian-ﾭ‐territorial	 ﾠ
frame	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠera,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ154	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appears	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ pressing	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bulk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ
disputants,	 ﾠour	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontingency	 ﾠof	 ﾠframes	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
end	 ﾠ here.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ orientation	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ consistent,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
“whatever	 ﾠconfiguration	 ﾠof	 ﾠframes	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠas	 ﾠprovisionally	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠmust	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠopen	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠas	 ﾠnew	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠto	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconfiguration”	 ﾠ
(2010,	 ﾠ p.44).	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ vital	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ avoid	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ foreclosing	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ
connected	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ framing	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ future,	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
arrangements.	 ﾠ
Reflexivity	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ itself,	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ enough.	 ﾠ Openness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ injustices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
misframing	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ practice,	 ﾠ reflexivity	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ unproductive.	 ﾠ Along	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ valorising	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ frames,	 ﾠ
therefore,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
negative	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠit	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
manifest	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ impotence,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ determinative	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
competing	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ correct	 ﾠ framing	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ clarified,	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
respective	 ﾠmerits	 ﾠevaluated,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠprovisional	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘just’	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
frame	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠinstance.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrole	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsets	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠin	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthree	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠhold	 ﾠsway	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
sphere	 ﾠtheory,	 ﾠnamely:	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠframing	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“criteria	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelonging”	 ﾠand	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“what	 ﾠ
turns	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠinto	 ﾠfellow	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠshared	 ﾠcitizenship	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
shared	 ﾠnationality”	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.410);	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhumanism	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“appealing	 ﾠto	 ﾠcriteria	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonhood”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
fellow	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“common	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
defining	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠhumanity”	 ﾠ(2009,	 ﾠp.290);	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐affected	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
proposes	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ collectivise	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ justice-ﾭ‐publics	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ “co-ﾭ‐
imbrication	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ web	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ causal	 ﾠ relationships”	 ﾠ (2008,	 ﾠ p.411).	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ somewhat	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ
reasons,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ despite	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ holding	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ merits,	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ finds	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ none	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
approaches	 ﾠis	 ﾠfitting	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠresolutions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
solidly	 ﾠ grounded	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ horizons	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ intelligibility	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ practicability,	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ readily	 ﾠ
shields	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠborders	 ﾠof	 ﾠinclusion/exclusion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ155	 ﾠ
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insufficiently	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ misframing.	 ﾠ Effectively	 ﾠ equating	 ﾠ binding	 ﾠ
obligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠshared	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolity,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ“maintains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠdefensible	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrest	 ﾠon	 ﾠreal	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
comprising	 ﾠ it”	 ﾠ (Fraser	 ﾠ 2009,	 ﾠ p.289),	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ limits	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ connections	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ co-ﾭ‐
belonging	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbounded	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ(whether	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠcitizenship	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ nationality).	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ despite	 ﾠ resonating	 ﾠ favourably	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ
realities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(some)	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠheld	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠidentifications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠera,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ membership	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ serves	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ protect	 ﾠ established	 ﾠ frames	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ loss	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
accommodate	 ﾠframing	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ‘trans-ﾭ‐territorial’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘post-ﾭ‐territorial’	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠlight	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
reflexivity	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠheavy	 ﾠon	 ﾠdeterminism	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠavenue	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠin	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠtimes.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ humanist	 ﾠ principle,	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ hand,	 ﾠ operates	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opposite	 ﾠ direction.	 ﾠ
Inherently	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplode	 ﾠany	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠbounding	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠmembership,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠresists	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠconforming	 ﾠto	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠ
‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠnorms.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhumanist	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐fitting	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ neither	 ﾠ genuinely	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ capable	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ determinative	 ﾠ capacities	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ actual	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute.	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ contends	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ appeal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ shared	 ﾠ
humanity	 ﾠ“operates	 ﾠat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠabstraction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdiscern	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
moral	 ﾠ significance	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ configuration”	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ thus,	 ﾠ
“[a]dopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐size-ﾭ‐fits-ﾭ‐all	 ﾠframe	 ﾠof	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠhumanity,	 ﾠit	 ﾠforecloses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ frames	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ scales	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice”	 ﾠ (2009,	 ﾠ p.290).	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframe	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠ
back	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriori	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠframe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠquestioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠframes	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ surrendered”	 ﾠ (Fraser	 ﾠ 2009,	 ﾠ p.290).	 ﾠ Again,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ correct	 ﾠ balance	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
reflexivity	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeterminism	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstruck.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐affected	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠfinally,	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtack	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠprinciples.	 ﾠ
Whereas	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠand	 ﾠhumanism	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ advance	 ﾠ (albeit	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contrasting	 ﾠ ways),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ insufficiently	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ contestation,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ centres	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ appeal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
relations	 ﾠof	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinterdependence	 ﾠas	 ﾠconstituting	 ﾠfellow	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ view,	 ﾠ “[w]hoever	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ causally	 ﾠ affected	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ nexus	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ standing	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠit”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠp.291),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠ
shape	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠ156	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
resistant	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠfixation	 ﾠon	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠactive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐affected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠalso	 ﾠproves	 ﾠunsuited	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠPrincipally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffectedness	 ﾠstumbles	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmorally	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobjectively	 ﾠascertained.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ kinds	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ degrees	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ affectedness	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ warrant	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ concern	 ﾠ requires,	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠ contends,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ “complex	 ﾠ combination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ normative	 ﾠ reflection,	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠtheorizing”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ“inherently	 ﾠ
dialogical	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical”	 ﾠ(2009,	 ﾠp.292).	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠfears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐affected	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠis	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescending	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“reductio	 ﾠad	 ﾠabsurdum”	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠempirically	 ﾠadduced	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjust	 ﾠabout	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠis	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠjust	 ﾠabout	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠarrive	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠstable	 ﾠand	 ﾠworkable	 ﾠframes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠwhatsoever	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.411).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdescent	 ﾠback	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐size-ﾭ‐fits-ﾭ‐all	 ﾠ
globalism	 ﾠagain	 ﾠseems	 ﾠan	 ﾠall	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠrealistic	 ﾠpossibility,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreached	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexivity	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reliable	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeterminism	 ﾠstill	 ﾠeludes	 ﾠus.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ weighing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ respective	 ﾠ merits	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ deficiencies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ competing	 ﾠ approaches,	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠis	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfitting	 ﾠoption	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠtimes.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwords:	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ view,	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ turns	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ collection	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ fellow	 ﾠ subjects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
neither	 ﾠ shared	 ﾠ citizenship	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ nationality,	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ possession	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abstract	 ﾠ
personhood,	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sheer	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ causal	 ﾠ interdependence,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ joint	 ﾠ
subjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsets	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ interaction.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ structure,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ
matches	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjection.	 ﾠ
(2008,	 ﾠp.411)	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠand	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐affectedness,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠis	 ﾠagain	 ﾠhere	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠas	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠfellow	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠtreads	 ﾠa	 ﾠmiddle-ﾭ‐
ground	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo.	 ﾠSimple	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinterdependence	 ﾠis	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠas	 ﾠinsufficiently	 ﾠ
robust	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ infer	 ﾠ binding	 ﾠ obligations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ (i.e.	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐affected	 ﾠ
principle),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ domain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ instead,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Fraser,	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
decidedly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ‘political’	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrelationships,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
equated	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ shared	 ﾠ belonging	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ nation	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ (i.e.	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
membership	 ﾠ principle).	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ relationships	 ﾠ exist	 ﾠ wherever	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ jointly	 ﾠ157	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠor	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsets	 ﾠrules	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinteractions,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ fall	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ explicit	 ﾠ jurisdiction.	 ﾠ Here,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rigidity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
membership	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitably	 ﾠpitted	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindeterminacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐
affected	 ﾠ principle,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ resultant	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ presented	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ usable	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ standard	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
provisionally	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠfellow	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠcount	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠare	 ﾠwe	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠ kinds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ arising	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute?	 ﾠ Whilst,	 ﾠ
overall,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ obvious	 ﾠ reason	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ why	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunsuited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠissue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠ clarification.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ needs	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ properly	 ﾠ emphasised	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ outset	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ
recourse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠrepeatedly	 ﾠnotes)	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠprovisional	 ﾠ
method	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwho	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠcount	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠAll-ﾭ‐
subjectedness	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ unequivocally	 ﾠ settle	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ eliminate	 ﾠ conflicting	 ﾠ
perspectives	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠframe	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormatively	 ﾠrich	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsome	 ﾠactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgood	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
body	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ formally	 ﾠ contesting	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ unfairly	 ﾠ prevented	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠ principle,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ lies	 ﾠ primarily	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠdeterminative	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠany	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ justice-ﾭ‐community	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ apparent.	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ importantly	 ﾠ distinct	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
determining	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠframe	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠresolutely	 ﾠ‘just’.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠtell	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠany	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠnoticeable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn.	 ﾠAttending	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ witnessed,	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ definitive	 ﾠ points	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contention	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
disputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠis	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcoerced	 ﾠsubjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠ
arising	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠor	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠthrough,	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐building	 ﾠprocesses.	 ﾠ
Whilst,	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ150	 ﾠyears	 ﾠor	 ﾠso,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠfully	 ﾠin	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
evidenced,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠby	 ﾠlong	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠfull	 ﾠcitizenship	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
enfranchisement,	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠresisted	 ﾠall	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
recast	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstatuses	 ﾠas	 ﾠanything	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ‘cultural’	 ﾠor	 ﾠ‘internal’	 ﾠminorities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthrust	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠincorporation	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠin	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ158	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to	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ constant	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bear	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ play	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ webs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ being.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ historically	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
considerable	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠperpetuated	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
justice-ﾭ‐communities	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ(according	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple)	 ﾠ
included,	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ realising	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ inclusion	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ justice-ﾭ‐communities	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants,	 ﾠ
come	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolving	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠframing.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrux	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ continues	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ lie	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommand	 ﾠa	 ﾠjustice-ﾭ‐community	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ ought,	 ﾠ normatively	 ﾠ speaking,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ
emergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrossly	 ﾠinequitable	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠarrangements,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcentrality	 ﾠis	 ﾠowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ coercion,	 ﾠ wherein	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠundermined	 ﾠor	 ﾠsuppressed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠsuppose,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠredrawing	 ﾠboundaries	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlandscape	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
coercively	 ﾠrendered	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrules	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘just’	 ﾠframe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠhugely	 ﾠ
contentious	 ﾠ leap.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ why	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ justice-ﾭ‐communities	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ
constellate	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠaccompanying	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
fact.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠboundaries	 ﾠaround	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠway	 ﾠseems	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠsituate	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠas	 ﾠde	 ﾠfacto	 ﾠminority	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ others	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠstructures),	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠseems	 ﾠperilously	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠreplicating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ dynamics	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have,	 ﾠ to-ﾭ‐date,	 ﾠ proven	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ resistant	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ
aspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠcontestation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠeven	 ﾠsituates	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
marginal	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeveloped.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠframe	 ﾠis	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠjust,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠits	 ﾠboundaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠjustly	 ﾠdrawn,	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠstands	 ﾠon	 ﾠrather	 ﾠtenuous	 ﾠground.	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠclarity,	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
think,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmodest	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ easily	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ inferred	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ care	 ﾠ deserts	 ﾠ us.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ normative	 ﾠ principle,	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐
subjectedness	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ159	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠ in	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ helps	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
moments	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠremedial	 ﾠattention	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccompanying	 ﾠ
expansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgive	 ﾠus,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ inferring	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ resolutely	 ﾠ just,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
preliminary	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠ ridiculous	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ included	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
justice-ﾭ‐publics	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
subject,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠif)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
functioning)	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ unjust.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ say,	 ﾠ therefore,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
constituted	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠought	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠas	 ﾠfull	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠsubjects.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠcry	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠare	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframe	 ﾠitself	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠjust.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠcontingency	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠcommunity-ﾭ‐demanding	 ﾠ
roles	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ borne	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ mind,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ limitations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠin	 ﾠattending	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠaround	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠanything	 ﾠin	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconflicts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠlend	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠof	 ﾠhighlighting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠto	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠresistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠcreeping	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠframes	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠuncontentious	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcaution	 ﾠin	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠassertion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[a]n	 ﾠ
issue	 ﾠis	 ﾠjustly	 ﾠframed	 ﾠif	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠsubjected	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure(s)	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠswath(s)	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠis	 ﾠaccorded	 ﾠequal	 ﾠconsideration”	 ﾠ
(2008,	 ﾠp.412).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ‘justly	 ﾠframed’	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘just	 ﾠframe’	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠconflated.	 ﾠThough,	 ﾠperhaps,	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
possible,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠtask	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠis	 ﾠequipped	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
fulfil	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠor	 ﾠindependently.	 ﾠBearing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlimitation	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ remembering	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ commitment	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reflexivity	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ theorising	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠrequires,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠany	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠoverly,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ damagingly,	 ﾠ deterministic.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ argument	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ ‘against’	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐
subjected	 ﾠ principle,	 ﾠ but,	 ﾠ again,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ qualify	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
theorising	 ﾠsuited,	 ﾠparticularly,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabnormalities	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	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6.4	 ﾠIn	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠpromising	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠresource	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ arising	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ justly	 ﾠ
framed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠany	 ﾠactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdenied	 ﾠit.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreach	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
immediately	 ﾠbegs	 ﾠitself	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ
For,	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhom,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘subjectedness’	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined?	 ﾠ
Through	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ sort	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ procedural	 ﾠ route	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ subjectedness	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
upheld	 ﾠor	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠjustice-ﾭ‐community	 ﾠdrawn,	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠsense?	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠa	 ﾠsatisfying	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠring	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠhollow.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ familiar	 ﾠ refrain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ reckoning	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ sides	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
abnormality	 ﾠagain	 ﾠunderpins	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠShe	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
sufficiently	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ nonstandard	 ﾠ views	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapplied,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
guard	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠpitfalls.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrefuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“hegemonic	 ﾠpresumption”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠgrammar	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
‘how’	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ determined	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ powerful	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ elites	 ﾠ (Fraser	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ
p.413).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Westphalian	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠstands	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimultaneous,	 ﾠif	 ﾠoften	 ﾠinadvertent,	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠ
creation	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐hegemonic	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhandling	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframing	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠin	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠtimes”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.414).	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframe	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
frequently	 ﾠ enveloped	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ fair	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ resolving	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠaround	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠattached	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠframe.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ
serve	 ﾠto	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐inscribe	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ reasons,	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ recourse	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ “scientistic	 ﾠ
presumption”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠscience	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncontroversial	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘correct’	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjection	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠ
(2008,	 ﾠ p.414).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ frames	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ reduced	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ “simple	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ empirical	 ﾠ fact,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ interpretations,	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ theories,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ underlie	 ﾠ factual	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
dispute”	 ﾠ(Fraser	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠp.414).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdanger	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠitself	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
disinterested	 ﾠ mode	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ assessment	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ reasoning	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ unavoidably	 ﾠ guided	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ161	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
contingent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ contestable	 ﾠ assumptions,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ again	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reinforce	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
unjustifiable	 ﾠclosure	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreach	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcontestation. 
Though	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠalong	 ﾠmarkedly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtrajectories,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠunites	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ hegemonic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ scientistic	 ﾠ presumptive	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ shared	 ﾠ premise	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjectedness	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠ“monologically,	 ﾠby	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠ (in	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ power,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ science)	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ accountable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
discursive	 ﾠgive-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐take	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdebate”	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠp.414).	 ﾠEach	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
uncertainty	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠby	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
vantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠprivileged	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠEffectively	 ﾠanswering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠarises,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠ
match	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠby	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlack	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexivity	 ﾠit	 ﾠdemands.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfitting	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠargues,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠvalidate	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ engaging	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘how’	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ conflicts	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
legitimately	 ﾠtackled	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠfair	 ﾠand	 ﾠinclusive	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠ
positions.	 ﾠ
Simply	 ﾠciting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠinsufficient.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
culture	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformations	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠin	 ﾠisolation	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠenough.	 ﾠAbsent	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrepresentativeness	 ﾠand	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
checked,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠprovisional)	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
emerge,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ left	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deeply	 ﾠ unsatisfactory	 ﾠ situation,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ
promise	 ﾠof	 ﾠfacilitating	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ cites	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ track	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ stand	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
complementary	 ﾠ partnership	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ civil	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ track.	 ﾠ Dynamically	 ﾠ receptive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
accountable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdebates	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠtrack	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
structured	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsolidly	 ﾠaround	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠform.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠfurthermore,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠreach	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠadjudicating	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠframing	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠarise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpress	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠin	 ﾠprescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠtrack,	 ﾠ
citing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠand	 ﾠacknowledging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
considerably	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ done	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ track	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ162	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
practice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠwants	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaway,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ abnormality	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘how’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ once	 ﾠ dialogical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ validate	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ binding	 ﾠ
outcomes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠneither	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠneglected	 ﾠunder	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice. 
Fraser’s	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠappear	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ
commitments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐subjectedness.	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormality	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
appears	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠmanifests	 ﾠin	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
witnessed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠaccommodating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeliver	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠis	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠvital.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠequation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠembody	 ﾠan	 ﾠunbearable	 ﾠhostility	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
meta-ﾭ‐injustices;	 ﾠany	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠis	 ﾠsure	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠinadequately	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠinstances.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠbeating	 ﾠa	 ﾠpath	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠoption,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpath	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠseem.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
sense,	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠinhabitation	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠ
allowing	 ﾠ meaningful	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ continue	 ﾠ despite	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ irresolution	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
uncertainty	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠvitally	 ﾠimportant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠenvisions	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠ track	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ world,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
particularly	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ architecture	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ
Specifically,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwonder	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠfixing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠgaze	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠway	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠalternative,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ‘local’	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠworthwhile,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠendeavour.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcarefully,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠus	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠon	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
citing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
mind.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠprogression	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinclusionary	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
underpins	 ﾠher	 ﾠposition	 ﾠsince,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠconceptually	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠall	 ﾠactors	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ‘global’	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠframe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠimmune	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisframing.	 ﾠLeaving	 ﾠno	 ﾠspace	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠexclusion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠframe	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcharges	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
frames	 ﾠare	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe)	 ﾠinherently	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠ–	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbuilds	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠstability	 ﾠand	 ﾠ163	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
legitimacy	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvantage	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠrepresents.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠalways	 ﾠunimplicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
kinds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ seeks	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ respond,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ situated	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ rightfully	 ﾠ
respond	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠsince	 ﾠall	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠgovernance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠan	 ﾠadjudicating	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠsubjectedness	 ﾠpertaining	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocalised	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ‘other-ﾭ‐than-ﾭ‐global’	 ﾠframes. 
The	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠevident	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
attentions	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ matters	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ implementation.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ because,	 ﾠ logically,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐
encompassing	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ institution	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ prescribes	 ﾠ cannot	 ﾠ emerge	 ﾠ ‘from	 ﾠ
above’,	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ external,	 ﾠ general,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ‘global’	 ﾠ authority,	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠthis	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstitute.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ confronted	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ something	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ paradox	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ founding:	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠtrack	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠthe	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠ
disputes)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐existence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ established.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
inescapable	 ﾠrealisation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠever	 ﾠto	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠany	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠhas	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠorganic	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠemanating	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudgements	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠof	 ﾠprior	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘less-ﾭ‐than-ﾭ‐
global’	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ consideration	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ implies	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ anything	 ﾠ
resembling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsketches	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealised,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠ
down	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ advance	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ frames	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠstructures.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠviable	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠform	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠactive	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠan	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠcomplexity.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠsupposing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠand	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠlabour	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠ reason	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ suppose	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠand	 ﾠframes	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠdecisions?	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbrute	 ﾠ
coercion	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ neither	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ feasible	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ normatively	 ﾠ desirable	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ensuring	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ
responsiveness,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ compelling	 ﾠ reason	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐
global	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ yield	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ demands	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ boundaries	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
inclusion	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaltered	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠhad	 ﾠalready	 ﾠinternalised	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ arbitrariness.	 ﾠ By	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ mean	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ majority	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠframe	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠthose	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠit)	 ﾠare	 ﾠcogently	 ﾠaware	 ﾠ164	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of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunjustly	 ﾠshaped,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠframeworks	 ﾠ
supporting	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ light	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ Without	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ core	 ﾠ
receptiveness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ arbitrariness,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ
motivation	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate,	 ﾠendorse,	 ﾠor	 ﾠyield	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠgeared	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠframing	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠ 
The	 ﾠupshot	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconcur,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘how’	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ dialogical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharacter,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠefficacious	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠfor	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠinitially,	 ﾠis	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠreimagining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠframes.	 ﾠ
Only	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreceptiveness	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠto	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠframeworks	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠloosening	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrip	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠframes	 ﾠbegin.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgrip	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠloosened	 ﾠenough	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ accepted	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ justice-ﾭ‐community	 ﾠ formations	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ
contingent,	 ﾠcontestable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠboundings	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjudicate	 ﾠover	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
pursued. 
If	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠplausible)	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠtarget.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠbody	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Fraser	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ mind	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ continue	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
primary	 ﾠobjective,	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccommodating	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠexchanges	 ﾠat	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠstrategy.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠ
course,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframing	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠguides	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠinsomuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠimmune	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
contests	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisframing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmistaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠsubstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ institution	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ argues	 ﾠ for.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠbody	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠupon	 ﾠincremental	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
receptiveness	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ less-ﾭ‐than-ﾭ‐global	 ﾠ levels,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ localised	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ
dialogical	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐condition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠlevel. 
Of	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmove	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐invoke	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠit	 ﾠaddresses.	 ﾠIf,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwould	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠ hegemonic	 ﾠ frames	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ sufficiently	 ﾠ receptive	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ responsive	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
possibilities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ misframing,	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ compel	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ establishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormal-ﾭ‐
dialogical	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ‘internally’,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘local’	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace?	 ﾠWould	 ﾠsensitivity	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to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐arbitrariness	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinternalised	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
too?	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠso,	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideational	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠtrack	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcleared? 
These	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠare	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠa	 ﾠrejection	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
destabilising	 ﾠ frames	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ realistic	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ (especially	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bound	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ hegemonic	 ﾠ frames).	 ﾠ They	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ eclipse	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstitutionalised	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠcultivated	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠframes	 ﾠand	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructures.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpointing	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐inscription	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐global	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commitments	 ﾠto	 ﾠactually	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠformal	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠarenas,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
garnered	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠever	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠreflexive-ﾭ‐
dialogical	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ level,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ prepared	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ again	 ﾠ shift	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ initial	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠfocus.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
institutionally	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠaround	 ﾠreflexivity	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠagitated	 ﾠ‘outwards’	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrip	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠreflexivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexists	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠ
values,	 ﾠ principles,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐understandings	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ sway	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
frames.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠlocating	 ﾠand	 ﾠutilising	 ﾠresources	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
consonance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠit	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠ realistic	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ realisation	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ wider	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ scale	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
found.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠvein	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
‘what’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ‘who’	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ my	 ﾠ intention	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ
institution	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sort	 ﾠ outlined	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ working	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠby	 ﾠhighlighting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
idea	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠadd	 ﾠa	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠelement	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpicture,	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠattentions	 ﾠback	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠenvisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠrefocusing	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠor	 ﾠsteer	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠmomentum	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconfused	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠsynthesised	 ﾠ‘within’	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠcontexts;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠkind	 ﾠis	 ﾠbound	 ﾠto	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠit.	 ﾠPragmatism	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠ attend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ route	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ journey	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ occur.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ
thinking	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ sorts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ exist,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ can	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realistically	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ constructed,	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠ importance,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ rightly	 ﾠ rest	 ﾠ alongside	 ﾠ grander	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ
commitments.	 ﾠ
6.5	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠconstructively	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
encounter	 ﾠwith	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠdeserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠterms	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
considered,	 ﾠparticularly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠ
not,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ argued,	 ﾠ withhold	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principles	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
contending	 ﾠwith	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘what’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐subjected	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwe	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcaution	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠParticularly,	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠresist	 ﾠfalling	 ﾠinto	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠpremature	 ﾠoverconfidence	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠemancipatory	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠand	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠvalidity,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
contestable	 ﾠelements.	 ﾠOpenly	 ﾠacknowledging	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontestable	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠis	 ﾠvital	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflexivity	 ﾠseriously,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠabide	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠ
consistently.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠgermane	 ﾠ
fashion.	 ﾠ
Further,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ recommendations	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ contending	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘how’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefocus	 ﾠattentions	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘end-ﾭ‐point’	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ satisfactorily	 ﾠ reflexive-ﾭ‐dialogical	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ future,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ push	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠstrides	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠentails	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
present.	 ﾠ Arguing	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ come	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ ‘within’	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bounds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐
reflexive	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠ–	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠessential	 ﾠ–	 ﾠendeavour	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlend	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
appropriated	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccommodation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacknowledged	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠwill	 ﾠallow	 ﾠonly	 ﾠan	 ﾠimperfect	 ﾠreplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ dialogue	 ﾠ deemed	 ﾠ necessary	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ deal	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dispute,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ nevertheless	 ﾠ prove	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ invaluable	 ﾠ tool	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ helping	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
cultivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠfutures.	 ﾠ
Arguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠresounding	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠdisagreements	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠ
engagement,	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ settle	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ appeal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	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sophisticated	 ﾠ‘theory’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdialogues	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠdivergent,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠconflicting,	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
dealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠreckoning	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctly,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeeply,	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠfeel.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
next	 ﾠchapter,	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠdetail.	 ﾠDeveloping	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠ refer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ characteristic	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠ–	 ﾠI	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠit	 ﾠholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
begin	 ﾠto	 ﾠalter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠalong	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠlines.	 ﾠ
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7 
Moving	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
democracy	 ﾠ
7.1	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
bring	 ﾠdisagreements	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠshape,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠand	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdialogue.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠ
recommendations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠin	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠdialogue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
persuasions	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ proclivities	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ normality	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ prevented	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ unduly	 ﾠ stifling	 ﾠ
possibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠdeserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
deeply	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠone.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsketches	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ everywhere	 ﾠ contingent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ composition,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ everywhere	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ drawn	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ consistent	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
exploration.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ principles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ all-ﾭ‐subjectedness	 ﾠ stand	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠguides	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠendeavour,	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠstable	 ﾠevaluative	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠacross	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠand	 ﾠframing	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠremain	 ﾠstructurally	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
application	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodified	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconflictual	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠinterplay	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeterministic	 ﾠand	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
discover	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ processing	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ sacrificing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ170	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in	 ﾠ real	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ character	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ emerges	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ
understands	 ﾠ responsibilities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ responsiveness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pertain	 ﾠ equally,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
simultaneously,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠplanes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsees	 ﾠany	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠeither	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠas	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠchapter,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdepth	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
bodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠShowing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ carries	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
irrepressible	 ﾠ drive	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ radical	 ﾠ openness	 ﾠ (through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contingency	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ
foundations	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ‘normalities’	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ exposed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ rendered	 ﾠ vulnerable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
demands)	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ remaining	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ wedded	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ insistence	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ performing	 ﾠ
moments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ provisional	 ﾠ closure	 ﾠ (which	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ decisive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ lasting	 ﾠ real-ﾭ‐world	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ
possible),	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrolled	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
principle,	 ﾠ unbounded	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ exploration,	 ﾠ destabilisation,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ transformation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
abnormally	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspheres.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠthus	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠa	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
receptive	 ﾠand	 ﾠsympathetic	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
pervade	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠor	 ﾠassured	 ﾠrelief	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ scenes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contestation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ nor,	 ﾠ indeed,	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
continuing	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ nevertheless	 ﾠ works	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
reconfigure,	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠand	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠways,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitico-ﾭ‐discursive	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ place.	 ﾠ Leaving	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relationships	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠordering	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthorship	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠinhabiting	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠspaces,	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ sights	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ authorship	 ﾠ takes	 ﾠ
place.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠyet	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠalways	 ﾠorientated	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjourney	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ
7.2	 ﾠClarifying	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ position,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ seen,	 ﾠ entails	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ aversion	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ notion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
resolving	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tension	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ normality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ abnormality.	 ﾠ Driven	 ﾠ simultaneously	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
world-ﾭ‐disclosing	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐coordinating	 ﾠmotivations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
open-ﾭ‐ended	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠ–	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠ
whereby	 ﾠall	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠconsensuses	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠopened-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠtransformation)	 ﾠis	 ﾠaligned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ utilise	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ contestable	 ﾠ foundations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ convincingly	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ
instances	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm,	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ171	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠreflection,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠgenerally)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
perspectives.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠ–	 ﾠextending	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠand	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠordering	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ prevented	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ attaining	 ﾠ absolute	 ﾠ stability,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ receive	 ﾠ
exposure	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ destabilising	 ﾠ forces,	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ carry	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ profound,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠrather	 ﾠtroubling,	 ﾠconnotations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠobservers,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠworry	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
stability	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ permanently	 ﾠ pitted	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ instability,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ
character.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠraise	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworldview	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠis	 ﾠderived	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠintellectual	 ﾠ
tradition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠcomposition,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠitself	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠuniversalistic	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠby	 ﾠinferring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠ‘justice-ﾭ‐seeking’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘democratic’	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠconform	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠdemands.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠbias,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ trouble	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ approaching	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠdirections.	 ﾠParticularly,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdemocrats	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠactually	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠ
undermining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠand	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠlike	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠso	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
were,	 ﾠunwittingly	 ﾠ render	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ vulnerable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
enemies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠcatastrophic	 ﾠconsequences.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠyet	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
direction,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠplausibly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobjected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠno	 ﾠabsolute	 ﾠstability	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ(let	 ﾠalone	 ﾠdesirable)	 ﾠ
inevitably	 ﾠends	 ﾠup	 ﾠdescending	 ﾠinto	 ﾠincoherence.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠlost	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
ring	 ﾠfence	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthis	 ﾠground	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreach	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠcontestation,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
fails	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠmust	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠin	 ﾠon	 ﾠitself	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠhollowed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠground	 ﾠbeneath	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
democracy,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ taps	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ matter	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ seriously.	 ﾠ Though	 ﾠ
obviously	 ﾠstemming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠand	 ﾠmotivations,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
reservations	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ dealt	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ clarification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
democracy’s	 ﾠ character.	 ﾠ One	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ engaging	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ closer	 ﾠ
conversation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ veins	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ grouped	 ﾠ together	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ banner	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ172	 ﾠ
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agonistic	 ﾠ democracy.	 ﾠ Agonistic	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ growing	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
theory	 ﾠof	 ﾠlate,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsources	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠways,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscipline’s	 ﾠmost	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
debates.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠburgeoning	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠ
democracy	 ﾠso	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠand	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠclose	 ﾠ
family	 ﾠ resemblance	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ agonistic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ perspectives.	 ﾠ Most	 ﾠ
vividly,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠperspectives	 ﾠinsist	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠor	 ﾠtelos,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠideal	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen-ﾭ‐ended	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ beings	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ inescapably	 ﾠ fated.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ agonists,	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠand	 ﾠarranged	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlines.	 ﾠAccompanying	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠ moments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ consonance,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ
dissonances	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ agonist	 ﾠ positions.	 ﾠ Attending	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
similarities	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠreservations	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠabove	 ﾠand,	 ﾠcrucially,	 ﾠto	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠa	 ﾠclearer	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhold	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
abnormal	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ outlooks	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ (what	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ hesitantly	 ﾠ refer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ as)	 ﾠ ‘typical’	 ﾠ agonist	 ﾠ
perspectives	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ constructed.	 ﾠ For,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ ostensibly	 ﾠ similar,	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ closer	 ﾠ inspection	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
becomes	 ﾠevident	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsubtly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commitments,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠtake	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
proponents	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠilk,	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠan	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠtragic	 ﾠquality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstems	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠineliminable	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ agonistic	 ﾠ notion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ pluralism	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ critically	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ usually	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ pluralists.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ because,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
agonistic	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘fact’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ
(as	 ﾠRawls	 ﾠ(1993),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠit),	 ﾠeven	 ﾠan	 ﾠinevitable	 ﾠone.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
agonistic	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ thinking,	 ﾠ pluralism	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ stand	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ something	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ like	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
“axiological	 ﾠprinciple”	 ﾠ(Mouffe	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠp.19).	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdirection,	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠ properly	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ conceived	 ﾠ just	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ (inevitable)	 ﾠ empirical	 ﾠ feature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
world,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠontologically	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ
here	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ one,	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ agonists	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ failing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
acknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠhostility	 ﾠto	 ﾠ173	 ﾠ
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“genuine	 ﾠ pluralism”	 ﾠ (Honig	 ﾠ 1993,	 ﾠ p.130),	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ discreet	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ destructive	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠconsequence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Clearly,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠclarification,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠsince,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhands	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠproponents	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠhere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠRawls	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ Habermas	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ cited	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ ‘empiricist’	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐constitutive’	 ﾠ
conceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠhave	 ﾠserved	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ expressly	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ mediation	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
disagreement,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠany	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠor	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠhostility	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagonists,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠeradicate	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠclaims).	 ﾠPrincipally,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠbecause,	 ﾠin	 ﾠconcentrating	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ encountered	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ pluralism,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ approaches	 ﾠ fail	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ properly	 ﾠ
appreciate	 ﾠits	 ﾠorigins.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠagonists,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠmost	 ﾠheavily	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠthoughts;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠattending	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
origins	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠadvantageous	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠdemocratically	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠencounters	 ﾠwith	 ﾠplurality	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠusual	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠflows	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshare	 ﾠan	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠcannot)	 ﾠitself	 ﾠobjectively	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠit	 ﾠ(Wingenbach	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠOften	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠextensively	 ﾠon	 ﾠWittgensteinian	 ﾠand	 ﾠDerridean	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠinsights,	 ﾠsupporters	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ conception	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ pluralism	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ starting	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
meaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠby	 ﾠextension,	 ﾠidentity)	 ﾠis	 ﾠborne	 ﾠout	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠidentities).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠderives	 ﾠits	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
individuality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ distinctiveness	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ continual	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ sameness	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconstellations	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠsubjectivities,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠperpetual	 ﾠ(re)constitution.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠno	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠ
resides	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠrelational	 ﾠdetermination,	 ﾠnone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
possess	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ ultimate	 ﾠ essence	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ anchor	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ whole	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠabsolute	 ﾠrigidity,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠminimal	 ﾠor	 ﾠlocalised.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
consequence,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘impossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠclosure’	 ﾠaround	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
meaning	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ identity:	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ novel	 ﾠ interpretation,	 ﾠ misunderstanding,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
miscommunication	 ﾠalways	 ﾠstand	 ﾠas	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠfinality	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠsubjective	 ﾠpositions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠalso	 ﾠunderline	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ“protean	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife”	 ﾠ(Connolly	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠ
p.319)	 ﾠholds	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠintersubjective	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠplurality	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects),	 ﾠ174	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠintrasubjective	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpluralisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself)	 ﾠ(Connolly	 ﾠ1995).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
contests	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(mis)communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(re)interpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeanings	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
place,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ identities,	 ﾠ values,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ connected	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ prone	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
consistent	 ﾠreconstitution	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinitive	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠcapturing	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠreach.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠConnolly	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit,	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠnever	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠ being	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ becoming,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ driven	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ realise	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
plurality	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠeven	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠit	 ﾠpertains.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠalways	 ﾠimmanent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠ
ineradicable	 ﾠand	 ﾠirreducible	 ﾠ(Mouffe	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠ
primarily	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠempiricists	 ﾠdo)	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
origin	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ agonists	 ﾠ do)	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ tends	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ easily	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ ideal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐
pluralism’.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠinclination	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠperhaps,	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠper	 ﾠse)	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ life.	 ﾠ Whilst	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ thinking	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ imbued	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ intuitive	 ﾠ
appeal,	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ constitutive	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ pluralism	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ appears	 ﾠ fundamentally	 ﾠ misguided	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠit	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠonly	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdistant	 ﾠor	 ﾠweak	 ﾠideal,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠpluralism.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠideal,	 ﾠ
agonistic	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠreal-ﾭ‐world	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠendeavours	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐pluralistic	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfashion,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠis	 ﾠinfinitely	 ﾠdeferred	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠchannelling	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenergies	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠclosure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalways	 ﾠembody	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠpluralism:	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ
pluralism	 ﾠis	 ﾠirreducible	 ﾠand	 ﾠineradicable	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠ
constitutive	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠany	 ﾠillusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠforce,	 ﾠ
coercion,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ concealment.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ agonists,	 ﾠ accordingly,	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
oriented	 ﾠ primarily	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ troubling	 ﾠ moments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ closure	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ
attempting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ realise	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sensitivity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ontopolitical	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
pluralism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠtragedy	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠlife	 ﾠcrystallises.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Clearly,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠsome	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠthreads	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsonance	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthis	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠinstructive	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠclarifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠyet	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdissonance	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
position,	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Fraser	 ﾠ presents	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ sought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
preceding	 ﾠchapters,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠaround	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠontological	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠ
pluralism;	 ﾠ rather,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ centred	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ call	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ175	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
pragmatic	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterminability	 ﾠof	 ﾠpluralism.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠontological	 ﾠcommitment,	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠ
crucially,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplace	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠarise	 ﾠsits	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠplane	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
constitutive	 ﾠ pluralism.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ relates,	 ﾠ instead,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ineliminable	 ﾠ
exclusionary	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘normality’.	 ﾠ Fundamentally,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ entails	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
rejection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormality,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠstable	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeterminant	 ﾠset	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠor	 ﾠprinciples,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠabsolved	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠ
weaker	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ ontological	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ usually	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ proponents	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ constitutive	 ﾠ
pluralism	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbasically	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠapproaches).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterminable	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
emerges	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠholds	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠaffinity	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠpluralism,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
essential	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperspective.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠit	 ﾠasks	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
‘only’	 ﾠhere)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
settlement	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ purport	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ seem)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ‘resolve’	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ domain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ life	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
trusted	 ﾠ absolutely,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ rendered	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ immune	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ
dialogical	 ﾠexamination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠstability	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
agreement	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠcontingency,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠan	 ﾠinsoluble	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ(re)absorbing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠalways	 ﾠback	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠThrough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdisturbed,	 ﾠtransformed,	 ﾠor	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠentirely,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaffirmed	 ﾠ
anew.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠinquiry	 ﾠforever	 ﾠopen	 ﾠand	 ﾠactive	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife. 
This	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠreservations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
cultural	 ﾠ biases	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ politics.	 ﾠ Once	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ realise	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tragic	 ﾠ
composition	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠactually	 ﾠboils	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforever	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
transformation	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠrenewed	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontinuity)	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparties	 ﾠactually	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠrelationships,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠradically	 ﾠopen-ﾭ‐ended	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠit	 ﾠputs	 ﾠ
forward	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpalatable	 ﾠand	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠ
appeal.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
inhabitation	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠpluralism,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpertain	 ﾠto	 ﾠ176	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠ strands	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ thought	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Western	 ﾠ tradition	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
constructed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ ‘non-ﾭ‐Western’	 ﾠ intellectual	 ﾠ traditions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ orders.	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠa	 ﾠpragmatic	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterminable	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
(ii)	 ﾠan	 ﾠontological	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠineliminable	 ﾠexclusionary	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠof	 ﾠclosure	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
base	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsympathetic	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccommodating	 ﾠof,	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠof	 ﾠpluralism	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠcoterminous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠthus	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
ethical	 ﾠ base	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ real-ﾭ‐world	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ demanding	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
broadly	 ﾠaccessible	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontesting	 ﾠor	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠprivy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠthought	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠextended	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
reservations	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠmight	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠ grounds	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ injustice,	 ﾠ harm,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠeven	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠreservation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠextends	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠencompass	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠideas,	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ
societies,	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠpower	 ﾠthat	 ﾠideas	 ﾠlike	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠpossess.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfoundations,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠgoes,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠletting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenemies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠthe	 ﾠback	 ﾠdoor,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠspeaking,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadvocates	 ﾠof	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠthought	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠwith.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠhas	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠarisen	 ﾠmost	 ﾠprominently	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠregister	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘conflict’	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠasked	 ﾠof	 ﾠagonists	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
stressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠ
sacrifice	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ability	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ coherently	 ﾠ exclude	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ conflict	 ﾠ whatsoever	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠpolitics.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠqualify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠand	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ ‘valuable	 ﾠ conflict’	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ agonistic	 ﾠ perspective,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reaffirm	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ necessity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠdemocracy,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproven	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecurring	 ﾠ
challenge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Amongst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠagonists	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
Chantal	 ﾠMouffe	 ﾠ(2005).	 ﾠInfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠSchmittian	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘the	 ﾠpolitical’,	 ﾠMouffe	 ﾠ
contends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠare,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠcharacterised	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠan	 ﾠever-ﾭ‐present	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeruption	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisagreement.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Mouffe,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ conflict	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ manifest	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ contrasting	 ﾠ
forms.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠarise,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠin	 ﾠantagonistic	 ﾠform,	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“takes	 ﾠ177	 ﾠ
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place	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠenemies,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠsymbolic	 ﾠspace”	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠ
p.14).	 ﾠAntagonistic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsignal,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠa	 ﾠresoundingly	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflict,	 ﾠ
carrying	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ threat	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ physical	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ mutual	 ﾠ annihilation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
catastrophic	 ﾠ rupture	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ relations.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Mouffe,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
purpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠto	 ﾠguard	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeruption	 ﾠ
(or	 ﾠcontinuation)	 ﾠof	 ﾠantagonistic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠby	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠ
type	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠ–	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠconflict.	 ﾠRather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠin	 ﾠform,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conflict	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠenemies	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠadversaries	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ“friendly	 ﾠenemies”	 ﾠas	 ﾠMouffe	 ﾠherself	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ“persons	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠsymbolic	 ﾠspace	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠenemies	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠorganize	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠ symbolic	 ﾠ space	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ way”	 ﾠ (2005,	 ﾠ p.14).	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ type	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
agonistic	 ﾠconflictual	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadversaries	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠout	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠon)	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsimilarities.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
pluralistic	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
reconstituted,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠworked	 ﾠout	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠ
(though	 ﾠnever	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠfinality).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠpointing	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠagonists	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠof	 ﾠagonism)	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
somewhat	 ﾠuneasy	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMouffe	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conflict.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdestructive	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠis	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠone,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsentiment	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ shared	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ manner	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ agonistic	 ﾠ
democrats.	 ﾠCertainly,	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠperspectives	 ﾠemphasise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsignalling	 ﾠits	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠits	 ﾠsickness	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsets	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmany	 ﾠother	 ﾠveins	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠthought	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠorientate	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠideals	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠand	 ﾠagreement.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠ
stretches	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics;	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conflict	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘friendly	 ﾠ
enemies’.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
lapse	 ﾠinto	 ﾠcomplacency	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘non-ﾭ‐exclusionary	 ﾠnormal’	 ﾠcompels	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠposit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠharbouring	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠ politics.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ constantly	 ﾠ disturb	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ proclivities	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠabsolute	 ﾠstability,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠbases	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠalways	 ﾠback	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ endorsement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ conflict,	 ﾠ like	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ agonists,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ unqualified.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ178	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reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ distinguish	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ destructive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ conflict	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ limit	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
conflict	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ broadly	 ﾠ conducive	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continuation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ overall	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠmanifestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflictual	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠthreatens	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠremove	 ﾠor	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfree-ﾭ‐play	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠactors	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠdenying	 ﾠthem	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠhegemonic	 ﾠ
normality	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠexposed.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠ
contravene	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠposition’s	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠ(seeing	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠend	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
fuel	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠjustification)	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ way,	 ﾠ though	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ limits	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ domains	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠextend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
legitimate	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠand	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘valuable	 ﾠconflict’,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠalso	 ﾠunderline	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ light	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ observance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
essential	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdangers	 ﾠof	 ﾠstability	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠagreement.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠrecognises	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠstability	 ﾠformed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘non-ﾭ‐conflict’	 ﾠor	 ﾠ‘temporary	 ﾠ
closure’	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠsuspicious,	 ﾠregrettable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐politicised	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
life,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinvaluable	 ﾠplatforms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠmount	 ﾠinterventions	 ﾠ
designed	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm,	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmodicum	 ﾠof	 ﾠassurance,	 ﾠefficacy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ immediacy,	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ ability	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ instances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
catastrophically	 ﾠimpeded,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠchallenging	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransforming	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠimpossible.	 ﾠ 
We	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠanalogy	 ﾠhere	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠthought	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠof	 ﾠTheseus’	 ﾠShip	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevery	 ﾠplank	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠvessel	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠreplaceable,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplanks	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠmove	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcatastrophic	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠship.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠenough	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplanks	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
held	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠone	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠany	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠplank	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeven	 ﾠones	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠload	 ﾠor	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwaterline,	 ﾠto	 ﾠextend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmetaphor	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinspected,	 ﾠ
modified,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ replaced	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ship	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ falling	 ﾠ apart	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ succumbing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
depths.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ stability	 ﾠ provided	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ matrix	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contingent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
replaceable	 ﾠthough	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠundisturbed	 ﾠplanks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
transformation	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠship	 ﾠmay,	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ planks	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ replaced,	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ something	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ179	 ﾠ
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process,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠretain	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠirremovable	 ﾠessence	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpuzzle	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPlutarch	 ﾠwants	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠTheseus’	 ﾠship	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠalways	 ﾠcontestable)	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpertinent	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠship	 ﾠremains	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠartefact	 ﾠ
throughout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(potentially)	 ﾠradical	 ﾠalteration.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise,	 ﾠ
then,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠstability	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠ
forces,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiametrically	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠ–	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠview,	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠinescapably	 ﾠand	 ﾠproductively	 ﾠentangled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlight,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstrive	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠallow)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsimultaneous	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠensures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnone	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
moving	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreach	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠabsolutely.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimpermanent	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠstability	 ﾠ
offered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatrix	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠleft	 ﾠundisturbed	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠ
(even	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ contestation)	 ﾠ affords	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ sufficient	 ﾠ
traction	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠdecisive	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠalso	 ﾠopening	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ region	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ ground	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dialogical	 ﾠ justification	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
transformation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠradical	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠsacrifice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠ
judgments	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ serve	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ continuance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ overall	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
process,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠfall	 ﾠinto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐contradiction	 ﾠor	 ﾠincoherence	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠstemming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠpossesses,	 ﾠ
then,	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ consonances	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ dissonances	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ agonistic	 ﾠ
veins	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠ
valuable	 ﾠ clarification	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ form,	 ﾠ commitments,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ implications	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
democracy.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠin	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠ situated	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ conversation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
dispute	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprecise	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
how,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ constructive	 ﾠ response	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ
7.3	 ﾠReflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠwitnessed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠframework	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
applied	 ﾠin	 ﾠPart	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis,	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠby	 ﾠattending	 ﾠto	 ﾠfive	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
presence,	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠvoice,	 ﾠrecovery,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠact	 ﾠto	 ﾠ180	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trouble	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ assumptions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ expectations	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ
societies,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ continue	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ostensibly	 ﾠ align	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ
respects.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠabnormalisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
contexts.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠabnormalisation	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderline,	 ﾠcharacterised	 ﾠby	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
approximation	 ﾠof	 ﾠequality	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ‘meta-ﾭ‐disputants’	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠvisualisable	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ composed	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ ‘empty	 ﾠ centre’	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ none	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ disproportionate	 ﾠ influence.	 ﾠ
Rather,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠare	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠmarginalised	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuppressed,	 ﾠ
drowned	 ﾠout	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠrepetitive	 ﾠsound	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠexclusionary	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠshape,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccompanies	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠunflinching	 ﾠimposition	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ centre	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discourse,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ under-ﾭ‐appreciated	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ
unrealised	 ﾠ–	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ
Precisely	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠservice,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠways	 ﾠmight	 ﾠit	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada? 
There	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ engaged	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ answering	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
questions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠlet	 ﾠme	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠby	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ compelling	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ contribution	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠ promises	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ why,	 ﾠ therefore,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ represents	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ attractive	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
worthwhile	 ﾠproject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠholds	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
domination	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠarchitecture	 ﾠof	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠto	 ﾠprescribe	 ﾠor	 ﾠembody	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠheld	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠso	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Of	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠcounterintuitive	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
herald	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠelsewhere)	 ﾠto	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ fashioning	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ recommendations	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
achievement	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘just’	 ﾠendpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠlegal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrelationships,	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠinjuries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠencountered	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ promised	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ imagined)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ minimised	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ eliminated	 ﾠ
entirely.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠmany	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ181	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commentators,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ apparent	 ﾠ failure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ body	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
substantive	 ﾠ prescriptions	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ end	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ like	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ troubling	 ﾠ
weakness	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strength	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ signalling	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ inability	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ guidance	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
resolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontend,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠmisunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
democracy	 ﾠis	 ﾠoriented,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠholds	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠrefusing	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘just’	 ﾠfuture.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Most	 ﾠ directly,	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ exploration	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ
indicated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdisparities	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠLaden	 ﾠ(2001;	 ﾠ2007;	 ﾠ2012)	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
(e.g.	 ﾠ MacKinnon	 ﾠ 1989)	 ﾠ refer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ ‘constructive	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ power’	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ understood	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠidentity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠactors	 ﾠcome,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprocesses,	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
marks	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ pressing	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ otherwise	 ﾠ neglected	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ lacking	 ﾠ
constructive	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
sphere,	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠon	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠdictated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoorly	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
actors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠpertain	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ insight	 ﾠ into)	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ exclusion	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ authorship	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠgrammars,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcompose	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ injustice.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ doing	 ﾠ so,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ highlight	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ existence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
relevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠplane	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠunderpinning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠ
wherein	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ constructing	 ﾠ ideas	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ substantively	 ﾠ ‘just’	 ﾠ
futures	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠinquiry	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ conventionally	 ﾠ stretch.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ undercurrent	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠto	 ﾠproblematise	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ideational	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠcontours	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠare	 ﾠformed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exclusions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ injuries	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ lie	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ Accordingly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ hope	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccompany	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisturbance	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
obtain	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ authorship	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ parameters	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ182	 ﾠ
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justice\injustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠvisions	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠfutures	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ reflect	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ needs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ
peoples	 ﾠas	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlight,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠseems	 ﾠa	 ﾠfine	 ﾠthing	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠa	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠ
disputants	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠare	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠbecoming)	 ﾠmarginalised	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
piece	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠa	 ﾠmosaic	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsupposedly	 ﾠfully	 ﾠjust	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠarrangement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠescape	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠjourney	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ imagined	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ (supposing	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ possible)	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ realised	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ engagement	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ threats	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
exclusion	 ﾠalways	 ﾠlurk.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠescape	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘imagining’	 ﾠ has,	 ﾠ itself,	 ﾠ inherently	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ components,	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreative	 ﾠprovenance	 ﾠ(relating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠraw	 ﾠideational	 ﾠresources	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
thinking,	 ﾠimaginative	 ﾠbeings)	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarchitecture	 ﾠof	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠ(relating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforces	 ﾠ
behind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠeffect).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠRaymond	 ﾠGeuss	 ﾠputs	 ﾠ
it:	 ﾠ
My	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ“open”	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ“ungrounded.”	 ﾠI	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconclusive	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠneither	 ﾠfully	 ﾠexplicable	 ﾠnor	 ﾠfully	 ﾠ“justifiable”	 ﾠby	 ﾠmy	 ﾠantecedent	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
desires	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnor	 ﾠare	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠfully	 ﾠunder	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmercy	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠand	 ﾠevents	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠ
control.	 ﾠ
(2010,	 ﾠp.ix)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ imagining	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sense,	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ interlaced	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ threads	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
politicality,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ tug	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ threads	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
interrogate	 ﾠthem	 ﾠon	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmeaningfully	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠ supposedly	 ﾠ ‘just’	 ﾠ picture	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ capturing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ
intensely	 ﾠuncertain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcounts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠand	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠneed	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠand	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheory,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ testing	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ transforming	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠimmanent	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ lie	 ﾠ behind	 ﾠ every	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ‘picture-ﾭ‐making’	 ﾠ pertaining	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ contexts.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ183	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emphasis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠfall	 ﾠon	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusionary	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
disputation	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ serve	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ leave	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ unable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠname	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠ expose	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ imbalances	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ disparities	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ constitute	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginalisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠauthorship	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthose	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠare	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodified	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaddressed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠworking	 ﾠout	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠstart	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ 
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠits	 ﾠaim.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠin	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠextending	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠdirections,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠlimit,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleave	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhands	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠlies	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠpretending	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
realise	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ offering	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
beginning	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ exclusion	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ prevent	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
bringing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠvisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
equitable	 ﾠmanner.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠremembering,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
democracy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpertains	 ﾠequally	 ﾠto	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ marginalisation	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠ struggles,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ similarly	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ hegemonic	 ﾠ
normality	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠexposed.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdictating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
resolution	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
improve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠand	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ place.	 ﾠ Its	 ﾠ focus,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ democratising	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ ending	 ﾠ it:	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ authorship	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ property,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
project,	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠactors	 ﾠinhabiting	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠdemocratising	 ﾠservice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgives	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠinto	 ﾠits	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
established,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemocratising	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠextends	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
brings	 ﾠall,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠexception,	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
view,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ life	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ ordering	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ184	 ﾠ
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contexts	 ﾠ(or,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthem)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠimmune	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠinto	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠ dialogue	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ criticism	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ principle,	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ rejected	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ transformed,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
affirmed	 ﾠanew,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexploration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ radical	 ﾠ vulnerability	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ justificatory	 ﾠ demands	 ﾠ serves	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ preliminary	 ﾠ
openness	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhas	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmarkedly	 ﾠabsent.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠit	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirected,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ realise	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ discontent	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
conventionally	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠor	 ﾠobscured	 ﾠwithin,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠweightless	 ﾠ
compulsion	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ dialogical	 ﾠ justification;	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ navigating	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠholds	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
regard,	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘meta-ﾭ‐grammar’	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠfacilitating	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ provisional	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ abnormality	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ discourses	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ views	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice\injustice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠthat	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
perform	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ function.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ articulating	 ﾠ divergent	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠregister	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠon	 ﾠand	 ﾠexposes	 ﾠan	 ﾠelement	 ﾠof	 ﾠaffinity	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠ–	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠas	 ﾠeach	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠimbalance	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠkind	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠ–	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠpositions.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠall	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ greeted	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ presumption	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ intelligibility,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ second,	 ﾠ trigger	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
preliminary	 ﾠ stages	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justificatory	 ﾠ dialogue.	 ﾠ Through	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ initial	 ﾠ
processes,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠno	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
disparity	 ﾠlies	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠan	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠsome	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠremedial	 ﾠaction	 ﾠmight	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠor	 ﾠdesirable);	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠ
mutual	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠor	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
concerned	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠ(ii.a)	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
it,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠneither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
relate	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠconcerted	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠ185	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠfurther,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠand	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
replete	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠprocesses. 
It	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderlined	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠ‘mutual	 ﾠjustification’	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmere	 ﾠ‘mutual	 ﾠreason-ﾭ‐giving’.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠdeliberative	 ﾠ
democrats	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠGutmann	 ﾠand	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠ(2002;	 ﾠ2004),	 ﾠMansbridge	 ﾠ(2009;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
Mansbridge	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠkeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ dialogue,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ compelling	 ﾠ acceptance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reason	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
drastically	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
occur	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠneed,	 ﾠfear,	 ﾠobligation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠignorance	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠfree	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠunder	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠfull	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠand	 ﾠequality.	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmean	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠnormatively	 ﾠricher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmere	 ﾠ
reason,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ perhaps,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Mansbridge	 ﾠ (2009,	 ﾠ p.2n)	 ﾠ suggests,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ stands	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
“antonym	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠpower”	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
agreement.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ regard,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy,	 ﾠ mutual	 ﾠ justification	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ
open-ﾭ‐ended	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠturned	 ﾠback	 ﾠin	 ﾠon	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdialogically	 ﾠinterrogate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠforces	 ﾠlying	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠany	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmove	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠholds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
bodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠand	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
establishes	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠcommunicative	 ﾠbridge	 ﾠacross	 ﾠan	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice\injustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠbridge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsolid	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhold	 ﾠany	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠallegiance	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠ
participatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠdisputants	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠurgency	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provoke	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ responses	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠit,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠscope	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Importantly,	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcommunicative	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠneeding	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsupplant	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠlanguages	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠ
parity	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusive	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
domains	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠits	 ﾠcommunicative	 ﾠpurpose.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
motivations	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠ can	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
pragmatic	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ strategic	 ﾠ needs,	 ﾠ wherein	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ186	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
communicating	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠmark	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠcapturing	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠviews	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ
held	 ﾠby	 ﾠactors	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠit.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠ
sense,	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠopen	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommunicative	 ﾠbridge	 ﾠby	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠignored	 ﾠor	 ﾠdismissed	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscourse,	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠ functions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provoke	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ expand	 ﾠ discussions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ necessarily	 ﾠ
dictate	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠor	 ﾠexhaustively	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠspaces.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠchapter,	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠcan	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ carry	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ inherent	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐problematising	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisturb	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
occupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠcontinually	 ﾠ
bringing	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominance	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠ
traditions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcommunicative	 ﾠbridge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠ structurally	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ transformation	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ weight	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ traffic	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠresists	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdescending	 ﾠinto	 ﾠassimilatory	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ which	 ﾠis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠimmense	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthreats	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommunicate	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
injustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreside	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
register	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresonates	 ﾠexpressly	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠnormal.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcentralisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠ
parity	 ﾠmight	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
framing	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠangle.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ
reservations	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ raised	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ chapter	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ
recommendations	 ﾠcentred	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘implementation’	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠglobal-ﾭ‐scale	 ﾠarbitratory	 ﾠbody	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠenvisions.	 ﾠThere,	 ﾠI	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠto	 ﾠactually	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠ‘from	 ﾠabove’,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠ paradoxically	 ﾠ presuppose	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
created	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠupon	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠideational	 ﾠand	 ﾠethical	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠarising	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ frames,	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
acutely	 ﾠ concentrated.	 ﾠ But,	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ frames	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠ basically	 ﾠ accepting	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potentiality	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
arbitrary	 ﾠand	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠcomposition,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠbody	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjudicate	 ﾠover	 ﾠframing	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠactually	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠtransformations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠever	 ﾠemerge.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ187	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
prior	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠ–	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmove	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubmit	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠadjudicating	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠmisframing	 ﾠseems	 ﾠimplausible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Obviously,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframing	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ predominantly	 ﾠ according	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ within)	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
boundaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSettler	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠrole	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ play	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ articulating	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ
connected	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠimplications.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠcouched	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠand	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠsense)	 ﾠas	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠframe	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelation,	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
lies	 ﾠ predominantly	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ society	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ discontents	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠraise	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘who’	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcommunicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ
again,	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠurgency	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresonates	 ﾠacross	 ﾠan	 ﾠabnormality	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠpositions.	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ say,	 ﾠ as,	 ﾠ now,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participatory	 ﾠ parity	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
construction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ frames,	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ relating	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ ‘disparity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ framing	 ﾠ power’	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
similarly	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsketched	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ move	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ compels	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframe	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠguided	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
‘preset’	 ﾠor	 ﾠalready	 ﾠinternalised	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠcontingency	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontestability	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠframing	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠinstead,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
intelligibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠextended	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisparity	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipation,	 ﾠ
whatever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdisparity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmove	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠout	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠis	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentrality	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠrealisation	 ﾠor	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠare	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠor	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠ
unjust.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠand	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠof	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠframing	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
contested	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ this,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ realisation	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ
eventually	 ﾠdawn	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠparties	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
participants	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠa	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠwith	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘higher’	 ﾠor	 ﾠ‘external’	 ﾠ
adjudicating	 ﾠbody	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠjustification.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠto	 ﾠkickstart	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠbody	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFraser	 ﾠhas	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠof	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal,	 ﾠif	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠ distant,	 ﾠ possibility.	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ least,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ emerges	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ prominent	 ﾠ
collective	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠframe	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
justificatory	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠless	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠto	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframing	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠplausibly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠopen	 ﾠup	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
presumptive	 ﾠ primacy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ subdued	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ mitigated	 ﾠ against,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
engagements	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠon	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ
Of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ eventualities	 ﾠ are,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ reckoning,	 ﾠ neither	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ easy	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ assured	 ﾠ
outcome.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcentralising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
participatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠconnecting	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ possesses	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ structural	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
viable	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠprogressing	 ﾠan	 ﾠarray	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ
too	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠor	 ﾠoverlooked.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideal	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠnor,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠneed	 ﾠit	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ directed.	 ﾠ Rather,	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ gives	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ option	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
conducting	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐disputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠways,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠ imbalances	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ constitute	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ field	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice\injustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠand	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠan	 ﾠoften	 ﾠhostile	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠstruggles.	 ﾠ
Just	 ﾠas	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexploration	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠdisputes,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy’s	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠto	 ﾠsacrifice,	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
importance	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealities	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ contemporary	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada.	 ﾠ Presently,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠare	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠinequalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
pathologies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbring	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠphysical,	 ﾠpsychological,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspiritual	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany.	 ﾠ
Whilst	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠare	 ﾠintimately	 ﾠentwined	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ(even	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
fully	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem),	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠneither	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtackled	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠby	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
repositories	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠresources	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠ
nor	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ addressing	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ ‘put	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ hold’	 ﾠ until	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
progressed	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠdegree.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstability	 ﾠand	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
meaningfully	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠremains	 ﾠintensely	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontested,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠ189	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
monopolises	 ﾠcannot,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjeopardised	 ﾠin	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐
order	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ history	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠsphere,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthat	 ﾠremain	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
symbolically	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ practically.	 ﾠ Current	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ pertaining	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ land,	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
government,	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠrecognitions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠstatuses	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠrights	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada),	 ﾠhave	 ﾠeach	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠhard	 ﾠwon	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperseverance	 ﾠand	 ﾠingenuity	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠstand	 ﾠas	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecuring	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠacute	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas,	 ﾠ
arguably,	 ﾠ offering	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ expressions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
consequences.	 ﾠ Nevertheless,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ cases,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ rights	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ secured	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠdoubt,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠambivalence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠbecause,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠcentrality	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠand	 ﾠintolerable	 ﾠ
domination,	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠvital	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmitigating	 ﾠand	 ﾠagitating	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ condition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domination,	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ ways.	 ﾠ
Accordingly,	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ move	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recklessly	 ﾠ jeopardise	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrights	 ﾠare	 ﾠsecured	 ﾠand	 ﾠenforced	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠprofessing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
name	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ threatens	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ negative,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ disastrous,	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ despite	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ emancipatory	 ﾠ
objectives.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠexpressly	 ﾠprotects	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
radical	 ﾠexcavation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠstable	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpower	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠopens	 ﾠup	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcentre	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠ
interrogation.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠstability	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcentre,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠrendering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ‘ownership’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ expression	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ deployment	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ justificatory	 ﾠ demands	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ
accordingly,	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠtransformation.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠretention	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ never	 ﾠ lost,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ actually	 ﾠ translate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ outcomes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ justificatory	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ real-ﾭ‐world	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ social,	 ﾠ political,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ ordering.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ democracy,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ deployable	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐identical	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
reinforcing	 ﾠways	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠhopelessly	 ﾠlocked	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠcircular	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐190	 ﾠ
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repetition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠinstead,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdeployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodify	 ﾠor	 ﾠreconfigure	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
original	 ﾠform,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠaround	 ﾠit.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠholds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐dispute	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠto	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠor	 ﾠundue	 ﾠweakening	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
protections	 ﾠand	 ﾠresources	 ﾠalready	 ﾠpossessed	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠthreaten	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠvacuum	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠand	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠ
instances	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ trauma.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ offers,	 ﾠ instead,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
controlled	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠ(yet	 ﾠalways	 ﾠresponsive)	 ﾠdisturbance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdisplays	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacterise	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles,	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
motion	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐injustices	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ
maintaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ–	 ﾠboth	 ﾠas	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
efficacy	 ﾠto	 ﾠtackle	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠharm	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
transform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthese	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontend,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠstands	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpromising	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ complexities	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ encountered	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
dispute.	 ﾠOffering	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠactively	 ﾠ
addressing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ deep	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ otherwise	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ inaccessible	 ﾠ imbalances	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ
pervade	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinequalities	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠ faced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ attempting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ raise	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice\injustice	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠdemocratise	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠaround)	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠopen	 ﾠup	 ﾠand	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐
dispute	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ too	 ﾠ readily	 ﾠ stifled,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ conducted	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
dialogical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ resonate	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ reveal)	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
abnormality	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠpositions.	 ﾠLeaving	 ﾠno	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworld	 ﾠimmune	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
justificatory	 ﾠprocesses,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠ
offers	 ﾠa	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuation	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreal	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
realise	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ challenging	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ profound	 ﾠ dimensions	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
comprise	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ responsiveness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠnever	 ﾠrealised	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpense	 ﾠof	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠto	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
address	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm,	 ﾠsuffering,	 ﾠand	 ﾠneed.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠzero-ﾭ‐sum	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠoff	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠstability	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstability.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestabilisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
hegemonic	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ–	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠits	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠideas,	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
takes	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ stability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ centre	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ life,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ191	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
identity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpower	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠinterrogation	 ﾠand	 ﾠredefinition.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ way,	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ stands	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ sensitively	 ﾠ realise	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tensions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
ambivalences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpervade	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ acutely	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ offers	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ generating	 ﾠ progress,	 ﾠ
simultaneously,	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ meta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ first-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ planes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice,	 ﾠ always	 ﾠ
working	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠin	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7.4	 ﾠMoving	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ remains,	 ﾠ finally,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ think	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ brought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bear	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠlandscapes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠstart	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠheld	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠon	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠgrounds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
movement	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠdemocratisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠpromising	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠanswering	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
arrangements	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ eye	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ openness	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ responsiveness	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
display	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠand,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠ‘abnormal’	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠthrust	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhope	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠdemocratising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterrain	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠaround	 ﾠjustice\injustice	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ participate	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ equitably	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ ‘within’	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ terrain	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
encountered	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ extant	 ﾠ form,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ participate	 ﾠ equitably	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
(re)constructing	 ﾠits	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠshape.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthorship	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠ
sphere	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠ conventionally	 ﾠ excluded	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ overlooked	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ generate	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠmost	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠhospitality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠextended	 ﾠto	 ﾠactors	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠraise	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠor	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠunusual	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice.	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠremain	 ﾠtied	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ‘normal’	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠand	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠhear	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠconventions,	 ﾠactors	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠperspectives	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠ ill-ﾭ‐suited	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ speaking	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ listening	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ placed	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
immediate	 ﾠdisadvantage.	 ﾠ	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Iris	 ﾠ Marion	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ (2000)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ raised	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ critique	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tendency	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ
theorists	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ deliberative	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ privilege	 ﾠ rational	 ﾠ argumentation	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcommunication.	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠtheorises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthree	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
communication	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ greeting,	 ﾠ rhetoric,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ narrative	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ overlooked	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
scorned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquest	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠstripped	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠ
ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ understood	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ (both	 ﾠ descriptively	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ normatively)	 ﾠ intrinsic	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ
communication.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ important,	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ contends,	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ participants	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠshared	 ﾠpremises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
fashion	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠconvincing	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinstances,	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠstory-ﾭ‐telling	 ﾠor	 ﾠemotional	 ﾠplea	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠvital	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
unable	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠgrammars	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommunicate	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠharms	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfeel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticularity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠocclude.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsentiment	 ﾠof	 ﾠYoung’s	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠechoed	 ﾠby	 ﾠNorval	 ﾠ(2007;	 ﾠ2009)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠ though	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ nonstandard	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ unable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ full	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ sufficient	 ﾠ
expression	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠunderstandable	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠbounds	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
expression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠ
upon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠaccessible	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwider	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdomain,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠvisible.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠNorval	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacknowledged.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠvery	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠrestate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdenial	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim”	 ﾠ
(2007,	 ﾠp.182:	 ﾠmy	 ﾠemphasis).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconsequence,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠof	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠunintelligible	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ(when	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
parameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠdiscourse),	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“re-ﾭ‐examination	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠreiteration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠposition”	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠan	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠ
(Norval	 ﾠ 2007,	 ﾠ p.182).	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ Norval:	 ﾠ “At	 ﾠ worst,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reassertion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠrearticulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
worst	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠorder	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreasserted:	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
engagement”	 ﾠ(2007,	 ﾠp.182).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ‘marking’	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠhere	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld-ﾭ‐
disclosing	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ call,	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Wittgensteinian	 ﾠ language	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
Norval	 ﾠemploys,	 ﾠan	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠdawning)	 ﾠmoment,	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐universal	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
dominant	 ﾠcontours	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠstart	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠthem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
granted	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠdestabilised.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ193	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of	 ﾠall	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠutterances,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthose	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠform	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother	 ﾠthus	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠappreciable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠopen	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠarrangement	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ normal)	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ claim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ space	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
allows	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ claims	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ whatever	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfertile	 ﾠground	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠengagements.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠ
(or	 ﾠabnormal)	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠassure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrival	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ
starting	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ direction	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ made.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ
arrangements	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠsuited	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠmust	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠto	 ﾠinitiate	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthoroughly,	 ﾠand	 ﾠequally,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhands	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠ
any)	 ﾠactors	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠplatform	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstaging	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstage.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠall	 ﾠstagings	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
precise	 ﾠform,	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovoke	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠinclination	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠin	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠ
processes.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠshort:	 ﾠif	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdialogue,	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠstart,	 ﾠdisplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠradical	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠlisten	 ﾠand	 ﾠrespond,	 ﾠequally,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcriterion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠradical	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠand	 ﾠradical	 ﾠresponsiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
claim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ provides	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ useful	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ beginning	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ
accountable	 ﾠon	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠgrounds,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠgauge	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreceptive	 ﾠto,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠ encourage,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ emergence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ sustained	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
justificatory	 ﾠdialogue,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠso,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmoreover,	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
begin	 ﾠto	 ﾠcultivate	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠreceptiveness	 ﾠin	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwanting.	 ﾠ
Where	 ﾠwe	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠundue	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠare	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠencounter	 ﾠan	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
normality	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ threatens	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ deny	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ equitable	 ﾠ
participation,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ dialogue	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ emerge	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ lessened	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
result.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠlandscapes	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠlack	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsiveness.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠas	 ﾠno	 ﾠsurprise,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
undertaken	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Part	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ thesis,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ extent	 ﾠ oriented	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ194	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showing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠare	 ﾠconventionally	 ﾠimpeded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐standard	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ claim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ entirely	 ﾠ stifled	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠhospitality,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnonstandard	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠare	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ perceptions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ discourse.	 ﾠ One	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ look	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAboriginal	 ﾠTent	 ﾠEmbassy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaging	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠa	 ﾠperformative	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ(here,	 ﾠquite	 ﾠliterally,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmbassy’s	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlawns	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Old	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanberra)	 ﾠyet	 ﾠremain	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠ
domain	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Muldoon	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Schaap	 ﾠ 2012;	 ﾠ 2013).	 ﾠ Notwithstanding	 ﾠ this,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠstand	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠ
chance	 ﾠof	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠhold	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠhospitality	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐standard	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠremains	 ﾠpoorly	 ﾠrealised	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠsome	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠsigns	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠalready	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
others	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠemerge.	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠnoteworthy	 ﾠexample	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpreside	 ﾠover	 ﾠmany	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprivileging	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ written	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ oral	 ﾠ sources	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ evidence,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ has,	 ﾠ along	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ
emphasis	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠon	 ﾠideals	 ﾠof	 ﾠformalised	 ﾠneutrality,	 ﾠimpartiality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠobjectivity,	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ visible	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ pertaining	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ cultural	 ﾠ heritage	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ
directly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠtraditions	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠor	 ﾠessential	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
organising	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠ(Manley-ﾭ‐Casimir	 ﾠ2012;	 ﾠWebber	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠalso	 ﾠBorrows	 ﾠ2002;	 ﾠ
2010;	 ﾠEades	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠAlongside	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠand	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
oral	 ﾠ traditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ peoples,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ started	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ
formerly	 ﾠvery	 ﾠrestrictive	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠofferings	 ﾠof	 ﾠnarrative	 ﾠand	 ﾠstorytelling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
proceedings	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeliberations	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
courts	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ land	 ﾠ rights,	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐government,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ matters	 ﾠ
(Corntassel	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠManley-ﾭ‐Casimir	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Whilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠoverstate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadvancements	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠwitnessed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠ
(especially	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthese	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠare	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠstill	 ﾠafforded	 ﾠonly	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
peripheral	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ subordinate	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ courts),	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ formerly	 ﾠ closed	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institutional	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠcan	 ﾠevidently	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaim-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovoke	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠprocesses,	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠminimally	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ ignored.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcommentators,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠKirsten	 ﾠManley-ﾭ‐
Casimir	 ﾠ (2012)	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ argue	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ openness	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ courts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠstorytelling	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠrole	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠprovoking	 ﾠfar	 ﾠ
wider	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠengagements	 ﾠon	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutionalised	 ﾠ‘genuine	 ﾠlistening’	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠactors.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠweight,	 ﾠManley-ﾭ‐Casimir	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠsuggests,	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
complicity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ senses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ bring	 ﾠ before	 ﾠ it,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
foreground	 ﾠthis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠand	 ﾠlistening	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠplays	 ﾠhost	 ﾠto.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
obviously	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ dissolve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ senses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ surrounding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ court’s	 ﾠ
sovereign	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠassertions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ resolve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ contradictions	 ﾠ encountered	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ attempting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pass	 ﾠ
judgement	 ﾠon	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠits	 ﾠsovereignty,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
fruitful	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreflexive)	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠto	 ﾠemerge.	 ﾠ
Recent	 ﾠ years	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ developments	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ direction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
innovative	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Australia.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Citizens’	 ﾠ
Assemblies	 ﾠon	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠreform	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠColumbia	 ﾠ(2004-ﾭ‐5)	 ﾠand	 ﾠOntario	 ﾠ(2006-ﾭ‐7),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠmark	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommunicative	 ﾠand	 ﾠparticipative	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ practice,	 ﾠ whereby	 ﾠ ordinary	 ﾠ citizens	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ exert	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ decision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ encouraged	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ of	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠ (Smith	 ﾠ
2009;	 ﾠWarren	 ﾠand	 ﾠPearse	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠin	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠinnovation	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
echoed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠreconciliation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
2001,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeliberative	 ﾠpoll	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠFishkin	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2000;	 ﾠG.	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ2005)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtitle	 ﾠ‘Australia	 ﾠDeliberates:	 ﾠReconciliation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠWhere	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠHere?’.	 ﾠForming	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠReconciliation	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠproject,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeliberative	 ﾠpoll	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠa	 ﾠphase	 ﾠwherein	 ﾠ
nearly	 ﾠ400	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠidentification	 ﾠwere	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠ
together	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠface-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐face	 ﾠon	 ﾠissues	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast,	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Indigenous-ﾭ‐Settler	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ experiment	 ﾠ produced	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
encouraging	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ attitudes	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐Indigenous	 ﾠ participants	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ discontents	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ aspirations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ participants	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ196	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especially	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ‘symbolic’	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconciliation,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
constitutional	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠformal	 ﾠapology	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ attack	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Howard-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ chapter	 ﾠ 4)	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
changed	 ﾠfavourably	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠdialogical	 ﾠengagements	 ﾠ(Jimenez	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdevelopments	 ﾠin	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠexperimentation	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠspace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactors	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexpression,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠin	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠways.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠ
points	 ﾠout,	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeither	 ﾠimpede	 ﾠor	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
listening	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ connectedness	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ individuals.	 ﾠ Insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ trends	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠ innovation	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ aim	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ opportunities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
communicative	 ﾠengagement,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠ supportive	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ dialogue.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠremain	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinfancy,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcerned,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
scope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmobilised	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠsocieties.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠ
engagement	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthen	 ﾠplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠshift	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠfutures	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sole,	 ﾠ primary,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ intended	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
considerable.	 ﾠ
Formal	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠarenas	 ﾠand	 ﾠinnovative	 ﾠparticipative-ﾭ‐communicative	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
obviously	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ exhaust	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ dialogical	 ﾠ
engagements	 ﾠon	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠwill)	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts.	 ﾠ Nor,	 ﾠ indeed,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ sites	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ engagement.	 ﾠ
Encouraging	 ﾠand	 ﾠfacilitating	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ objective.	 ﾠ Yet	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ developments	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠencouragement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ just	 ﾠ importantly,	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ viable	 ﾠ location	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ focusing	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
progressive	 ﾠ energies.	 ﾠ Endeavouring	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ hold	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ ever	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
accountable	 ﾠ according	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ criteria	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ openness	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ responsiveness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ diverse	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
claim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠof	 ﾠpushing	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠfutures	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠupon	 ﾠmomentum	 ﾠalready	 ﾠgathering	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠ
achieving	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ openness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ diverse	 ﾠ claim-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
immediate	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ assured	 ﾠ route	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ dialogue,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ offer	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ197	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terms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠengagements	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
mark	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠarrangements,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublics,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
contexts.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarking,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠas	 ﾠactors	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
accustomed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticularity	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ whom	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ engage	 ﾠ politically.	 ﾠ Members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ publics	 ﾠ might,	 ﾠ
accordingly,	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ finding	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ mutually	 ﾠ convincing	 ﾠ
justifications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsustaining	 ﾠor	 ﾠtransforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwebs	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart.	 ﾠ
7.5	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠhas	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠand	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ emerges	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ recommendations	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ abnormal	 ﾠ
justice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ‘reflexive	 ﾠdemocracy’	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠ
contestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Canada.	 ﾠThrough	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠagonistic	 ﾠveins	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsought	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠelucidate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
serve	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ positively	 ﾠ alter	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ terrain	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice\injustice	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠpasts	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠto	 ﾠsacrifice	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠharm	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ suffering.	 ﾠ By	 ﾠ offering	 ﾠ scope	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ exclusionary	 ﾠ forces	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ presently	 ﾠ
operate	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠup	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
authorship	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
argued,	 ﾠstands	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠaltering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠarchitecture	 ﾠof	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠ
struggle	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
offer	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠclaim)	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ historically)	 ﾠ felt	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors,	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ
nevertheless	 ﾠworks	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠactors	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠentering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pursue	 ﾠ struggles	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ contexts	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ
terms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfutures	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial,	 ﾠcultural,	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
ordering	 ﾠenvisioned	 ﾠby	 ﾠall	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠstart	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠ
Indigenous	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠ
stands	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠ198	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 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ leaves	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ actual	 ﾠ substantive	 ﾠ outcomes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimaginative	 ﾠengagements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactors	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Concluding	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠ
By	 ﾠany	 ﾠreckoning,	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠcentring	 ﾠon	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ colonialism	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Australia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canada	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
justice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠscenes	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠblight	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠlives	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠare,	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠunderscored	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
plethora	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠand	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ violences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonial	 ﾠ domination.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ
separate	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ domains	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ conceivably	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ addressed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
isolation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠand	 ﾠinextricably	 ﾠentwined,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeoples	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠforces	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠand	 ﾠpropagation.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
address	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ suffering	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ neglect	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
seek	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠactually	 ﾠexacerbating	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
lay	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠand	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuffering.	 ﾠEqually,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconversely,	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠtackling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
deeper	 ﾠdiscontents	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠdomination	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlose	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ needs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ communities	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ inadvertently	 ﾠ compounding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
suffering	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhope	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ
simultaneously	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomplementarily	 ﾠon	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠentangled	 ﾠdomains	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcome	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcounterpart	 ﾠregresses	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other,	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠappears	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular. 200	 ﾠ
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Taken	 ﾠtogether,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠstand	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthrow	 ﾠinto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrelief	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠin	 ﾠraising	 ﾠand	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠstruggles	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmoreover,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
responding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠways.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠguide	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
endeavour	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
‘abnormal	 ﾠjustice’	 ﾠ(2008;	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠinto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtermed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠclose	 ﾠattentiveness	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspheres	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice)	 ﾠprovides,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Developed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ put	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Part	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ thesis	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ potential,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ helped	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ clarity,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ closer	 ﾠ detail,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
intricate	 ﾠblends	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispute	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠcontain,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ difficulties	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ faced,	 ﾠ particularly,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ
struggles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠangle	 ﾠit	 ﾠprovides,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠin	 ﾠraising	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ sphere,	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ Settler	 ﾠ societies	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
frequently	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠby	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠor	 ﾠ‘normal’	 ﾠassumptive	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscursive	 ﾠframeworks	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠeither	 ﾠill-ﾭ‐equipped	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠor	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠlie	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthose	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠactively	 ﾠreinforce	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovoke	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠus	 ﾠmore	 ﾠscope	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
implications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠsphere,	 ﾠwhilst,	 ﾠcrucially,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠimbrication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
sources	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘meta-ﾭ‐order’	 ﾠdiscontent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ‘first-ﾭ‐order’	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisadvantage,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠenables	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠsophisticated	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠattuned	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
revealing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ‘abnormal’	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠand	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠactors	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ diagnostic	 ﾠ function,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ also,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ sought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
demonstrate	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Part	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thesis,	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ reconstructive	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
ought	 ﾠto	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠeach	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠrevolve	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ deeper	 ﾠ democratisation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ discursive	 ﾠ terrain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ201	 ﾠ
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disputes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealise	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefensible	 ﾠway	 ﾠforward	 ﾠin	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠby	 ﾠpermanently	 ﾠopening	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠshape,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ realm	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ demands,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ extending	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
actively	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠworking	 ﾠon	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐
order	 ﾠproblems,	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠresponsibly	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
sphere	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Across	 ﾠChapters	 ﾠ5	 ﾠand	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠI	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠthis	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠ sense	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ light	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Australian	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Canadian	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠBringing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠtheorising	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
conversation	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
raised	 ﾠby	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ(Chapter	 ﾠ5)	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠveins	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠthought	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠ(Chapter	 ﾠ6),	 ﾠI	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
moving	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmove	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ realise	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ dealing	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ relating	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
ongoing	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Foremost	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ benefits	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard,	 ﾠ I	 ﾠ argued,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
position’s	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠproclivity	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘self-ﾭ‐democratisation’.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠinsists	 ﾠupon	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipatory	 ﾠparity	 ﾠand	 ﾠopen-ﾭ‐
ended	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ mutual	 ﾠ justification	 ﾠ establishes	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ dynamic	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ wherein	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
meaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘parity’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐given	 ﾠor	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠfacts,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠremain,	 ﾠinstead,	 ﾠalways	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠalso	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ responsive	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ demands.	 ﾠ Consequently,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ
democracy	 ﾠcentres	 ﾠitself	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠstructurally	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠrearticulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠdisputes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠwe	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠstands,	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠstems	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠmonological	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠaligned	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ(and,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
are)	 ﾠimplicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠraise	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐problematising	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠclear.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠlogically	 ﾠrendering	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠform	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ kinds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justificatory	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ demands,	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ democracy	 ﾠ gives	 ﾠ
scope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublics	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterrogate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexclusionary	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransform	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠarray	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠtraditions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠ202	 ﾠ
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in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠalso	 ﾠworking	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 
Pursuing	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠ stands	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ disputants	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ justice	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ opportunity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ
productively	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠpublicise	 ﾠand	 ﾠproblematise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeta-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠinjury	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ exposed,	 ﾠ whilst	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ working	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ expose	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ address	 ﾠ
urgent	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠand	 ﾠharm.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠscope	 ﾠto	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ exclusion	 ﾠ currently	 ﾠ encountered	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Indigenous	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ bringing	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠprominence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbring	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠor	 ﾠregresses	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdomains.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Of	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverriding	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcontests	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠand	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠevaporate	 ﾠonce	 ﾠ(or,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccurately,	 ﾠif)	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
atmosphere	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠand	 ﾠargued	 ﾠfor	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠassured	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠand	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠits	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ altering	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terrain	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ disputes	 ﾠ continue	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ
(indefinitely)	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ future.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ intuition	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ guided	 ﾠ my	 ﾠ development	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
application	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ congruent	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ
intentions	 ﾠin	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠonce	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠterms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠunderstandings	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ‘just’	 ﾠ
futures	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠreal	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠovercoming	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ injustices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ historical	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ colonialism,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ resolving	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ongoing	 ﾠ
contradictions	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠrelationships,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
is,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ hope	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contributing	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
equalisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
directed.	 ﾠ 
v	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠNancy	 ﾠ
Fraser’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dispute,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ indeed,	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ attempts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ seriously	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ
‘reflexive	 ﾠperspective’	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitiating	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠherein	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠout	 ﾠand	 ﾠelucidating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Fraser’s	 ﾠ thought,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ transposing	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ format	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
suited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠenabled	 ﾠa	 ﾠ203	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠnew	 ﾠand	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintricacies	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstruct	 ﾠa	 ﾠpromising	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ responding	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ theory	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ stones	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠleft	 ﾠunturned	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomprehensively	 ﾠtrace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠback	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccurately	 ﾠsituate	 ﾠit	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
concerted	 ﾠ effort	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ help	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ clarify	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ
influences	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderpin	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠtheorising,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠenable	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
explore	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ implications	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ depth.	 ﾠ Particularly,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ me	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
considerable	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠextended	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠstrands	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠtheory.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠ conversation	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ started	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ agonistic	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
thought,	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠextent	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
radical	 ﾠdemocrats,	 ﾠdeliberative	 ﾠdemocrats,	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠworking	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠproximity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠschools	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠstudy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ contribution	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ spectrum	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠthought	 ﾠon	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ‘divided’	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠof	 ﾠattentions	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠto	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠscope	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠneed)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ further.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ depth	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ analysis	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reflexive	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ
encourages	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠ‘diagnostic’	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ laborious	 ﾠ task	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ respects,	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ seems	 ﾠ probable	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠwill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠas	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠselect	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
detailed	 ﾠcase	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠwork	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcompleted.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠveritable	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormally	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspheres	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast)	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
colonial	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠprove	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠhope	 ﾠof	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠwider	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreconstructive	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠperspective.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠenhanced	 ﾠby	 ﾠcasting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠa	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠwider,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
attempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠuncover	 ﾠand	 ﾠcatalogue	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠarising	 ﾠamongst	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
wider	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspheres,	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠcolonial-ﾭ‐204	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ injustice	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ diverse	 ﾠ body	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ experiences	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
aspirations.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠdemocratisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
realised	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠit	 ﾠholds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠactors	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠto	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠalone	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠestablished.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadd	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific,	 ﾠlocalised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠquantifiable	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠzeitdiagnose,	 ﾠand	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠadvancement	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflexive	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ sum,	 ﾠ then,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ study	 ﾠ undertaken	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ opened	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ range	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ possibilities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠFraser’s	 ﾠideas	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠclarification	 ﾠand	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠ
exploration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠprove	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein.	 ﾠWhilst	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠ
deal	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwork	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠstill	 ﾠremains	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
little	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠprepared.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
v	 ﾠ
Addressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolonialism	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhorizons	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ–	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoloniser.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠhorizons	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ process.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ say	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ progress	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ occur	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ
recognised,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ situated,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ horizons	 ﾠ amongst	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠhorizons.	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠ
contexts	 ﾠfind	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠdenied	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠserves	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠreinforce	 ﾠand	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐inflict	 ﾠ
key	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠagainst,	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarduous	 ﾠ
task	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘decolonising’	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠis	 ﾠseriously,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠcatastrophically,	 ﾠimpeded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠiteration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
moreover,	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ offering	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ beginning	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ challenge	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠ sphere	 ﾠ structured	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ insights	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ commitments	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
reflexive	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠpromises	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠIndigenous	 ﾠactors	 ﾠwith	 ﾠresources	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
confront	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusions	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
justice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ wider	 ﾠ attention,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ terrain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ dispute	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ
participants	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ(re)constructed	 ﾠon	 ﾠmore	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠterms	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ
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